University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 20202021

Secure and Trustworthy Hardware and Machine Learning Systems
for Internet of Things
Shayan Taheri
University of Central Florida

Part of the Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering
Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd2020
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2020- by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Taheri, Shayan, "Secure and Trustworthy Hardware and Machine Learning Systems for Internet of Things"
(2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2020-. 569.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd2020/569

SECURE AND TRUSTWORTHY HARDWARE AND MACHINE LEARNING SYSTEMS
FOR INTERNET OF THINGS

By

SHAYAN TAHERI
M.S. Utah State University, 2015

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the College of Engineering and Computer Science
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term
2021

Major Professor: Jiann-Shiun Yuan

© 2021 Shayan Taheri

ii

ABSTRACT
The advancements on the Internet have enabled connecting more devices into this
technology every day. This great connectivity has led to the introduction of the internet of things
(IoTs) that is a great bed for engagement of all new technologies for computing devices and
systems. Nowadays, the IoT devices and systems have applications in many sensitive areas
including military systems. These challenges target hardware and software elements of IoT devices
and systems.
Integration of hardware and software elements leads to hardware systems and software
systems in the IoT platforms, respectively. A recent trend for the hardware systems is making them
trustworthy and energy efficient. On the other hand, the trend for software systems is making them
intelligent and secure. The hardware elements are made energy efficient through implementation
of them using emerging transistor and memory technologies.
The artificial intelligence (AI) techniques can be utilized in the design and development of
software elements. In order to enhance security of the software and the hardware elements, possible
threats and countermeasures for them need to be researched and introduced into the community.
Globalization of the computing systems and making them Internet-connected introduces diverse
set of security threats and malicious activities.
These security problems bring detrimental impacts and catastrophic consequences into the
networks and systems. In this regard, we address these problems in the IoT world from both
hardware and software perspectives. In order to address the emerging security problems in the
hardware, we design and develop threats and countermeasures for two different types of Analog
to Digital Converter (ADC). This is the first attempt in introducing ADC into the security context.
Our findings show that lack of considering the security of ADCs, their performance and
functionality can be remarkably degraded due to the payloads of possible attacks. For addressing
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the ongoing software security problems, we propose: (a) the AI-based software that can help in
countering certain attacks; and (b) the techniques for protecting AI-based software against
launching attacks on them.
We found enhancing the defense systems with AI caters major improvements in detecting
malicious information and recognizing the identities. Additionally, we found protection of the AIbased software against functionality manipulative data (a.k.a. adversarial examples) is realized
through engaging multiple elements in system training and improving its classification knowledge.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In this section, an introduction to Cybersecurity and the background concepts related to the
two main parts of this dissertation that means hardware and software (specifically AI-based
computing elements) platforms. Information in Cybersecurity is considered a significant aspect of
power, diplomacy, and armed conflict for a very long time [1]. We have protection of Internetconnected systems including hardware, software, and data from attacks and threats in the
Cyberspace.
The threats and the attacks in this domain can target single actors or groups targeting
systems for financial benefits, information gathering, and electronic systems. The role of
information in international relations and security has diversified and its importance for political
matters has increased, mostly due to the proliferation of information and communication
technology into all aspects of life in post-industrialized societies.
The ability to conrol the generation, management, manipulation of information has become
a desired power resource in sensitive areas such as, military forces and financial applications [26]. We refer to Cybersecurity as studying the security aspects of systems involving communication
and computation mechanisms. It is a wide area that involves the security of many different
application and types of infrastructure.
This area can be very tricky in which intuition may often mislead as attacks often exploit
subtle vulnerabilities that our intuition fails to consider. Due to these reasons, this area is very
challenging and interesting. Designs are evaluated based on various parameters in order to make
sure that they are secure enough. We need to assess the security of designs in different adversarial
settings.
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The importance of the security in IoT becomes more serious when the network of
ubiquitous smart objects has become an integral part of modern day-to-day life enabling novel
application and services covering diverse sets of applications. All the devices in the IoT are under
the attack of threats and vulnerabilities. Security vulnerabilities in the IoT domain have raised the
number of threats and attacks that can potentially compromise critical infrastructure and national
security.
Using the techniques in this domain, we can protect computers, networks, programs, and
data from unauthorized access or possible attacks. It should be mentioned that the traditional
approaches are not effective anymore and the usage of them can lead to undefended and
unprotected systems against less dangerous risks [7-10]. The attacks are designed with the purpose
of accessing, changing, or destroying sensitive information as well as interrupting the executive
processes.
The attacks can lead to different types of payloads from identity theft, extortion attempts,
and loss of important data [11-18]. The attacks and the crimes of this domain are introduced in
various forms, resulting in loss of services, loss of control over services, stolen personal
information, fraud and identity theft, and receiving a high volume of spam messages. The attacks
are carried out by computer viruses, denial of service, phishing, and hacking. Emerging
technologies including cloud, big data, mobile, IoT, and artificial intelligence may cause further
spread of virus and more challenges for security and data protection.
The traditional defense methods are not effective in confronting many of the emerging
threats especially due to their mixture with ongoing technologies. In accordance to what has been
discussed, this dissertation focuses on two major parts including, hardware security and software
(more specifically AI) security. One project related to hardware security and three projects related
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to AI security are explained. The rest of this section is dedicated to provision of introductory
material for hardware security and artificial intelligence security.
1.1. Hardware Security
We define hardware as a collection of physical elements that constitutes a computer
system. Hardware is used by everyone even if they are not aware of it. Hardware in this context
can be defined as Computer Hardware and Mobile Hardware. For the category of computer
hardware, we have processors, firmware, and memory that can be the target of possible attacks
and defenses. For the category of mobile hardware, the simcard, radio frequency identification
(RFID) tags, chip, and pin are included.
The other hardware for security purposes are physically unclonable functions that have a
unique fingerprint. This hardware uses challenge and response for its operations. The attacks in the
hardware domain have physical nature that are accomplished with hardware or software tools
depending on the stage of integrated circuit (IC) supply chain. It is highly important to protect and
secure the hardware elements especially for the IoT devices and systems.
The security of IoT device and systems need to be given a high priority while developing,
configuring, and updating the devices to ensure the optimal performance throughout their lifetime.
Protecting these devices against the attacks can be helpful in achieving a high level of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability with authorized access to the users. The IoT security is a work in progress
and proliferation of these devices at an alarming rate leading to challenging circumstances to secure
them.
The IoT devices are attractive targets for adversaries due to their easy accessibility,
vulnerabilities, and the quality of data they hold. We need to protect the devices from Cyberattacks
with a high level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability with authorized access to the users. Other
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threats in this domain are the untrusted entities in the foundries [19-24]. The security of hardware is a
critical aspect of all the hardware elements nowadays.
One of the main attacks in the hardware domain is Hardware Trojan Horses (HTHs) that can
impose a significant threat [25-29]. The hardware Trojans are malicious modifications into the original
ICs and are inserted into the design with different payloads, including malfunction, information
leakage, performance degradation with causing minimal footprint. Common defense for the HTH is
prevention and detection of this attack. The countermeasures for HTH attack can be implemented at
software- and hardware-level.
The Trojans can have catastrophic impacts for different domains including, industry, military,
and many other domains. Incorporating an infected hardware element into a critical application makes
its malicious impact and catastrophic consequences even more serious. The threat of a hardware Trojan
can even be more serious when all the devices are connected to the Internet. Possible defense models
for the HTHs can be stated as hardware online and offline monitoring, functionality correction, and
malicious behavior detection.
Any proposing threat for hardware Trojan need to have a minimal impact on the energy and
any countermeasure needs to satisfy the energy requirements of the device. We focus on design and
development of new HTHs in our hardware security study. Many attack and defense models have been
proposed for hardware design based on the traditional transistor and memory technologies. These
models may not be effective for design of hardware using emerging transistor and memory
technologies.
Therefore, they need to be adapted or new models need to be proposed. With respect to this
assumption, new attacks and defenses need to be designed. Due to the Internet connectivity of the IoT
devices, the threats for the hardware platforms become more serious since an infection from hardware
can be propagated throughout the network. The security of hardware is essential for ensuring the
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authentic and the valid deployment of these devices throughout their lifetime, especially for the devices
that are not updated more regularly.
From the other side, malicious insertion and modifications of the design can be performed
during chip design and they will be able to alter the data processing and communication. Having a
malicious hardware element leads to wrong operation of the whole computer system and it is often
treated as an abstract layer that runs instructions passed from the software layer. The ICs supply chain
need to be protected with high barriers that attackers could not easily compromise the chips.
Insertion of hardware attacks, especially hardware Trojans cause change of logic or
introduction of flaws that can be exploited by attackers after the IP cores. Studying the impact of
hardware Trojans on different analog, mixed-signal, and digital platforms is highly important.
Relatedly, we work on the security of two different types of ADCs namely successive approximation
register and delta sigma ADCs. Specific hardware Trojans and corresponding defense mechanisms for
these hardware elements are developed accordingly.

1.2. Artificial Intelligence Security
AI is a field of technology with rapid progress and great importance for national security.
This field has received significant attention from different agencies including the U.S. Department
of Defense. AI has already been engaged in different military operations and many applications
have been developed in this regard. Within this context, AI system is defined as a centralized
system of intelligence in an application, aiming at helping organizations make the leap to becoming
AI-driven companies.
The system integrates seamlessly into all enterprise systems, whilst getting smarter over
time that leads to deploying AI across the whole business without needing to rip and relace legacy.
In almost all AI systems, machine learning-based operations are utilized that look for patterns in
the training data in order to make predictions for new cases. AI security is defined as studying the
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security aspects of AI that is underway in the fields of secret data collection and analysis [30-38],
logistics, cyber operations, information operations, command, control [39-41], and in a variety of
semiautonomous and autonomous vehicles [42-48].
Within this terminology, different technologies (refer to as AI technologies) are used in
design and development of AI systems. These systems are designed for detecting and classifiying
normal and abnormal data. The AI technologies present unique challenges for military challenges,
especially when bulk of systems are developed in the commercial sector. The AI technologies can
be used in the defensive application, while there is a possibility of attacking it as well.
Attacking an AI system can be done using Trojans or fooling samples. Engaging AI
technologies with IoT applications bring many opportunities for advancing the connectivity and
the functionality. However, these advancements come at the expense of more challenges and
security issues. Employing AI into the security context can be engaged with detection of different
types of data from multiple sources. These sources can be semiconductor industry, computer
network, biometric data, and so forth.
On the other hand, the AI systems can be fooled by certain types of malicious data called
adversarial examples. Related to the AI security, both areas of improving the AI systems and
fooling the AI systems are explored in this dissertation. With respect to the projects for
strengthening the AI systems, the computer network data and the biometric data are incorporated
in our work. Regarding the study based on fooling the AI system, a new architecture is proposed
that has multiple elements in order to make the victim neural network robust against adversarial
examples.
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CHAPTER 2: SECURITY OF ANALOG TO DIGITAL
CONVERTER1
2.1. Introduction
We study the emerging threats and countermeasures for two different types of analog and
mixed-signal integrated circuits in this chapter. Many of the elements and infrastructures within
the military and telecommunications applications that include analog and mixed-signal circuits
and systems are subject to be attacked by different threats including Trojans attack, reverse
engineering, and counterfeiting [49-52].
Many studies have been accomplished in the field of hardware security in understanding
the security threats as well as developing possible respective solutions mainly in the digital domain
[25, 27, 53-56]. The areas of exploring design, detection, and defense for Trojans for the analog
and mixed-signal circuits are relatively unexplored. Recently, it has been started to explore the
threats and the countermeasures in the analog and the mixed-signal domains [27, 55, 57-60].
However, there are still many concerns in this domain that need to be addressed including
stealing sensitive information or functionality alterations through hardware Trojans embedded in
analog, mixed-signal, and radio-frequency integrated circuits, having multiple quiblibrium states
in these circuits leading to possible undesired (potentially malicious) state, having analog/mixedsignal based trigger mechanism for hardware Trojans, counterfeting, and reverse engineering [61].
The analog and the mixed-signal circuits have become an appealing target for attackers due
to a number of reasons widespread utilization of analog functionality (i.e., physical interfaces,

sensors, actuators, wireless communications, and so forth) in current computing systems,

1

The material from this chapter were published in: (a) Taheri, S., Lin, J. and Yuan, J.S., 2017. Security interrogation
and defense for SAR analog to digital converter. Electronics, 6(2), p.48; and (b) Taheri, S. and Yuan, J.S., 2017.
Mixed-Signal Hardware Security: Attacks and Countermeasures for ΔΣ ADC. Electronics, 6(3), p.60.
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communication and transmission of data bwtween the analog and mixed-signal with the digital
parts of the computing systems for process of information, communication of sensitive
information, and being vulnerable to reverse-engineering and counterfeiting is another aspect of
these circuits that make them good candidates for attacking [55].
This is due to the widespread usage of analog and mixed-signal functionalities (i.e.
conversion of analog to digital signals and vice versa). The executing elements of these functions
are physical interfaces, sensors, actuators, wireless communications, and converters. The hardware
Trojans for these areas can target the digital, the analog, and the mixed-signal elements of the
design for performing different types of malicious activities.
The analog and mixed-signal integrated circuits are the weakest link in warranting the
global security policy for the entire electronic system. The threats do belong to multiple categories
including confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. The attack can be implemented and inserted
in various phases of the design supply chain. The related countermeasure may also be inserted in
these phases for tackling similar attacks.
The behavior of these threats and how they damage the system are not clear yet. Other
possible security concerns in these areas, whether a digital element can damage an analog/mixedsignal element in the system and vice versa. Therefore, there are many parts in these areas that are
required to be researched. Doing research and addressing the challenges in these areas is
significantly important especially for the designs employed in sensitive secotors, including
defense, infrastructure, health, automotive, space, and telecommunication applications.
The selected types of mixed-signal circuits for security study in this work are successive
approximation register (SAR) and delta-sigma (DS) analog to digital converters. The contributions
presented in this section can be stated as:
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1) Studying a low power six-bit SAR ADC from the security perspective.
2) Proposing a threat and a countermeasure for the SAR ADC datapath.
3) Proposing a threat and a countermeasure for the SAR ADC control unit.
4) Illustrating the SAR ADC operation flows under the proposed threats and
countermeasures.
5) Analysis of the SAR ADC functionality and performance under the the proposed threats
and countermeasures.
6) Studying a first-order one-bit DS ADC from the security perspective.
7) Proposing four mixed-signal threat models for the DS ADC.
8) Proposing a central intelligence unit (CIU) mechanism for security checking and
defending the DS ADC.
9) Analysis of the DS ADC functionality under the proposed threats and countermeasure.
These contributions are presented in the following sections.
2.2. Threat Models and Countermeasures for a Successive Approximation Register ADC
Most of the emitting signals from different physical objects in this world have analog
nature, such as voltage, current, pressure, and temperature. In order to employ these signals in diverse
computing applications, they should be transformed into the digital domain for facilitation of their
processing, transmission, and storage. The process of converting an analog signal to binary data
(which is a number of codes or a series of ones and zeros) is called quantization, and the electronic
device that executes this function is called analog to digital conversion.
The number of ADC output bits (or the ADC resolution) determines the number of
quantization levels that can partition a voltage range. The reconstructed analog signal from the
ADC output bits should be functionally and behaviorally close enough to the analog input signal.
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Functional closeness means mapping from the analog input signal to the digital output without
introduction of significant quantization errors.
In addition, the quantization levels should be precisely equally spaced. The behavior of
the reconstructed analog signal is close to the original input signal when there is no or a small
presence of performance errors and uncertainties (such as nonlinearity errors) in the converter
operation. Otherwise, processing either the digital data or the reconstructed analog signal causes
system abnormality. Evaluating the functional and behavioral closeness is done by checking the
outputs bits and calculating the quantization error as well as performance parameters (for example,
the effective number of bits).
An ADC can be infected by insertion of an Hardware Trojan (HT) inside the chip, with the
payload of causing an intentional error during the ADC operation. The possible errors in an ADC
operation are:
a) Quantization, which is limitation on the signal-to-noise ratio caused by the converter finite
resolution that leads to wrong output codes.
b) Offset, which is the deviation between the first actual transition and the first ideal
transition.
c) Gain, which is the deviation between the last actual transition and the last ideal transition.
d) Differential nonlinearity, which is the maximum deviation between the actual steps and the
ideal steps.
e) Integral nonlinearity, which is the maximum deviation between any actual transition and
the endpoint correlation line.
f) Missing code, upon which the ADC does not produce one of its quantization levels for
any applied analog input signal [62, 63].
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The missing code error is a fit candidate for a Hardware Trojan payload due to its
detrimental effects in sensitive and critical applications such as medical devices and military
systems, which is why we choose it in this work. Meanwhile, bit monitoring is a common testing
method for missing code error to make sure that the output bits have the expected transition and
there is no stuck-at-fault.
Now, we study the security of an ultra-low power six-bit successive approximation register
analog-to-digital converter [64], implemented using tunnel field effect transistor technology. This
ADC is power-efficient and suitable for the Internet of things applications due to its low power
consumption, small design overheads, and implementation transistor technology. The top-level
architecture of this ADC along with its built-in-self-test (BIST)-based input mechanism is shown
in Figure 2.1.
This architecture consists of seven main components: (1) external fully-differential analog
input signal; (2) BIST signal generator; (3) analog inverter; (4) analog multiplexer; (5)
sample/hold/compare (SHC); (6) register file; and (7) control unit. External fully-differential
analog input signal (VIN−n and VIN−p) is the coming signal from the outside world. It can be acquired
using a sensor through measuring a physical quantity of an object in differential mode.
VIN−n and VIN−p are the negative and the positive single-ended analog input signals,
respectively. BIST signal generator is responsible for producing a standard test signal with a certain
waveform (such as ramp, sinusoidal, sawtooth, and triangular), frequency (or period), and
amplitude internally. The produced test signal is single-ended, and its combination with the analog
inverter output creates a fully-differential test signal to be sent to the analog multiplexer. Analog
inverter is an analog IP for inverting the sign of the single-ended test signal in order to provide a
fully-differential analog test signal to the next component.
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Figure 2.1. The top-level architecture of an ultra-low power six-bit successive approximation
register analog-to-digital converter with a built-in-self-test (BIST)-based input mechanism.
Analog multiplexer makes a decision on sending either the external fully-differential analog
input signal or the fully-differential analog test signal to the SHC block, depending on the status
of the “Test Mode” signal. For example, if the Test Mode signal is equal to logic one, then the fullydifferential analog test signal is sent to the SHC component. This is beneficial for situations in
which the external input signal is not standard and test-friendly, while the ADC needs to be tested
and security checked.
In addition, the status of the Test Mode signal can be determined either externally by user or
internally through predefined conditions. The testing and security checking process can occur
during the IC run-time operation when either the ADC is idle or it is active and the external
analog input signal has a suitable waveform (such as sine) for testing. Vs−n and Vs−p are the exiting
signals from the analog multiplexer, which are the negative and the positive single-ended analog signals
under process, respectively.
Sample/hold/compare is an analog component for sampling, holding, and comparing the
entering fully-differential signal into it. The circuit for this block is shown in Figure 2.2.
According to the circuit, there is a dedicated clock signal (CLKS/H) for the sampling-related
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switches. At the beginning of each sampling, the state of approximation-related switches is
restarted according to which the upper and the lower capacitor arrays are connected to VCM
entirely.
The state of these switches is updated/controlled by the coming signals from the SAR
control unit. The input signals to the control unit are CLKOUT(i) (which is the clock signal for the
flip-flop of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ ADC output bit) and VOUT(i) (which is the voltage signal of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ ADC output
bit). VSW−VDD(i), VSW−CM(i) and VSW−GND(i) are the control signals for connection of the
approximation-related switches to the supply voltage, common-mode voltage, and ground,
respectively.

Figure 2.2. The sample/hold/compare block circuit.
VComp is the entering data signal to the register file for construction of the ADC output
bits. VDD, VCM and GND are the supply voltage, common-mode voltage, and ground,
respectively. VCM is set equal to VDD/2. The comparator is actuated by the “Comparator Enable”
signal. Register file is a digital IP for storing a six-bit code in D flip-flops. Each flip-flop is
triggered by a proprietary clock signal.
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Control unit is a digital IP for generating the control signals for the approximation-related
switches in the SHC block. The circuit for this block is shown in Figure 2.3. In this circuit, CLKOUT(i)
is the clock signal for the flip-flop of the ith ADC output bit, VOUT(i) is the voltage signal of the
ith ADC output bit, and VSW−VDD(i), VSW−CM(i) and VSW−GND(i) are the control signals for connection
of the approximation-related switches to the supply voltage, common-mode voltage, and ground,
respectively.
The delay blocks are used to provide sufficient time for readiness of the sampled signal
before applying the control signal to the switches. All of the required clock signals for different
parts of the ADC circuit are generated by a clock generator block that is triggered by the system clock
signal (CLK). The operation flow of the original ADC circuit is presented in Figure 2.4. V+ and V−
are the positive and negative terminals of the comparator, respectively.
VSampled and VSampled are the s−p and s−n positive and negative sampled versions of the
analog input signal, respectively. According to the flowchart, a fully-differential analog input
signal is sampled. The difference between the sampled signals and the common-mode voltage are
applied to the comparator. If the comparator output is equal to supply voltage, then logic one is
stored in the relevant flip-flop (inside the register file) and the relevant capacitors in the upper and
the lower capacitor arrays are connected to ground and supply voltage, respectively, and vice versa.
The process is completed by calculation of all the ADC output bits. The seventh bit is used
for error checking. In order to satisfy the timing requirements of different components of an ADC
circuit, multiple clock/trigger signals are needed that are provided by a clock generator.
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Figure 2.3. The control unit block circuit.

Figure 2.4. The operation flow of the original analog to digital converter circuit.
Figure 2.5 displays the timing diagram of the discussed ADC circuit according to which:
(1) “Reset” signal brings the memory elements to their initial states; (2) “CLK” is the system
clock signal; (3) “CLKS/H” is the sampling clock signal and triggers the switches; (4) “Comparator
Enable” signal is for actuating the comparator; and (5) “CLKOUT(i)” is the clock signal for the
flip-flop of the ith ADC output bit.
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Figure 2.5. The timing diagram of the ADC operation.
A central processing unit can be attacked by subverting the functionality of its data-path
and/or control unit through HT insertion [65, 66]. This strategy can be utilized to attack an ADC
as well. Thus, an adversary attacks both the data-path and the control unit of the ADC by infecting
(or inserting a Hardware Trojan inside) the register file digital IP and the sample/hold/compare analog
IP, respectively. The purpose of attack is cause the ADC malfunction “occasinally”.
It is emphasized here that our designed function-targeting Hardware Trojans are not
detected during the testing and verification phase since the “Mate Trigger” for the “Main Trigger” of
each Hardware Trojan is generated by other parts of the SoC during the “chip run-time operation”.
In other words, the mate trigger and the main trigger for each Trojan go to an AND function before
being applied to the Trojan payload circuit. In this scenario, a function-targeting Hardware Trojan
is never detected during the testing phase since there is no knowledge about the application that is
going to be run on the chip.
There is less controllability and observability on the Trojan circuit as well. With these
features, the Trojans behave more sneakily. A countermeasure is proposed for each case. With
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respect to implementing each of the proposed Hardware Trojans, its number of logical cells may
be reasonable compared to the total number of logical cells used in a system on chip. In addition,
an malicious person inside the design team or the foundry [50] might be able to employ the idle
logical cells from other regions of the SoC to construct the Trojan circuit. The same concept can be
applied for defense circuit implementation.
2.2.1. Datapath-Based Threat and Countermeasure
The plotted datapath-based threat is described as manipulation of the exiting digital signals
from the register file. There are six D flip-flops inside the register file and the output of any of
them can be maliciously changed sometimes. The Trojan trigger circuit is designed based on
making its activation behavior “randomly” and “more sneaky”. Therefore, among the output
signals of the six D flip-flops, two pair signals are selected randomly as inputs to the Trojan circuit,
shown in Figure 2.6.
According to the circuit, the two-bit shuffling unit changes the flow path of its input signals
depending on the value of Select signal. This signal is generated by a frequency divider that is
controlled by the sampling clock signal (CLKS/H) and the last value of the Trojan enable signal
(Trojan_En). The Trojan enabled signal is the governing signal for a multiplexer that outputs the
inversion of the stored data in one of the output six flip-flops instead of the actual data.
In this work, the third bit is chosen for sabotage that makes a medium-level error. A
descriptive example for the circuit operation can be stated in this way: if R1 − R4 is 0111, the top
and the bottom XNOR gates output logic zero and one, respectively. Having Select equal to logic
one in this example makes the AND gate output as well as Trojan_En equal to logic one, and
consequently inverts the third bit of the ADC output.
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Figure 2.6. The Trojan circuit for the datapath-based threat.
Figure 2.7 presents the operation flow of the infected ADC circuit by the datapath-based
Hardware Trojan. The difference between this flowchart and the original one (shown in Figure
2.4) is inversion of the xth bit of the ADC output whenever the Trojan is activated. The datapathbased countermeasure is designed based on this convention that the standard waveforms (for
example, ramp, sine, sawtooth, and triangular) usually have ±1 least significant bit (LSB)
difference between their adjacent sampled data points.
In other words, the digital code for the i + 1th sample point is assumed to be +1 LSB
higher, the same, or −1 LSB lower than the ith sample point. If the ADC operation does not
accommodate this convention for a sampled data point, the defense circuit (which is the inserted
or internally developed BIST block) considers it as an abnormal output. Thus, the “abnormal
signal” is flagged, the user is notified, and the last correct code is outputted for that data point
instead of the current produced code.
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Figure 2.7. The operation flow of the infected ADC circuit by the datapath-based Hardware
Trojan.
The defense circuit is shown in Figure 2.8. The Cond 1 is the abnormal signal, IN (5:0)
refers to the ADC output bits before processing, OUT (5:0) refers to the ADC output bits after
processing, and the registers are used for keeping the possible cases for the next sampling point.
The defense circuit causes delay in delivering the ADC output bits due to the positioned registers
and the added circuit, although these registers provide synchronization and reduce the output noise
significantly.
In addition, the defense circuit has the capability of filtering and smoothing the sampled
signal, if the analog input signal has unwanted (not necessarily malicious) large variations. A
descriptive example for the circuit operation can be stated in this way: Cond1 and Cond2 are equal
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to logic zero and logic one in normal circuit operation, respectively. Consequently, Select is equal
to logic zero and the original ADC output bits (IN(6 : 0)) are delivered directly.
If the newly produced ADC output bits do not follow the convention (to be the same as or
one bit higher/lower than the last captured ADC output bits), then Cond1 and Select become equal
to logic one due to abnormality, and the last captured data is delivered. Figure 2.9 presents the
operation flow of the secured ADC circuit by the datapath-based defense circuit. The difference
between this flowchart and the original one (shown in Figure 2.4) is checking the conformity of the
ADC output with the described convention (and reacting in case of incompatibility) before delivering
the output.

Figure 2.8. The defense circuit for the datapath-based countermeasure.
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Figure 2.9. The operation flow of the secured ADC circuit by the datapath-based defense circuit.
2.2.2. Control-Based Threat and Countermeasure
The plotted control-based threat is described as manipulation of the control signals for the
approximation-related switches inside the SHC block. Normally, all of the capacitors (C1p-C6p and
C1n-C6n) should be connected to VCM at the beginning of each sampling. Next, they are connected
to either VDD or GND depending on the updated control signals. The designed HT has the
intention of disabling the connection of one (or more) capacitor(s) to VCM sometimes.
Thus, the victim capacitor holds its charge from the last sampling and consequently one
(or more number) of the ADC output bit(s) may be different than what it (they) should be. The
Trojan circuit for this threat is shown in Figure 2.10. Its starting component is a four-bit counter that
is triggered by the output signal of the analog comparator. The four output bits of the counter can
construct up to sixteen Boolean functions based on the corresponding truth table.
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Four functions are chosen randomly (which are the 4th, 7th, 12th and 14th rows of the truth
table) and built in the four-bit Minterm construction unit. Next, the functions are sent to a four-bit
shuffling unit. The two-bit choice signal (Choice (2:1)) may be extracted from any part of the circuit
to make it less dubious (or it can be made inside the SHC block). We run exclusive-OR (XOR)
function on the “even” and “odd” bits of the ADC output bits to make this signal.
The result bits are stored in a four-bit register that is triggered by the sampling clock. At
last, the control signal for an approximation-related switch has its actual value or is zero depending
on the stored data in its corresponding flip-flop in the four-bit register. We select the 2nd to 5th bits
of the ADC output for malicious change. In simple words, Select(j) determines either VSW−CM(i)
to be applied to the ith approximation-related switch or the ground.
If the Trojan trigger circuit makes the value of Select(j) equal to logic one, then the relevant
switch is not connected to the common mode voltage at the time of sampling and incorrect results
may be generated by the analog comparator. Figure 2.11 presents the operation flow of the infected
ADC circuit by the control-based Hardware Trojan. VFault−p and VFault−n are the faulty voltages
made by the electrical charges (remaining from the last sampling) on the victim capacitors in the
upper and the lower capacitor arrays, respectively.
The difference between this flowchart and the original one (shown in Figure 2.4) is applying
“the reduction of the faulty voltages from the sampled signals” to the analog comparator when the
Trojan is activated. Sub-circuit replication is a common method in designing analog and digital
BIST blocks [67]. The designed BIST block can be inserted or internally developed in some or all
of the requested number of chips for manufacturing.
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Figure 2.10. The Trojan circuit for the control-based threat.

Figure 2.11. The operation flow of the infected ADC circuit by the control-based Hardware
Trojan.
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The control-based countermeasure is designed based on a sub-circuit replication method,
upon which a trustworthy and possibly lightweight SHC (in terms of logic simplicity and smaller
capacitors) analog IP is positioned inside the chip. The outputs of the malicious SHC (or the SHC
under test) and the reference lightweight SHC are sent to the decision unit for comparison and
making a decision. If an error occurs, the user is notified and the reference SHC output is delivered
to the register file.
A lightweight reference SHC may bring lower performance and quality because of having
less complexity, but it definitely provides correct functionality. The defense circuit is shown in
Figure 2.12. VMAL and VREF are the output voltages from the malicious and the reference SHCs and
the inputs to the decision unit, which its circuit is shown in the bottom of figure. The output of the
decision unit is VO. If Error equals logic one (due to the difference between the applied input
voltages), then the VREF is delivered to the next circuit stage and the user is notified.
In fact, the decision unit can detect any mismatch in the “timing status” and the “logical
status” of the SHCs. Figure 2.13 presents the operation flow of the secured ADC circuit by the
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒

𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡
control-based defense circuit. 𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝
and 𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝

are the outputs of the test and the reference

comparators, respectively. The difference between this flowchart and the original one (shown in
Figure 2.4) is sampling, holding, and comparing the applied analog input signal in two similar
paths in order to catch any mismatch and abnormality.
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Figure 2.12. The defense circuit for the control-based countermeasure.

Figure 2.13. The operation flow of the secured ADC circuit by the control-based defense circuit.
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2.3. Results and Discussion
The functionality and performance of the six-bit SAR ADC for IoT low power applications
[64] are evaluated in five different operating conditions: (1) “Healthy ADC”, in which no change is
carried out on the ADC circuit; (2) “ADC + Attack 1”, in which the ADC is infected by the datapathbased threat; (3) “ADC + Attack 1 + Defense 1”, in which the infected ADC is defended by the
datapath-based countermeasure; (4) “ADC + Attack 2”, in which the ADC is infected by the
control-based threat; and (5) “ADC + Attack 2 + Defense 2”, in which the infected ADC is
defended by the control-based countermeasure.
We use 20 nm AlGaSb/InAs tunnel field effect transistor (TFET) technology (provided in the
Universal TFET model 1.6.8 [68]) for implementation. TFET provides steeper sub-threshold slope,
smaller than 60 mV/dec [69], and is described as a gated p-i-n (which is the hole-dominant region,
the intrinsic (pure) region, and the electron-dominant region) diode that has asymmetrical doping
structure and operates under reverse-bias condition.
The steeper sub-threshold slope of the TFET device helps further downscale the supply
voltage and reduce the leakage currents substantially, which makes it an excellent candidate to
achieve low energy consumption for the IoT applications. The comparison between the drainsource current (IDS) versus gate-source voltage (VGS) curves of the n-type metal–oxide–
semiconductor field-effect transistor (MOSFET) and the n-type TFET is shown in Figure 2.14.
For simulating this plot, both devices have the same width and length of 20 nm and are
connected to the supply voltage of 0.6 V. As it can be seen from the figure, the TFET device turns
ON and goes to its saturation region at a smaller value of the gate-source voltage compared to the
MOSFET device. Thus, the TFET technology is favorable for low voltage design. The Cadence

26

Spectre Circuit Simulator is used for simulation and analysis of the implemented conditions for
the ADC circuit.

Figure 2.14. The comparison between the drain-source current versus gate-source voltage curves
of the n-type metal–oxide–semiconductor field-effect transistor and the n-type tunnel field-effect
transistor.
The duration time for the transient analysis is set to 120 µs, the system clock signal
frequency ( fCLK) is set to 20 MHz, the base capacitance in the SHC block is set to 20 fF, and the
supply voltage is set to 0.3 V for all of the simulations run. The capacitance for each bit is a factor
of the base capacitance depending on its index. For functionality evaluation, a ramp signal is
applied to the ADC. A full scale ramp input signal is an ideal waveform for testing an ADC since
it causes generation of all the possible codes (having 64 codes for a six-bit ADC) [70-75].
Regarding the applied ramp signal, its maximum amplitude is 0.3 V, slope starting point is
at 5 µs, and slope ending point is at 87 µs. The simulation results for functionality evaluation of
the ADC in the five operating conditions are presented in Figure 2.15. The magnification of the
results for the second to the fifth conditions (or cases “a” to “d”) is shown in Figure 2.16. As the
figures show, the designed Hardware Trojans demolish the ADC functionality.
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The datapath-based Trojan brings only spikes to the reconstructed analog signal from the
ADC output, while the control-based Trojan makes large and small variations in the reconstructed
signal. The defense circuits demonstrate effectiveness in eliminating the payloads of Trojans. The
datapath-based countermeasure reduces even the unwanted variations in the ADC startup time.

Figure 2.15. The ADC functionality evaluation in five different operating conditions.

Figure 2.16. The magnification (an enlarged portion) of the ADC functionality evaluation: (a)
ADC + Attack 1; (b) ADC + Attack 1 + Defense 1; (c) ADC + Attack 2; and (d) ADC + Attack
2 + Defense 2.
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Seven metrics are employed in order to evaluate the ADC performance in the aforementioned five
conditions:
1 ) The total harmonic distortion (THD).
2) The effective number of bits (ENOB).
3) The root mean square (RMS) power consumption for the analog signal generator.
4) The RMS power consumption for the supply voltage.
5) The percentage of change in total area of the utilized cells.
6) The absolute value of the mean of the difference between the reconstructed analog signals
from the outputs of the reference and test ADCs.
7) The standard deviation of the adjacent differences between the reconstructed analog signals
from the outputs of the reference and test ADCs.
The THD metric shows the amount of present harmonic distortion, the linearity, and the quality
in the ADC output. The ENOB metric is effective resolution or resolution of an ideal ADC under
noise and other source of errors. It indicates the dynamic range and the accuracy of the ADC. The
power metrics exhibit the ADC suitability for low power applications. The footprints of the Trojan
and the defense circuits on the chip area are depicted in the fifth metric results.
The sixth and the seventh metrics are used to illustrate how proximate two signals are. For all
of these metrics (except ENOB), an ADC circuit has better performance if it delivers smaller
values. For obtaining these metrics, an ideal single-ended sinusoidal signal is generated and
applied to the ADC, with a maximum amplitude of 0.12 V and a frequency of 20 kHz. The input
signal amplitude is within the converter full-scale.
This signal can provide a more realistic view of the ADC performance and functionality under
the discussed operating conditions since its parameters are not in accordance with the ADC
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sampling condition. Let’s discuss what it means. The system clock frequency ( fCLK) is 20 MHz, the
sampling clock frequency ( fCLK−S/H) is 2.5 MHz, and the converter bandwidth is 1.25 MHz, which
is far greater than the input signal frequency ( fSIG).
The fully-differential input signal has the peak-to-peak amplitude (VFD−PP) of 0.48 V that is
compared against the fully-differential input full-scale (FS) that is 0.6 V. The ADC sampling
condition for normal operation allows a change of 1 LSB from sample to sample and the maximum
rate of change is given at zero-crossings. This condition can be formulated as
𝐹𝑆
2𝑛

2 × 𝑉𝐹𝐷−𝑃𝑃 × 𝜋 × 𝑓𝑆𝐼𝐺
𝐹𝐶𝐿𝐾−𝑆/𝐻

<

in which n is the number of ADC output bits.
This condition causes reduction in the converter effective bandwidth. With substituting the

values into the formula, we get fSIG < 7.7712 kHz, which shows the condition dissatisfaction by
the chosen frequency for the input signal. Dissatisfaction of this condition can reduce the effective
number of bits and increase the total harmonic distortion. The selected window for ENOB
calculation is rectangular. The ADC performance evaluation results are presented in Table 2.1.
According to the results, the defense circuits compensate and improve the ADC degraded
performance, which is caused by the Hardware Trojans.
From the second to the fourth operating conditions, the large THD and the small ENOB values
are due to the dissatisfaction of the sampling condition (and the payloads of the Hardware Trojans).
Due to the fact that an analog to digital converter forms a nearly small portion of the overall power
consumption and area occupation of a system on chip [76-80], the area and power overheads made
by the Trojan and defense circuits are relatively low. Meanwhile, the delays caused by the datapathbased Trojan and defense circuits are around 0.2 ns and 403 ns, respectively, in this simulation
analysis.
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Table 2.1. The analog to digital converter performance evaluation result.

2.4. Threat Models and Countermeasures for a Delta-Sigma ADC
The communications and signals within the military area include all aspects of
communications, interactions, and conveyance of information between armed forces and the
respective electronic devices. They can be in various forms such as voice and audio signals, tactical
ground-based communications, terrestrial microwave signals, satellite signals, signals of mobile
devices, and jamming signals. Most of these signals are analog in nature and they should be
transformed into the digital domain in order to employ them in different computing processes.
In this way, their processing, transmission, and storage are facilitated. The process of
converting an analog signal to binary data is called quantization, and the electronic device that
executes this function is called analog to digital converter. The ADC resolution (not necessarily
its number of output bits) determines the number of quantization levels that can partition a voltage
range. The functionality correctness and integrity of an ADC is highly critical since it has direct
impact on the reconstructed analog signal from the ADC output.
An ADC functionality is approved if: (a) there is a mapping from the analog input signal
to the digital output without introducing significant quantization errors; and (b) the quantization
levels are usually equally spaced, except in non-linear ADCs. In this situation, even infrequent
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(and unintentional) functionality failure(s) can have a detrimental effect on the system operation.
Therefore, it is necessary to test the ADC functionality to avoid any failure.
There are four metrics for classification of ADCs for different applications: sampling rate,
resolution, noise and distortion rejection/attenuation, and physical footprints (area and power
consumption). The two most popular types of ADCs are successive approximation register ADC
and ∆Σ ADC. The SAR ADCs provide an acceptable resolution, low power dissipation, and
relatively high sampling rate, while the ∆Σ ADCs deliver very high resolution at lower sampling
rate.
The SAR ADCs are employed for general purpose applications (such as data loggers,
temperature sensors, and bridge sensors), while the ∆Σ ADCs are utilized in specific purpose
applications (such as wireless and line communications, test and measurement instrumentation
medical imaging, radar systems, electronic warfare, unmanned vehicles, and missile systems).
With respect to this classification, we study the security of ∆Σ analog to digital converter.
An ADC can be infected by insertion of an HT inside the chip, with the payload of causing
an intentional error during the ADC operation. In this work, the ADC functionality failure is
chosen as the payload for Hardware Trojan design that induces rare but harmful effects in the
system operation, such as miscalculation and inaccuracy of a smart weapon in tracking and
pointing at the targeted point or disabling the weapon scope completely.
Now, we discuss a first-order one-bit ∆Σ analog to digital converter that is used in our
security analysis. The chosen configuration for the ADC is because of its simplicity for
implementation. The ∆Σ modulator circuit is implemented using AlGaSb/InAs tunnel field effect
transistor technology, provided in the Universal TFET model 1.6.8 [68]. The TFET device with
the 20 nm technology node is suitable for low power applications and provides area efficiency.
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The Universal TFET model is a simple and versatile semi-empirical, physics-based,
Simulation Program with Integrated Circuit Emphasis (SPICE)-friendly, analytical, closed-form
compact model based on the Kane-Sze formula that describes the current-voltage characteristics
of TFETs using a simple, continuous, and large-signal equation set [81, 82]. Its formulation does
not rely on any specific TFET embodiment and is widely configurable due to describing only the
fundamental physics of the generic device.
The model takes the unique features of the device, including the decrease in subthreshold
swing with drain current and the superlinear onset of the output characteristic. Also, it captures the
ambipolar current characteristic at negative gate–source bias and the negative differential
resistance for negative drain–source biases. Its reasonably general validity, not being specific to a
particular geometry, and the shown current-voltage characteristics make it a good candidate for
circuit simulation, comparable to the MOSFET SPICE models.
Other TFET models usually focus on particular TFET gate configurations, or on specific
aspects of the transport. Consequently, the resulting expressions for the drain current are complex
and it is possible there may not be intuitive connection to the device physics. The top-level
architecture of a ∆Σ ADC along with a general model for the delta-sigma modulator are shown in
Figure 2.17.
This architecture consists of five main blocks:
1) Anti-aliasing filter, which is required to band-limit the input signal to frequencies less than
one-half the oversampling frequency. Implementation of this filter can be quite simple,
such as a simple resistor–capacitor low-pass filter, when the oversampling ratio is large.
2) Sample and hold, which is responsible for sampling the signal under process.
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3) Delta-sigma modulator, which converts the analog signal into a noise-shaped but low
resolution digital signal.
4) Digital filter, which is a low-pass filter for eliminating (or attenuating) noise and increasing
resolution.
5) Down-sampling, which lowers the signal sampling frequency to usually equal twice the
frequency of the desired bandwidth of the input signal.
Meanwhile, some of these blocks can be combined or extended depending on the circuit
implementation. 𝑋𝐼𝑁 (𝑡) and 𝑋𝑂𝑈𝑇 [𝑛] are the analog input signal and the digital output signal of
the ∆Σ ADC respectively.

Figure 2.17. The delta-sigma analog to digital converter architecture along with a general model
for the delta-sigma modulator.
It is assumed that the converter has a multiplex-based input mechanism (not shown in the
figure). Therefore, there are two options for the analog input signal: (A) an external single-ended
analog signal, which comes from the outside world. It can be acquired using a sensor through
measuring a physical quantity of an object in single-ended mode; and (B) a standard analog signal
for testing the ADC generated by the CIU (or an intelligence inquiry by the CIU) internally.
This signal should have a fit waveform (such as sinusoidal, triangular, and sawtooth),
frequency (or period), and amplitude. Depending on the status of an “Intelligence Mode” signal, a
decision is made on sending either option “A” or option “B” to the anti-aliasing filter block. For
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example, if this selection signal is equal to logic one, then the analog test signal is sent to the filter
block. This is beneficial for situations in which the external input signal is not standard and testfriendly, while the ADC needs to be tested and security checked.
In addition, the status of the selection signal can be determined either externally by user or
internally through the predefined conditions. The testing and security checking process can occur
during the IC run-time operation when either the ADC is idle or it is active and the external analog
input signal has a suitable waveform (such as sine) for testing. The general linear model for the
∆Σ modulator is analogous to an amplifier realized by an operational amplifier (op-amp) and
feedback.
According to this analogy, the feedback reduces the effect of noise at the output through
the closed-loop. By analysis of the signal, noise, and system transfer functions, it is realized that
the system needs to have a pole at direct current in order to high-pass filter the quantization noise
and achieve first-order noise shaping. The pole for the system transfer function is modeled as a
delay block and is implemented as an integrator at circuit-level.
Meanwhile, higher order delta-sigma ADCs, with more than one stage of integration and
summation (or feedback) in the modulator, can be used to achieve further noise shaping and higher
resolution. 𝑢[𝑛], 𝑤[𝑛], and 𝑒[𝑛] are the input signal, the output signal, and the error signal in the
modulator system respectively. Figure 2.18 shows the circuit implementation of the modulator
model. All the circuit elements for each component are sized through parametric simulation and
analysis.
It is emphasized that only “functional correctness” of the modulator was our aim during its
design and implementation (since the designed Hardware Trojans have the payload of causing
functionality failure). The circuit consists of five main components: (a) differential amplifier,
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which amplifies the difference between two input signals (𝑉𝐼𝑁 and 𝑋𝐼𝑃 ) but suppresses any signal
common to the two inputs. The output signal (𝑋𝑂𝑈𝑇 ) is ideally proportional to the difference
between the two input signals.
In here, an operational amplifier is used as the engine (or the main element) in building the
differential amplifier. Its source supply voltage (−𝑉𝑆𝑆 ) is equal to the negative of the drain supply
voltage (𝑉𝐷𝐷 ), which means 𝑉𝐷𝐷 = 𝑉𝑆𝑆 . (b) integrator (or integrating amplifier), which accumulates
the input signal over a defined time to produce a representative output signal. In other words, it
performs the mathematical operation of integration on the input signal with respect to time.
This amplifier has a low pass filtering effect as well (at the beginning). The operational
amplifier is used to build this component (similar to the differential amplifier). (c) comparator,
which compares two input signals and outputs a digital signal (whose value is between ground and
supply voltage) that indicates the larger input signal. A comparator can be simply made by the opamp. In this circuit, the negative terminal of the comparator is connected to a reference voltage
(𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐹 ) that is equal to 𝑉𝐷𝐷 .
(d) D-type flip-flop (also known as data or delay flip-flop), which captures the input signal
value at a certain portion (or edge) of the clock signal (𝐶𝐿𝐾) and outputs the value (which is
between ground and supply voltage). The output signal cannot be changed at the other times; and
(e) analog multiplexer, which chooses one of two analog input signals (𝑉𝐷0 and 𝑉𝐷1) according to
the select signal (𝑉𝑆𝑒𝑙 ) and sends it to the output line (𝑉𝑂𝑈𝑇 ).
VSel means the inversion of the select signal. The analog multiplexer is used as a simple
digital to analog converter (DAC) in the ∆Σ modulator circuit. The amplitude of DAC output signal
is between negative supply voltage and positive supply voltage. The modulator circuit operation
can be described as: all the flip-flops and registers within the SoC design are reset once the chip is
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turned on. Therefore, the stored value in the D-type flip-flop of the modulator circuit is equal to
zero at the beginning (which means 𝑉𝑄 = 0).

Figure 2.18. The delta-sigma modulator circuit.
In this case, the analog multiplexer output (𝑉𝐷𝐴𝐶 ) is equal to −𝑉𝐷𝐷 . Next, VDAC is
subtracted from the input signal (𝑉𝐼𝑁 ) to the modulator using the differential amplifier. The result
signal goes to the integrator. The integrated signal is compared against the reference signal (𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐹 ).
The comparison outcome is captured by the D-type flip-flop. This process continues until the
modulation process for the input signal is terminated. Conventionally, the D-type flip-flop output
signal (𝑉𝑄 ), or the “modulator output bit”, is sent directly to the digital filter block for processing.
In this work, we can consider two variations in this flow for processing and security
checking of the modulator output. Case 1: the central intelligence unit is in parallel with the digital
filter in the ADC architecture. The modulator output bit (𝑉𝑄 ) is sent to the digital filter for
processing, while the “modulator output signal” or the DAC output signal (𝑉𝐷𝐴𝐶 ) is sent to the CIU
for security checking. In this case, if the DAC output signal is reported as suspicious, further
processing the modulator output bit is stopped and the user is notified.
Case 2: the central intelligence unit is in series between the ∆Σ modulator and the digital
filter. The DAC output signal (𝑉𝐷𝐴𝐶 ) is sent to the CIU for processing and security checking. In
this case, the CIU filters the intentional (and unintentional) fluctuations within the 𝑉𝐷𝐴𝐶 signal and
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makes a decision on the trust and validity of the result signal depending on its quality and closeness
to the reference (golden) signal. If it is malicious, further signal processing is stopped and the user
is notified. Otherwise, the signal is simply converted to digital format and is sent to the digital
filter block.
The advantage of sending the DAC output signal (instead of the modulator output bit) to
the CIU is: (i) reducing the possibility of having undiscovered malicious manipulation at the DAC
output signal; and (ii) requiring an analog filter that has the benefits of less circuitry, less area and
power consumption, easier signal debugging under processing, higher accuracy (sometimes), finegrained signal processing, less bandwidth demand, and being able to process large signals while
causing noticeable distortion and aliasing (in comparison with its digital filter counterpart).
An attack on a system functionality has more disastrous outcomes in comparison with the
other types of attacks, such as information leakage or performance degradation. In this regard, a
malicious SoC integrator can design a Hardware Trojan with the goal of causing the ∆Σ ADC
malfunction “sometimes” through manipulating the input signal, the output signal, or the output
bit of the modulator. It is assumed that the designed function-targeting Hardware Trojans are not
detected during the testing and verification phase since the “Mate Trigger” for the “Main Trigger”
of each Hardware Trojan is generated by other parts of the SoC during the “chip run-time
operation”.
In other words, the mate trigger and the main trigger for each Trojan go to an AND function
before being applied to the Trojan payload circuit. Meanwhile, the main trigger mechanism of each
Trojan circuit is designed based on the principle of making its activation “random” and “sneaky”.
The catered simulation results in Subsection 2.10 are obtained based on activating the Trojans
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using only their designed “Main Triggers” and the scenario of having “Mate Triggers” is not
applied in these simulations.
Without considering this scenario, the Trojans are not sneaky enough in terms of activation
time and caused changes in the circuit functionality that are considered as limitations. By taking
the scenario into account, the function-targeting Hardware Trojans are possibly not detected during
the testing phase since there is no knowledge about the application that is going to be run on the
chip. Therefore, there is less controllability and observability on the Trojan circuits and they
behave more covertly.
The payload of these Trojans is manipulating the input signal or the output signal/bit of the
modulator circuit. This manipulation can be justified based on five different plots:
a) Doing manipulation based on the internal circuit states for leakage of information.
b) Occurrence of functionality failure, which is the case in this work due to its easier modeling
and simulation for demonstration.
c) Doing manipulation for revealing circuit activities and/or structure.
d) Jeopardizing the security mechanisms of the related applications that rely on a trustworthy
interface for analog to digital conversion of information.
e) Doing mild manipulation of signals for the purpose of sign communication between two
entities that participate in executing an attack.
A countermeasure is proposed for the designed Hardware Trojans that attempt to eliminate
their payloads through signal filtering. With respect to implementing each of the proposed
Hardware Trojans, its number of analog and/or digital cells may be reasonable compared to the
total number of cells used in a system on chip. Also, we can consider a scenario for Hardware
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Trojan implementation according to which the idle cells (or the time-based unused cells) of the
SoC chip are detected and employed adaptively in order to construct the Trojan functionality.
In addition, hardware obfuscation may reduce the possibility of detecting the Trojans through
physical inspection. The shown area overheads for the Trojans in Subsection 2.10 are calculated,
considering the insertion of “extra” cells for implementing the Trojans. Without the discussed
scenario, these Trojans have limitations in terms of the added circuitry.
The same concept may be applied for the defense hardware implementation. Meanwhile, it is
assumed that the contribution of the defense hardware to the total chip area, performance, and
power consumption will not be significant, considering all the blocks in the ∆Σ ADC (not only the
modulator) along with the nearly small portion that it occupies in a system-on-chip design
[81, 82].
2.5. Attack 1: Input Signal Manipulation
The threat model for the input signal manipulation is described as applying a wrong version
of the input signal instead of the original (or healthy) version to the modulator sometimes. The
wrong input signal is a version of the healthy input signal with a difference in its frequency (or
period) and/or amplitude. In here, the same frequency is chosen for the wrong signal and its
amplitude is specified to be one-third of the healthy signal amplitude.
Therefore, when the maximum amplitude of the healthy signal is equal to 𝑉𝐷𝐷 , the
maximum amplitude of the wrong signal is equal to 𝑉𝐷𝐷 . Applying either the healthy signal or the
wrong signal is determined by an analog multiplexer. When the select signal of this multiplexer is
equal to logic zero, the healthy signal is applied to the modulator; otherwise the wrong signal is
applied. The select signal is made by an 𝐴𝑁𝐷 gate that has two inputs: (1) the output of the toppath circuit; and (2) the output of the bottom-path circuit.
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The top-path circuit can be described is this way: the system clock signal triggers a fourbit counter. The four output bits of the counter can construct up to sixteen Boolean functions based
on the respective truth table. Four functions are chosen randomly (which are the 10th, 11th, 14th
and 15th rows of the truth table) and built in the four-bit Minterm construction unit. The outputs
of these functions are sent to an 𝑂𝑅 unit that makes the top-path circuit output equal to logic one
when the output of any of the four functions becomes one.
The bottom-path circuit has the same structure as the top-path circuit with the difference
of having the modulator output bit as the trigger signal for the four-bit counter. Also, the chosen
random functions for the four-bit Minterm construction unit are the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th rows of
the related truth table. The circuit for this attack is shown in Figure 2.19.
According to the figure, 𝐶𝐿𝐾 is the clock signal, 𝑉𝑄

is the modulator output bit,

𝑉Input−Healthy is the healthy input signal, 𝑉Input−Wrong is the wrong input signal, and
𝑉Input−Malicious is the output signal of the analog multiplexer that is applied to the modulator.
Meanwhile, the structure and size of the components in the Trojan circuit may be changed based
on the attacker flexibilities and restrictions.

Figure 2.19. Attack 1: The hardware Trojan circuit for the input signal manipulation.
2.6. Attack 2: Noise-Triggered Output Signal Manipulation
The threat model for the output signal manipulation, triggered by noise signal is described
as manipulating the DAC output signal through making it inverted, attenuated, or inverted and
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attenuated together sometimes. The circuit for this attack is shown in Figure 2.20. The
manipulation function is performed by an analog multiplexer. When the select signals of the
multiplexer (𝑆𝑒𝑙 0 and 𝑆𝑒𝑙 1) both are equal to logic zero, the healthy output signal (𝑉DAC ) is
transmitted.
When 𝑆𝑒𝑙 0 is equal to logic one while the other select signal is equal to logic zero, then
−1
the inverted version of the output signal (𝑉𝐷𝐴𝐶
) is transmitted. When 𝑆𝑒𝑙 1 becomes equal to logic

one and the other select signal becomes equal to logic zero, then the attenuated version of the
1

output signal is transmitted. For attenuation, 4 of the signal amplitude is considered, meaning 𝜒 ·
𝑉DAC =

1
4

× 𝑉DAC. When both of the select signals are equal to logic one, then the inverted and

−1
attenuated version of the output signal (𝜒 · 𝑉𝐷𝐴𝐶
) is transmitted.

The select signals are produced in this way: a source of noise within the design/chip is
found and amplified. The amplified noise is compared against a high threshold voltage (𝛼 · =
2 × 𝑉DD ) and a low threshold voltage (𝛽 · 𝑉DD = 1 × 𝑉DD ) using the top and the bottom
comparators. The comparators are enabled by a request signal (𝑉REQ ). Next, the outputs of the
comparators go to an 𝐴𝑁𝐷 gate in order to generate a trigger signal (𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔).
𝑆𝑒𝑙 0 is generated by executing an 𝐴𝑁𝐷 function on the trigger signal and a condition
signal, called 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐴. Running an 𝐴𝑁𝐷 function on the trigger signal and another condition
signal, called 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐵 produces 𝑆𝑒𝑙 1. Now, let’s discuss how 𝑉REQ , 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐴, and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐵 are
generated. The system clock signal (𝐶𝐿𝐾) and the modulator output bit (𝑉Q ) are dispatched to an
𝑋𝑂𝑅 gate. The gate output signal triggers a four-bit counter.
The four output bits of the counter can construct up to sixteen Boolean functions based on
the respective truth table. Eight functions are chosen randomly and divided into two clusters:
(Cluster A) the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th rows of the truth table, and (Cluster B) the 12th, 13th, 14th
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and 15th rows of the truth table. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐴 is made by sending the functions of cluster “A” to an 𝑂𝑅
unit.
Similarly, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐵 is made through this flow. The request signal (𝑉REQ ) is obtained by
forwarding the condition signals (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐴 and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐵) to an 𝑂𝑅 gate/unit. Meanwhile, the
structure and size of the components in the Trojan circuit may be changed based on the attacker
flexibilities and restrictions.

Figure 2.20. Attack 2: The noise-triggered hardware Trojan circuit for the output signal
manipulation.
2.7. Attack 3: Controllable Manipulation of Modulator Output Bit
The threat model for controllable manipulation of the modulator output bit is described as
sending the inverted version of the modulator output bit (or the bit stream) to the digital filter block
at any time by controlling the supply voltage of a maliciously sized TFET-based static randomaccess memory (SRAM) cell [83, 84] locally or globally.
The nodes of the TFET-based SRAM cell can be described as: 𝐵𝐿 and 𝐵𝐿 are the bit lines,
𝑆𝑂 and 𝑆𝑂 are the storing nodes for the data bit, 𝑊𝑅 1 and 𝑊𝑅 0 are the control signals for
storing logic one and logic zero respectively, 𝑉DD and −𝑉SS are the supply voltage and ground
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respectively. This SRAM cell is sized maliciously in order to make the write operation possible
only when the supply voltage is set in 0.35 × 𝑉DD to 0.75 × 𝑉DD range.
In other words, if the supply voltage is set to a value outside this range, such as 𝑉DD , neither
logic zero nor logic one can be stored in this cell. In fact, this is an escape path for the attack since
when most (if not all) of the circuit/system elements operate perfectly at the supply voltage of 𝑉DD ,
the Hardware Trojan is dormant. On the other hand, if it is set to a value such as 0.67 × 𝑉𝐷𝐷 , all
the circuit/system elements along with the Hardware Trojan are active.
There are a number of possibilities for performing the malicious cell sizing: (1) physically
inside the untrusted foundry; (2) applying malicious modifications within the algorithms utilized
for sizing the design cells; and (3) designing a few malicious cells and inserting them inside the
chip during application specific integrated circuit design flow [85-89]. Adjusting the supply
voltage can be done internally through predefined circuit/system conditions or externally by a
malicious person.
Changing the supply voltage can be done locally only for this SRAM cell or globally for
the whole chip. It is assumed that the malicious SRAM cell is asleep when the supply voltage is
out of its working range due to predefined manipulation of the Gated Supply Voltage mechanism
[90], which is an architectural approach for reduction of leakage power consumption. In this way,
the malicious SRAM cell does not contribute to the chip functionality and no functionality failure
occurs before activation of the Hardware Trojan (which means when the supply voltage is at its
typical value).
In this work, local malicious variations of the supply voltage for the SRAM cell is
considered. The malicious TFET-based SRAM cell is sized through parametric simulation and
analysis, and the achieved values are: the channel length of all transistors is set to 20 nm, the width
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of pull-up transistors is set to 20 nm, the width of pull-down transistors is set to 45 nm, the width
of access transistors for writing logic zero is set to 45 nm, and the width of access transistors for
writing logic one is set to 35 nm.
Figure 2.21 displays a simulation of this circuit with these specifications: BL is set to 𝑉DD
and the other bit line is set to ground (or logic zero), 𝑊𝑅 1 is a pulse signal with the delay of 2.5
ns, the width of 5 ns, the period of 20 ns, and the amplitude of 𝑉DD , 𝑊𝑅 0 is a pulse signal with
the width of 10 ns, the period of 20 ns, and the amplitude of 𝑉DD , and the supply voltage is a
piecewise linear waveform with three states.
Each state takes 25 ns, and the amplitude of these states are 0.1 V, 0.2 V, and 0.3 V. The
duration time for the transient simulation and analysis is set to 300 ns. It can be understood from
this figure that the correct write operations (either for logic zero or logic one) on the storing node
(𝑉SO ) occurs when the supply voltage is equal to 0.2 V. Just as a clarification, the 𝑉DD notation of
the malicious supply voltage is different than the maximum amplitude of the other circuit signals.
Now, let’s get back to the controllable Hardware Trojan circuit for manipulation of the
modulator output bit (shown in Figure 2.22). The supply voltage under manipulation (or the
malicious supply voltage) is connected to the malicious SRAM cell. The voltage signal at the cell
storing node triggers a two-bit counter. The counter output bits are sent to an 𝐴𝑁𝐷 unit.
The result signal (𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔) is the select signal of a multiplexer that dispatches the inverted
version of the modulator output bit to the digital filter block whenever it is equal to logic one. In
order to “model” this attack for the ∆Σ modulator, the supply voltage of the malicious SRAM cell
is manipulated locally throughout the circuit operation. Meanwhile, the structure and size of the
components in the Trojan circuit may be changed based on the attacker flexibilities and
restrictions.
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Figure 2.21. The circuit operation of malicious SRAM cell.

Figure 2.22. Attack 3: The controllable hardware Trojan circuit for manipulation of the
modulator output bit.
2.8. Attack 4: Capacitance-Triggered Output Signal Manipulation
The threat model for the output signal manipulation, triggered by a victim capacitance is
described as manipulating the DAC output signal through transmitting a frequency-divided version
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of it (instead of the original version) sometimes. The victim capacitance can be realized at the
fabrication-level by targeting an interconnect capacitance (which is the capacitance among the
metal layer connections in different regions of the chip) or a transistor-associated capacitance (such
as the quantum capacitance of the channel).
The circuit for this attack is shown in Figure 2.23. The flow of this circuit can be described
in this way: the victim capacitance is charged or discharged through connection of its positive
terminal to the supply voltage or the ground respectively. The negative terminal of the victim
capacitance is always connected to the ground. The decision on charging or discharging the
capacitance is made by the modulator output bit. Then, the signal at the positive terminal of the
capacitance is compared against a threshold voltage (𝛾 · 𝑉DD = 2 × 𝑉DD ).
If the amount of charge stored on the victim capacitance exceeds the threshold voltage, the
comparator delivers logic one. The comparator output signal triggers a two-bit counter. The
counter output bits go to an AND gate that delivers Trig signal. Whenever this signal becomes
equal to logic one, the DAC output signal with its frequency divided by four is transferred by an
analog multiplexer. The frequency-divided version of the DAC output signal is provided by a
frequency divider. Meanwhile, the structure and size of the components in the Trojan circuit may
be changed based on the attacker flexibilities and restrictions.
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Figure 2.23. Attack 4: The capacitor-triggered hardware Trojan circuit for the output signal
manipulation.
2.9. Defense: Output Signal Filtering
In signal processing, a filter is a computational process that eliminates some unwanted
components or features from a signal. In other words, the important parts of information are
extracted, while random and undesired features, such as noise, are eliminated. The filtering process
can be performed on the time-domain or frequency-domain. The functionality of a filter can be
classified as: (a) signal separation; and (b) signal restoration.
Signal separation is used when a signal has been infected with noise or any other type of
interfering signal. Signal restoration is used when a signal has been distorted. Curve-fitting is the
process of constructing a mathematical function/model that has the best fit to a signal [91-93]. The
mathematical model can act as a filtering process through interpolation operation (which means
finding an exact fit) or smoothing operation (which means finding an approximate fit).
In a good fit, the main behavior of signal along with the important signal patterns are well
discovered and the unpleasant elements are left out. In fact, the signal to noise ratio is increased
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and the difference between the mathematical model (or specifically the predicted signal by the
model) and the actual signal is minimized. In order to measure the goodness of the model fit, a
statistical parameter called R-squared (𝑅 2 ) or the coefficient of determination is introduced.
This parameter is defined as the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that
is predictable from the independent variable(s). The main element in calculating the R-squared
parameter is the error data (or the Residuals) that is defined as: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 −
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙. The residual plot can reveal hidden patterns visually and more effectively.
Meanwhile, a negative R-squared value (or a reverse R-squared value) is obtained when the
mathematical model does not follow the signal behavior, which indicates a very bad data fitting.
Although a large magnitude for the R-squared parameter demonstrates a higher level of
relationship between the actual signal and the predicted signal, regardless of its sign. In this work,
the curve-fitting models are utilized within the bureau of intelligence and investigation (or the
CIU) in order to filter the infected DAC output signal and eliminate the malicious intentional
noise/features, introduced by a Hardware Trojan.
In this context, the formula for the residual parameter is modified as follows: Modified
Residuals = Reference Signal − Filtered Signal. The reference signal is a trustworthy DAC output
signal. The filtered signal is the outcome of running a filter on the DAC output signal under
security checking. The modified R-squared parameter is calculated accordingly. Some curvefitting models need the reference signal for carrying out the filtering process, while others do not.
The employed models for filtering the DAC output signal are: (1) simple linear regression;
(2) generalized linear regression; (3) moving average; (4) robust regression with the least absolute
residual computing method; (5) robust regression with the bi-squared computing method; (6)
median filtering; (7) Savitzky-Golay filtering; (8) autoregressive-moving-average model with
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exogenous inputs (ARMAX); and (9) region of interest (ROI) filtering. For applying each of these
filters, all the signals are prepared (in terms of scaling, offset elimination, and so forth)
accordingly.
In this work, the selected configurations for the models are:
a) The simple linear regression has the degree of one.
b) The distribution model of the generalized linear regression is Gamma and its link function
is reciprocal.
c) The window size for moving average is equal to 15,000.
d) The selected frame-length for the Savitzky–Golay filter is equal to 10,001, and its order is
equal to one.
e) The order of all the elements of the ARMAX model is equal to 10.
f) The positive and the negative peaks of the DAC output signal for any waveform is strictly
filtered based on the convention of having no spikes and noticeable variations in those
regions in the ROI filtering.
Meanwhile, it is assumed that there is no time-misalignment between the input signal applied to
the filter and its output signal.
2.10. Results and Discussion
In this section, the functionality of the first-order one-bit ∆Σ modulator is evaluated in six
different structures:
A. “Healthy ADC”, in which no malicious change is carried out on the modulator circuit.
B. “ADC Under Attack 1”, in which the input signal to the modulator is manipulated.
C. “ADC Under Attack 2”, in which the modulator output signal is manipulated according
to a noise-triggered mechanism.
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D. “ADC Under Attack 3”, in which the modulator output bit is manipulated based on
controlling the supply voltage.
E. “ADC Under Attack 4”, in which the modulator output signal is manipulated according
to a capacitance-triggered mechanism.
F. “Security Enhanced ADC”, in which the central intelligence unit is added to the ADC
architecture as a countermeasure against possible threats.
All these circuit structures are implemented using 20 nm AlGaSb/InAs tunnel field effect
transistor technology (provided in the Universal TFET model 1.6.8 [68]). In these
implementations, all the circuit elements are sized through parametric simulation and analysis.
Also, the main goal was only “functional correctness” during the design and implementation of
these circuits due to the chosen type of payload for the Hardware Trojans.
The Cadence Spectre Circuit Simulator is used for simulation and analysis of the
implemented circuit structures. The duration time for the transient analysis is set to 10 µs, the clock
signal has a pulse width of 1 ns, a period of 2 ns, and a delay of 10 ns, the reset signal has a pulse
width of 5 ns and a period that is out of the scope of transient analysis, and the supply voltage is
set to 0.3 V (in all of the components, except the operational amplifier in which it is set to 1.8 V)
for all of the simulations run.
In order to carry out a complete functional analysis of these circuit structures, three types
of waveforms are applied to the modulator input terminal that are sinusoidal, triangle, and
sawtooth. The period of the input signal for all these waveforms is set to 5 µs. Meanwhile, the
maximum amplitude of all the aforementioned signals is set to 0.3 V. Extracted from the simulation
results for the sinusoidal input signal, the root mean square power consumption of the main supply

51

voltage is equal to 121.9 nW and the average power consumption of the main supply voltage is
equal to 87.12 nW.
Due to the noticeable power consumption of the op-amp-based modulator components, the
impact of Hardware Trojans on the modulator power consumption is negligible. The delay
overhead (on the modulator circuit) caused by the first attack is 0.31%, the second attack is 3.96%,
the third attack is 13.17%, and the fourth attack is 6.93%. The area footprint (on the modulator
circuit) caused by the first attack is 1.63%, the second attack is 3.95%, the third attack is 0.21%,
and the fourth attack is 4.19%.
Again, these overheads are not significant when the share of the modulator within the
whole ADC architecture (and the SoC design) is taken into account. The functional simulation of
the modulator circuit for the structures “A” to “E” is shown in Figure 2.24. According to the figure,
all the Hardware Trojans damage the modulator output signal. The first attack ruins the signal
negative peaks very aggressively. The malicious changes caused by this attack on the first positive
peak is at a high-level, while it is mild for the second positive peak.
The second attack brings a large number of spikes in the signal positive peaks, while its
alterations in the negative peaks are small. The third attack makes distributed large variations in
both positive and negative peaks. The fourth attack forms considerable fluctuations in the signal
positive peaks, while its impact is small on the negative peaks. The effects of all these attacks can
also be observed more or less in the regions of signal transitions. All these malicious traces can
shape meaningful and catastrophic consequences in both analog and digital domains.
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Figure 2.24. Analysis of Attacks: The delta-sigma modulator output signal in the “A” to “E”
circuit structures.
Now, the performance of the discussed filters in eliminating the payloads of Trojans are
analyzed based on their delivering modified R-squared values. Let’s take a look at Figure 2.25 that
shows an example of the filtered modulator output signal by the simple linear regression method
(in the top plot) and the residuals from this filtering process (in the bottom plot). According to the
top plot, the simple linear regression method demonstrates effectiveness in removing the malicious
intentional spikes, especially in the positive and the negative signal peaks.
The residual plot and its order of magnitude displays the quality of filtering process even
further. Tables 2.2–2.3 present a complete performance analysis of the filters in confronting the
four attacks, when the three types of waveforms are applied to the modulator. According to the
results, the best filter in facing the Trojans is the robust regression using the least absolute residual
computing method, and the worst one is the Savitzky-Golay filtering (based on the absolute value
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of the modified R-squared values). It implies that a linear filter using an effective error
minimization method is a good candidate for defeating the attacks.
In order to achieve higher performance, a number of these filtering techniques may be
combined together (known as hybrid filtering). Also, a threshold value can be considered for the
R-squared parameter according to which a filtered signal is rejected if its 𝑅 2 value is below the
threshold (which means the filtered signal is not close enough to the reference signal). The
threshold value of 0.9 is a worthy option for signal rejection and user notification. Meanwhile, the
second threat model exhibits the strongest attack according to the simulation results.

Figure 2.25. An example of the filtered delta-sigma modulator output signal by the simple linear
regression method (top) and the residuals from this filtering process (bottom).
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Table 2.2. Defense Analysis (1): The performance analysis of filters based on their
corresponding modified R-squared values when a sinusoidal signal is applied to the modulator.

Type of Filter

Modified
R-Squared Value for
(Sinusoidal Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 2
(Sinusoidal Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 3
(Sinusoidal Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 4
(Sinusoidal Input)

Simple Linear

1.0000

0.9987

0.9997

0.9998

Generalized Linear

0.9999

0.9987

0.9996

0.9998

Moving Average

0.2293

0.0384

0.1563 (Reverse)

0.0260

Robust Regression
1.0000
(Least Absolute Residual Method)

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

Robust Regression

1.0000

0.9987

0.9997

0.9998

0.1511 (Reverse)

0.2193 (Reverse)

0.3339 (Reverse)

0.2494 (Reverse)

Savitzky-Golay Filtering

0.1308

0.0480

0.1579 (Reverse)

0.0078 (Reverse)

ARMAX Model

0.7945

0.5063

0.9282

0.4950

Region of Interest

0.1093

0.0266 (Reverse)

0.0479

0.0795 (Reverse)

Median Filtering

Table 2.3. Defense Analysis (2): The performance analysis of filters based on their
corresponding modified R-squared values when a triangle signal is applied to the modulator.

Type of Filter

Modified
R-Squared Value for
(Triangle Input)

Simple Linear
Generalized Linear

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 2
(Triangle Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 3
(Triangle Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 4
(Triangle Input)

0.9941

0.9882

0.9934

0.9933

0.9941

0.9883

0.9934

0.9934

Moving Average

0.1787 (Reverse)

Robust Regression
(Least Absolute
Residual Method)

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

0.9197

0.9882

0.9934

0.9933

Robust Regression

0.3153 (Reverse)

0.4146 (Reverse)

0.3108 (Reverse)

Median Filtering

0.3479 (Reverse)

0.5051 (Reverse)

0.6146 (Reverse)

0.5061 (Reverse)

Savitzky-Golay Filtering

0.1231 (Reverse)

0.3001 (Reverse)

0.4136 (Reverse)

0.3107 (Reverse)

ARMAX Model

0.5832

Region of Interest

0.2253 (Reverse)

0.3310

0.9185

0.3755 (Reverse)
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0.4137 (Reverse)

0.7649
0.3276 (Reverse)

Table 2.4. Defense Analysis (3): The performance analysis of filters based on their
corresponding modified R-squared values when a sawtooth signal is applied to the modulator.

Type of Filter

Modified
R-Squared Value for
(Sawtooth Input)

Simple Linear
Generalized Linear

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 2
(Sawtooth Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 3
(Sawtooth Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 4
(Sawtooth Input)

1.0000

0.9997

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

0.9997

1.0000

1.0000

0.4238 (Reverse)

0.4110 (Reverse)

0.4590 (Reverse)

Moving Average

0.1009 (Reverse)

Robust Regression
(Least Absolute
Residual Method)

1.0000

0.9997

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

0.9997

1.0000

1.0000

Robust Regression
Median Filtering

0.7509 (Reverse)

0.5139 (Reverse)

0.6886 (Reverse)

0.5341 (Reverse)

Savitzky-Golay Filtering

7.43 × 10−4 (Reverse)

0.3704 (Reverse)

0.4335 (Reverse)

0.2989 (Reverse)

ARMAX Model

0.5215 (Reverse)

0.3658

0.8223

0.0131 (Reverse)

Region of Interest

0.6192 (Reverse)

0.3918 (Reverse)

0.4910 (Reverse)

0.2780 (Reverse)

In order to assess the defense capabilities of the filters under the effects of process
variations, the first defense analysis is conducted in two more experiments according to which the
threshold voltage of the tunnel field effect transistors are changed to 20% higher and 20% lower
than its typical value. The results of these two experiments are shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6
respectively. The robust regression using the least absolute residual computing method is immune
in front of the effects of process variations, while the other filters show diverse behavior in
attenuating/eliminating the payload of the Trojans.
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Table 2.5. Defense Analysis Under Process Variations (1): The performance analysis of filters
based on their corresponding modified R-squared values when a sinusoidal signal is applied to
the modulator and the threshold voltage of the transistors is 20% higher than its typical value.
Type of Filter

Modified
R-Squared Value for
(Sinusoidal Input)

Simple Linear

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 2
(Sinusoidal Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 3
(Sinusoidal Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 4
(Sinusoidal Input)

0.9999

0.9997

0.9998

0.9999

0.9998

0.9996

0.9998

0.9998

Moving Average

0.2432

0.0862

Robust Regression
(Least Absolute
Residual Method)

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

0.9997

0.9998

0.9999

Generalized Linear

Robust Regression

0.0185 (Reverse)

Median Filtering

0.1987 (Reverse)

Savitzky-Golay Filtering

0.3325

0.0077

0.0076

0.0404

ARMAX Model

0.5096

0.6182

0.4210

0.5976

0.0012

0.1671

0.0252

0.0553

Region of Interest

0.0815 (Reverse)

0.1914 (Reverse)

0.0186 (Reverse)

0.1084 (Reverse)

Table 2.6. Defense Analysis Under Process Variations (2): The performance analysis of filters
based on their corresponding modified R-squared values when a sinusoidal signal is applied to
the modulator and the threshold voltage of the transistors is 20% lower than its typical value.
Type of Filter

Modified
R-Squared Value for
(Sinusoidal Input)

Simple Linear

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 2
(Sinusoidal Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 3
(Sinusoidal Input)

Modified
R-Squared Value for
ADC under Attack 4
(Sinusoidal Input)

0.9999

1.0000

0.9999

0.9998

0.9998

0.9999

0.9998

0.9998

Moving Average

0.1380

0.2647

Robust Regression
(Least Absolute
Residual Method)

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

0.9999

0.9998

Median Filtering

0.0601 (Reverse)

0.1344

0.4268 (Reverse)

Savitzky-Golay Filtering

0.0114

0.1926

0.2509 (Reverse)

ARMAX Model

0.7790

0.3804

0.1532

0.2041

Generalized Linear

Robust Regression

Region of Interest

0.2466 (Reverse)

0.6290
0.0412 (Reverse)
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0.3750 (Reverse)

0.5772 (Reverse)
0.4485 (Reverse)
0.7705
0.0224 (Reverse)

2.11. Conclusions
We have presented the security analysis of two types of ADCs including a TFET-based
low power six-bit SAR ADC and a TFET-based first-order one-bit delta-sigma ADC. The selected
architectures are just an example and the discussed security principles can be geenralzied and
applied to any type of ADC architecture with different resolution and configuration. With respect
to the SAR ADC secrutiy study: the datapath and the control unit of the ADC are targeted for
threat and countermeasure design and development.
In addition, related flowcharts are created to depict the ADC operation under the developed
malicious and secure conditions. Finally, the impacts of these conditions on the ADC circuit
functionality and performance are investigated. According to the results, the infected ADCs
malfunction sometimes and demonstrate poor performance due to delivering less accurate and
distorted output. In addition, the output smoothness is noticeably degraded.
On the other hand, the defense circuits attempt to correct the ADC functionality in case of
error occurrence. Furthermore, they somehow filter and smooth the ADC output. The power and
area overheads caused by the Hardware Trojans as well as the defense circuits are low, considering
the small possessed portion of the SoC chip by the analog to digital converter. In regard to deltasignal ADC: the ADC architecture and the ∆Σ modulator circuit are described
Four threat models and a corresponding countermeasure are proposed. The first threat is
described as applying a wrong version of the input signal instead of the original (or healthy) version
to the modulator sometimes. The second threat is illustrated as manipulating the DAC output signal
through making it inverted, attenuated, or inverted and attenuated together sometimes. The third
threat is depicted as sending the inverted version of the modulator output bit to the digital filter
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block at any time by controlling the supply voltage of a maliciously sized TFET-based SRAM cell
locally or globally.
The fourth threat is explained as manipulating the DAC output signal through transmitting
a frequency-divided version of it (instead of the original version) sometimes. The countermeasure
is described as leveraging signal processing filters for cleansing the DAC output signal in order to
omit the malicious undesired features and alterations caused by the threats. According to the
simulation results, the second attack model demonstrates the strongest attack.
Next, the modulator functionality is analyzed with respect to the threats and the
countermeasure. The substantial action of all these threats is recognized in the positive and the
negative peaks of the DAC output signal. Although their effects can also be observed more or less
in the regions of signal transitions. Regarding the countermeasure evaluation, the best filter in
confronting the threats is the robust regression using the least absolute residual computing method.
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CHAPTER 3: BOTNET DETECTION BY TRANSFER
LEARNING AND IMAGE REPRESENTATION OF NETWORK
TRAFFIC DATA2
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we study a deep learning-based botnet detection system that includes
transfer learning as well as deep neural network as its computing elements and use image format
of network traffic data for analysis. A self-configuring and adaptive complex network that provides
connection for uniquely identifiable objects/things to the Internet using interoperable
communication protocols is called the IoT.
These objects usually have sensing, actuating, and possibly programmability capability.
They may collect information from anywhere, anytime, and from anything inside the network. One
of the critical issues for this network is preserving the privacy and the security of information. It
is critical to protect the user information using authentication and cryptographic mechanisms.
Without doing so, the IoT devices will be vulnerable to simple intrusion attempts, such as stealing
passwords.
Common attacks in the IoT era include: (1) Botnet, defining as a network of systems
combined together with the goal of remotely controlled and distributed malware. The botnet
operators are from the control center called Command and Control (C&C) Servers. They are used
to perform denial of service attacks on spam and phishing emails, exploitation of online data, and
stealing confidential information. This attack is very critical in the Internet of Things world since
many IoT devices can become a ThingBot that makes a big network of bots around us.

2

The material from this chapter were published in: Taheri, S., Salem, M. and Yuan, J.S., 2018. Leveraging image
representation of network traffic data and transfer learning in botnet detection. Big Data and Cognitive Computing,
2(4), p.37.
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Detection of ThingBots is far more difficult than traditional bots since a lot of information
can be sent from them at various locations. (2) Man-In-The-Middle Attack, in which an attacker
is trying to interrupt and breach communications between two separate systems. This attack is
dangerous since it intercepts the communication between two parties and transmits wrong
messages between them. As an example, a security threat within this context can be the presence
of one or more intruding passive radio-frequency identifications tags that act as interferences.
Within such a passive RFID network, security threat with respect to the reliability of the
system operation is the presence of a number of intruding passive RFID tags that could act as
interferers. Using these malicious tags, an attacker can use them in the network as a mean to enter
interference in the operation of the other non-malicious tags, causing impossible demodulation of
their signals [94]. Another threat in this category is the existence of malicious, selfish, and noncooperative nodes within the context of wireless networks.
They may block the transmission of packets inside the network, known as jamming of the
packet transmissions [95]. (3) Data and Identity Theft, in which attackers try to steal data and
identity through social media information, smart watches, and fitness trackers for the purpose of
stealing money; (4) Social Engineering, in which the attacker manipulates people for the sake of
giving up their confidential information. The manipulation can be done directly or through
software; and (5) Denial of Service, in which a service becomes unavailable due to overloading
computing systems.
In its distributed form, a large number of these systems are targeted by a botnet, in which
many devices are accessed at the same time. Also, other vulnerabilities of the IoT devices include:
(a) Mirai botnet, which was able to infect many IoT devices (primarily routers and cameras),
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execute the denial of service attack on a domain name service provider, and disrupt many service
providers, such as Twitter or other major companies.
This attack takes advantage of the kernels of the devices. It is actually one of the most
prominent examples of the denial of service attack using a piece of malware to find and infect the
IoT devices; (b) Cold in Finland, in which two buildings were undergoing a denial of service attack
in which the heating system kept restarting. (c) Brickerbot, which is a denial of service attack that
simply kills the devices. (d) Botnet Barrage, which attacked many devices in a university according
to which the devices of the campus became slow or inaccessible.
Clearly, botnets are among the most serious malwares for conducting cybercrimes,
especially in the IoT world [96-98]. The main evolution of botnet detection was with the
appearance of SDBot and AgoBot. Many botnets have been introduced, namely Bashlite, Carna,
as well as Mirai. Mirai emerged as a high-profile denial of service attack. This botnet can take
advantage from efficient spread across the Internet, prevalent usage of insecure passwords, and
wrong assumption of having simple behavior for the botnet.
Mirai has many variations, but all follow the same principle. These malwares cause a large
volume of infected computers (known as bots) to engage in illegal activities inside a tuple stage
of: (i) spread; (ii) command and control; and (iii) launch. A number of examples can be mentioned
as: distributed denial of service attacks; spreading spams; brute force cracking; identity theft; click
frauds; carrying distributed computing tasks for illegal purposes; adware installation; and stealing
sensitive information of users.
The bots are created and controlled remotely through channels for command and control
and by botmaster (i.e., a single attacker or a group of attackers). Different communication protocols
and network topologies can be considered for these channels. The scale and controllability of
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botnets are evolving in the Internet. The difference between them and the other malwares is their
ability to perform autonomously and the possibility of equipping them with different applications,
such as communication channels for receiving commands and code updates from the central unit.
Therefore, the bot and the botmaster can communicate with each other in regards to the
working status and the status update. Within this communication, the Internet Protocol (IP)
address, domain name system (DNS), and node identification number for locating the controlling
unit are known. These malwares are used for transmission of malicious information and codes,
sending spams, deceiving and generating virtual attacks, launching strong attacks, and stealing
sensitive information.
The activities of botnets make most of the ongoing traffic data in the Internet. Their scope
of malicious activities can include economical organization, military stations, and house
appliances (such as compromised refrigerators, and security cameras). The type of networks used
for botnets is peer-to-peer that improves their resiliency in front of defense mechanisms. The
manager of the infected computers (or bots), called botmaster to distribute the commands.
It is difficult to detect the bots within this network topology due to their evasive nature.
The operations of Mirai botnet and the structure of a typical botnet are shown in Figures 3.1 and
3.2. The importance of botnet communication in real traffic data can be observed in Figure 3.3
(captured from [99]). Detection of these bots can be classified into four categories using: (a)
signature from data; (b) anomaly from data; (c) DNS of data; and (d) machine/deep learningenabled engines.
In the first category, the botnets have certain characteristics that can be used for their
identification using network traffic. The best candidate methods to detect bots are real conditions.
The anomalous network behaviors are discovered by the anomaly-based approaches. These
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techniques look for specific parameters, such as delay from network and the running operations
on the ports with less usage. If the normal traffic data are mixed with the anomalous traffic data,
then these techniques may be weak for demonstrating their functionality.
The DNS information of the bots can be used by the DNS-based techniques in order to
detect them. All the discussed techniques until this point are traditional in a sense that they can
only detect the well-known bots. In order to detect new (and unknown) bots, machine learningbased systems need to be developed since they are capable of understanding and predicting
unexpected patterns from the network traffic. Using these methods, useful features are extracted
from the data and learning algorithms are utilized with the goal of recognizing bots.

Command and
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Loader

Report Server
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Infect Command

Bot
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Figure 3.1. The operations of the Mirai botnet.
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Figure 3.2. The network architecture for a typical botnet.

Figure 3.3. The ongoing cyber-attacks in real world—having 45% bot communication among all
the ongoing malware traffic data in Spain last month (at the time of accessing [99]).
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Two classical machine learning techniques are using: (a) statistical methods and (b)
behavioral techniques. These techniques perform the task of classification through extracting
patterns from empirical data using a set of selective features. These techniques may suffer from
designing the best features for classification. In order to tackle this problem, a new approach has
been proposed according to which the features are automatically learned from raw data, which is
called representation learning.
A typical approach in this regard is representation learning that demonstrated acceptable
performance in many domains, including image classification and speech recognition. One of the
most well-known approaches for representation learning is convolutional neural network (CNN).
We can enter the traffic data into the CNN in numeric or image format.
Contributions. We propose in this work is a deep learning-based engine for botnet detection
system that inputs the image representation of network traffic data into a fine-tuned pre-trained
CNN for botnet detection. Also, the system performance is compared with its counterparts as well
as the traditional machine learning-based systems.
The organization of the following parts of this chapter is according to this: Section 3.2
presents the related works. Section 3.3 shows the background of the techniques used in our
methodology. Our designed deep learning-based engine for botnet detection is described in Section
3.4. The results, evaluation, analysis, and limitations of the experimental evaluation of this method
are all given in Section 3.5. We conclude the work in Section 3.6.
3.2 Related Works
As it was discussed in the introduction, we can divide the botnet detection techniques into
four categories based on usage of: (a) data signature; (b) data anomaly; (c) DNS of data; and (d)
deep/machine learning-based engines. Most of the proposed methods so far are included in the
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category of traditional botnets. The authors of [96] proposed using signature-based and behaviorbased analysis according to which a correlation engine is employed for generating the final
detection results and adjusting them using a multi-feedback engine.
The network traffic has been monitored for suspicious behavior through looking at
parameters such as nicknames, servers, and ports with less commonality. Another botnet detection
method uses n-gram analysis and a scoring system [97]. Another work in this domain is based on
a detection model being used for recognizing the characteristic fact of the commands from
botmaster and his bots [98]. In [100], the dialogs are monitored based on the events and the sources
of information.
Once a dialog matches what exists for a successful infection, then it is called an infection.
With respect to anomaly-based approaches, the networks and servers for command and control as
well as the infected hosts are identified in a network for local areas with the assumption of having
no knowledge of signatures as well as the C&C server addresses. Through this process, what is
captured is the spatial-temporal correlation of network traffic within the same botnet.
The captured information is inputted to statistical algorithms for botnet detection [101]. An
algorithm for universal compression was employed for a detection system, named the Lempel Ziv,
and was proposed in [102] according to which the traffic data is given a probability and the new
traffic data is estimated based on a specific likelihood. In [103], the statistical features of the
requests with HTTP format from the client-side and the responses of DNS from the server-side are
gathered for detection of HTTP-based C&C traffic.
In this process, three unsupervised anomaly detection techniques are employed for
isolation of suspicious information under transmission. Regarding DNS-based approaches, a
mechanism has been proposed in [104] that performs classification of the DNS traffic data from
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single hosts and a group of hosts periodically using duplicate queries. The power spectral density
is leveraged in order to recognize major frequencies in the periodic DNS queries of botnets [105].
Using this technique, the timing information of queries are utilized without considering the
number of queries and domains. The authors of [106] utilize clustering and classification
algorithms in order to remove noise and separate domains from each other based on similarity in
the characteristic distribution of domain names. The bots from each botnet and offline malwares
of the machines with infection are identified using collaborative filtering.
The recent and more effective approaches to detect botnets are machine learning-based that
are more beneficial for IoT botnets. In these techniques, the network traffic data are mostly
analyzed at the network-level, analyzing flows of the traffic conversations. The authors of [107]
showed the features based on flow such as small packet rate, initial packet length, packet ratio, and
bot response packet can be given to boosted decision tree, naïve Bayesian classifier, and Support
Vector Machine (SVM) algorithms for botnet detection.
In [108], the authors showed 21 flow-based features categorized based on byte, time,
behavior, and packet. Then, the features with the most useful information are selected for detection
of botnet. There are three important behaviors for network, called long active communication,
connection failure, and network scanning for feature extraction. The used data in this process are
the network layer flows and the transport layer.
The botmasters are identified using particle swarm optimization and K-means algorithms.
The authors of [109] proposed using deep learning in developing a botnet detection model
according to which the packets are converted into tokenized integer format by word embedding
and inputted to a bidirectional long short term memory-based recurrent neural network for learning
from and detecting of botnets. The BotHunter was proposed in [99] as one of the earliest botnet
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behavior detection systems that tries to correlate the generated alarms by Snort (which is a free
and open-source network intrusion detection system) to the behavior of an individual host.
The other detection system is BotMiner [110] that considers group behavior of individual
bots within the same botnet. A decision tree has been proposed by [111] in which they use reduced
error pruning algorithm for improving the performance. Usage of IP addresses as a reputed feature
is another aspect of their work that resulted in an increase in their detection accuracy. [112]
demonstrated that detection of infected IoT devices included inside a botnet is made possible with
a logistic regression-based mode.
In this model, the probability of having a bot for a device is calculated. The IoTSec has
been proposed as a software defined networking approach to enhance the security policies
specifically in front of IoT bots [113]. The characteristics of network traffic data were studied in
[114] for the purpose of botnet detection and control phase under the radar through malicious
email, website, file sharing networks, and ad-hoc wireless networks.
In [115], a host-based botnet detection system has been proposed in which a flow-based
detection method is utilized that considers the log files of the machines. The authors of [116]
developed a system for detection of botnet that leverages data mining approach for analysis of the
network traffic data at the gateway level. An adaptive learning rate multi-layer feed-forward neural
network has been used in [117] for botnet detection.
3.3. Background
In this section, the fundamental concepts and techniques that are employed in the proposing
system are discussed. These concepts and techniques include network traffic data to image
conversion, transfer learning, and the pre-trained Dense Convolutional Neural Network (known as
DenseNet) are all explained.
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3.3.1. Network Traffic Data to Image Conversion
The concept of network traffic data to image conversion for classification has recently
proposed in [118]. They showed the effectiveness of this technique scientifically in classification
of the network traffic data. Their results show high accuracy, precision, recall, and F-1 score in
binary classification of normal and malware traffic data. According to their study, the traffic
classification methods can be divided into four methods: port based, deep packets inspection (DPI)
based, statistical based, and behavioral based.
The port-based and DPI-based approaches peform traffic classification by matching
predefined hard-coded rules. The statistical-based and behavioral-based methods operate based on
classifying traffic through extracting patterns from empirical data using a set of selective features.
Desiging the proper features for these two later methods is a new challenge that is under extensive
research. This challenge has been resolved to a certain extent by a new approach called
Representation Learning that learns features automatically from raw data and reduced the need for
hand-designing features.
Applying deep learning as part of representation learning has shown promising
performance in image classification. In classification of network traffic representation, the
continuous traffic should be split to discrete units based on granualrity. In addition, different Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) or Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)
layers can be chosen in every packet.
The network traffic split granularity include: TCP connection, flow, session, service, and
host. Having different split granularity results in different traffic units. A flow is defined as all
packets that has the same five-tuple namely: source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port,
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and transport-level protocol. A session is defined as bidirectional flows including both directions
of traffic (i.e. the source and destination IP / port are interchangeable).
Considering the packet layers analysis, intuitively the intrinsic characteristics should be
reflected in application layer of TCP/IP model, i.e. layer 7 of OSI model. We have two types of
packet layers choice to be selected: all layers (All) and only layer 7 (L7). The IP and media access
control (MAC) information in a session or flow may damage the feature extrcation procedure. For
removal of the negative impact, we must eliminate that information through randominzation that
is also called traffic anonymization or sanitization.
The leveraged data preprocessing is the procedure of converting raw traffic data (PCAP
format) to CNN input image. According to this procedure, the raw data go through a three-stage
data processing before its image format come out. The stages in this data processing can be
described as: (a) Traffic split, in which a continuous raw traffic data in the PCAP (abbreviation for
packet capture) format is split to multiple discrete traffic units.
Depending on the type of data representation, the output can be either PCAP for flow-based
all layers or BIN (binary) for flow-based application layer (or the seventh layer). When the
representation type is Flow + All or Session + All, the output data is PCAP, and when it is Flow +
L7 or Session + L7, then the output data format is BIN. (b) Traffic clear, in which the media access
control address and the IP address are randomized in data link layer and internet protocol layer at
first.
This processing step is called anonymization/sanitization. This step needs to be done in
cases the traffics are from different networks. Once this step is done, then it is required to remove
duplicate or empty data. The duplicate data are due to the same content in some packets and the
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empty data are due to no application layer in some packets. Without removing these, there will be
bias in training CNN. (c) Image generation, in which the outliers are removed at first.
The outliers are defined as traffic data that have significantly different size from the rest of
the data. Next, the remaining data are adjusted to a specific length. Those data that are less than
the chosen length are padded with 0XFF (i.e., the numerical representation of white color). The
result data with the same size are transformed into images with gray-level format. Through visual
comparison of the images, it is easy to distinguish them and their differences are observable.
In [119], the authors worked on employing nonparametric kernel embedding based method
to convert early flow sequences into images that fully capture the static and dynamic behaviors of
different applications and avoid using handcrafted features that might cause loss of information.
They applied a CNN on the generated images for obtaining traffic classification results. In our
work, we leveraged this technique of converting network traffic data into images [118] within the
context of botnet traffic data detection.
This means the scientific background of this idea is already established. In other words,
representation learning, fully capturing the statics and the dynamic behaviors of the data, and
avoiding handcrafted features that may cause loss of information are the main reasons why this
idea of image generation is working in our system. Figure 3.4 shows some samples of normal and
botnet network traffic data (from the CTU-13 dataset [120]) in the image format.
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(a) Normal traffic data in the image format.

(b) Botnet traffic data in the image format
Figure 3.4. A few samples of converted the normal and the botnet network traffic data to image
from CTU-13 dataset [120].
3.3.2. The Neural Networks with Pre-Trained Weights
A neural network with pre-trained condition can be defined as a model that has been trained
on another problem as a starting point to be used for solving a similar problem. The training
happens through running images from thousands of object categories, such as keyboard, pencil,
coffee, and many animals. According to this technique, there is no need to create a model from
scratch. In fact, the pre-trained neural network is utilized to extract powerful information as well
as features from diverse images.
The acquired knowledge can be applied to other tasks. The other benefit that comes with
this approach is a faster and easier training process for other tasks since instead of training from
scratch, the network only needs to be fine-tuned for another targeted task. As an example for
certain tasks such as object recognition or cars with self-driving and –learning capability, maybe
months are needed to build the model from scratch [121-125].
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Using pre-trained networks, the faster execution time comes at the expense of less
accuracy. These models help learn an algorithm or try out existing frameworks. This technique is
highly desirable for applications with time limitations and computational resources do not allow
us to build a ground-up model. Therefore, a pre-trained model may be used as a benchmark for
improvement of existing models or testing the already built model for different applications [126128]. One option for the pre-trained model is convolutional neural network.
The common layers in a CNN are named as input layer, convolutional layers, rectified
linear unit, cross channels normalization layers, average pooling layers, max pooling layers, fullyconnected layers, dropout layers, softmax layers, and output classification layers [129-131]. In
training the network, the learning occurs from the data directly and the complexity and detail of
learned information is augmented from layer to layer. Nowadays, it may not be fully practical to
train a CNN from scratch especially due to time limitation. As a result, a CNN with pre-trained
condition can also be used as a feature extraction module.
3.3.3. Live Network Traffic Data Acquisition
In computer forensics, there are two types of data for examinations: (a) real-time/live
analysis; and (b) dead/offline/static analysis. The case of live acquisition happens when the
investigation is done on a live system. The data is acquired, processed, and investigated while the
system is on. However, in the dead analysis, the data have already been acquired and processed
later on. So, when we consider real time analysis of data, as soon as the data become available, it
is processed to understand and make conclusions.
In this case, the investigation is carried out immediately and it is determined whether the
network traffic data is normal or botnet. If a malware is detected, the corresponding
countermeasures can be taken. Due to quick reaction from the system without significant delay,
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less infection and damage can happen. While the offline analysis of data can determine the system
status after the problems occur.
We performed capturing live network traffic data from the University of Central Florida
(UCF) campus network and a local residential place. The tool that we used for capturing data is
the Wireshark capture engine. The leveraged interface is Wi-Fi with a buffer size of 2 MB. Also,
the used name resolutions are Resolve MAC Addresses, network names, and transport names. A
new PCAP file is created every 30 min. A snapshot of the acquired network traffic data is shown
in Figure 3.5. The UCF network traffic data are not shown due to restrictions.

Figure 3.5. A snapshot of the captured traffic data from a local residential network.
3.4. Proposed System and Methodology
The detail of our system for detection of botnet traffic data is proposed in this part. As it
can be seen in Figure 3.6, the flow of system can be split into two main parts: (a) transformation
of network traffic data into image and (b) classification of botnet and normal network traffic data.
In phase (a), the raw traffic data are partitioned based on the flow. A network flow is defined as
all the packets that have the same five-tuple, i.e., source IP, source port, destination IP, destination
port, and transport-level protocol.
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According to this partitioning, a set of raw traffic data are split into a number of subsets.
In each subset, the packets are arranged in time-order. Regarding the packet layers to be involved
into our analysis, the intrinsic characteristics of the packet layers are reflected into application
layer of TCP/IP model, while other layers contain some traffic feature information, which can be
used for identification of certain network attacks.
Input Data: Network Traffic Data
Flow Generation for
All Layers of Packet Type

Empty and Duplicate
Files Removal

Uniform Length
Adjustment

Batch Normalization-Rectified
Linear Unit-Pooling-Convolution

Softmax
Classifier
(Linear)

Pooling

Pooling

Dense Block 4
Convolution

Convolution

Image Generation

(a)

Dense Block 1

Batch Normalization-Rectified
Linear Unit-Pooling-Convolution

Trace Sanitization

Classification Result

Other Classification Methods
Making Images
One-Dimensional

Principal Component
Analysis
(Feature Extraction)

Classification Result
Support Vector Machine
Logsitic Regression

Support Vector Machine
(Classification)

(b)

Classification Result

Figure 3.6. The flow of botnet detection using DenseNet, Support Vector Machine, Logistic
Regression, a combination of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and SVM: (a)
transformation of network traffic data into image and (b) classification of transformed network
traffic data into image using DenseNet (top), only SVM or logistic regression (middle), and the
series connection of PCA as feature extractor and SVM as classifier (bottom).
In the beginning, a continuous raw traffic is split into multiple discrete traffic units. Next,
for elimination of the negative impact of the IP and the MAC address information in a flow, that
information is removed through a randomization process, usually called traffic sanitization.
According to this procedure, the MAC address and IP address are randomized in the data link layer
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and IP layer, respectively. After this cleaning process, it is needed to clean files for some packets
that have no application layer and accordingly the result bin files will be empty.
Also, a number of packets generate the same files when they have the same information
and content. This fact leads to having bias during training and they need to be removed as well.
After this step, the content of files are read in ASCII-encoded binary representations before being
adjusted uniformly in length. After this step, the data is converted into image. Having done so, the
second phase is classification of the network traffic data, which are now images, for determination
of their identity.
In other words, it is required to determine whether they are botnet or normal. Three types
of methods for classification have been selected, namely: (a) CNN-DenseNet (with/without
transfer learning); (b) support vector machine; (c) logistic regression; (d) a series connection of
principal component analysis (PCA) as feature extractor and SVM as classifier. For CNN, the
images are given directly as input.
For transfer learning, the ImageNet weights are loaded and different set of layers of CNN
are frozen during training to see their impact on the detection accuracy. In order to input the images
to the SVM and the logistic regression, they are transformed into a one-dimensional vector. With
respect to the last computing process to mention, the images are sent directly to the PCA for
decomposition and transformation. Next, the PCA output that represents the features of images are
provided to the SVM for classification. The flow of our system is shown algorithmically in
Algorithm 3.1.
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Algorithm 3.1: The Flow of botnet traffic data detection.
01: Input Parameters: Network Traffic Data
02: Output Parameters: Normal or Botnet Traffic Data Classification Outcome
03: Data Acquisition:
04: Data (in PCAP format) ← Acquiring normal/botnet network traffic data
05: Data Preprocessing:
06: Data ← All Layer Flow Generation (Data)
07: Data ← Trace Sanitization (Data)
08: Data ← Empty and Duplicate File Removal (Data)
09: Data ← Uniform Length Adjustment (Data)
10: Image ← Image Generation (Data)
11: Botnet Detection:
12: Fine-Tuned DenseNet Model ← Fine-Tuning Pre-trained DenseNet on ImageNet
Dataset (Training Images)
13: Trained SVM Model ← SVM (Flattened Training Images)
14: Trained Logistic Regression Model ← Logistic Regression (Flattened Training Images)
16: PCA Features ← PCA (Training Images)
17: Trained PCA-SVM Model ← SVM (PCA Features)
18: Made Decision from DenseNet ← Fine-Tuned DenseNet Model (Testing Images)
19: Made Decision from SVM ← Trained SVM Model (Flattened Testing Images)
20: Made Decision from Logistic Regression ← Trained Logistic Regression Model
(Flattened Testing Images)
21: Made Decision from PCA-SVM System ← Trained PCA-SVM Model (Testing Images)
3.5. Results
In this part, we present our experiments with the systematic approaches described above to
see their capabilities in botnet detection. The system is implemented using Python programming
language and Keras as a backend. The dataset used in our experiments is the CTU-13 dataset,
which is a dataset with given labels for botnet, normal and background traffic. We only employed
the botnet and the normal traffic data from this dataset.
All the data are transformed into images according to the discussed technique, letting us
analyze the influence of transfer learning in botnet detection using the obtained images. In this
regard, no weights are given to the DenseNet in the first run (which means no transfer learning).
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Afterwards, the beginning of the first, the second, the third, and the fourth dense block are selected
as the starting point for fine-tuning (or retraining) the CNN.
This means all the layers before the starting point are fixed (or frozen) and their transferred
weights remain unchanged. The ImageNet weights are given for this experiment. In all of these
experiments, the system is trained for three epochs. The evaluation results of these experiments
are shown in Figure 3.7. As it can be seen from the Figure 3.7, the best accuracy (99.98%) is
achieved when 10 number of layers are fixed. Also, the demonstrated accuracy without transfer
learning is noticeably low comparing to its TL-based counterparts.

Figure 3.7. Results of using transfer learning in DenseNet for botnet detection.
Additionally, we tested our system (fine-tuned using the CTU-13 dataset) on another solely
botnet dataset, named the Information security and object technology (ISOT) Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) botnet dataset (only the botnet portion) [132]. The results show that they system
is strong enough to detect botnet traffic data with accuracy of 100%. Although this result may
slightly be different in other runs of the code.
In order to make our analysis more comprehensive, we captured live traffic data from the
UCF network and a local residential place. This live data can show the performance of our system
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for real-world applications. The tested system achieves an accuracy of 99.35% that is promising
to employ this engine in the IoT and wearable devices.
In order to further assess the capability of our proposed system, we compare our results
with the reported results from a number of recent published works in the area of botnet detection.
This comparison is provided in Table 3.1. As it can be seen from the shown table, the closest
counterparts to our method in terms of accuracy are the PCA-SVM ssytem, [133], and clustering
in [134]. However, they are less effective in the other parameters.
Table 3.1. The comparison of classification results among Densenet, SVM, logistic regression,
and PCA-SVM system.
Score Merit
Accuracy (%) Area under Curve (%) Precision (%) Recall (%) F-1 Score (%) Kappa (%)
CNN: DenseNet (Best Result)
99.98
99.99
99.98
99.98
99.98
99.96
(for CTU-13 Dataset)
Support Vector Machine
83.15
75.80
80.73
98.07
88.56
57.72
(for CTU-13 Dataset)
Logistic Regression
78.56
81.06
92.76
73.49
82.01
56.35
(for CTU-13 Dataset)
PCA-SVM System
95.84
94.41
96.00
96.00
96.00
90.16
(for CTU-13 Dataset)
CNN: DenseNet (Best Result)
(for ISOT HTTP Botnet Dataset [36],
100
99.99
100
100
100
100
Only Botnet Traffic Data)
[133]
94.70
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
[135]: K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN)
90.20
N/A
89.50
91.00
90.30
N/A
(for T1 training set)
[135]: C4.5 (for T1 training set)
90.10
N/A
89.10
91.20
90.10
N/A
[135]: Random Forest (RF)
90.80
N/A
90.70
91.00
90.80
N/A
(for T1 training set)
[135]: Naïve Bayes
85.90
N/A
83.10
90.20
86.50
N/A
(for T1 training set)
[134]: Clustering
98.39
N/A
86.45
84.47
85.45
N/A
[134]: Neural Network
89.38
N/A
92.50
85.70
88.97
N/A
[134]: Recurrent Neural Network
83.09
N/A
95.41
69.53
80.44
N/A

We also performed a timing analysis on the system operation during training and testing
of the pre-processed network traffic data (or the images) when the CTU-13 dataset is used. There
are 403,004 number of images during training and 47,759 number of images during testing. The
system execution time is around 283.22 min during training (for three epochs) and 4.65 min during
testing. If we divide the execution time by the number of images, then the time it takes to process
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each image is 0.702772 milliseconds during training for three epochs. With considering the
number of epochs, then the time is 0.234257 for one epoch.
On the other side, we have the execution time of 0.0973638 milliseconds for each image
during testing. Each flow has an average number of packets of 20 [136, 137]. Considering this
value, the time to process each packet during training and testing are 0.011713 and 0.004868
milliseconds, respectively. By taking a look at the testing time of each packet, we can say
integrating even the current system in some IoT devices is not out of expectation. Figure 3.8
visualizes the training and the testing time of the botnet detection system.
Another analysis that has been done regarding the comparison between DenseNet, in
transfer learning (TL) when 10 layers are fixed, SVM, and Logistic Regression are based on their
confusion matrices. As it can be seen from Figure 3.9, the highest number of true positives and
true negatives are achieved when DenseNet is used. It means the normal traffic data are correctly
classified as normal and reach to their destinations and the botnet traffic data are correctly
classified as botnet and blocked from their targeted points.

Figure 3.8. The execution time of the botnet detection system during training and testing.
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The SVM shows better performance against Logistic Regression in terms of true negative,
while the logistic regression shows better performance in terms of true positives. On the other
hand, the SVM caters higher false positives, while the logistic regression brings more false
negatives. The interpretation of this action is having more unauthorized access when SVM is used
and more denial of access (service) when logistic regression is used.

(a) DenseNet

(b) SVM

(c) Logistic Regression

Figure 3.9. Analysis of confusion matrix of DenseNet (a), SVM (b), and Logistic Regression (c)
in classification of botnet and normal traffic data.
3.6. Discussion
The possible limitations of this system and its corresponding solutions are discussed here.
When a system is built using a deep learning engine, it may contain certain limitations, such as
being data hungry, having a power constraint, being complex, and being unable to deliver realtime response. These requirements are mostly referenced during the training and can be overcomed
by incorporating sufficient performance hardware.
In other words, once the system is trained for certain number epochs and input data, then
it only needs to be tested. The testing time is much less than the training time. In addition, there
are many real world applications of deep learning such as Image Recognition, Speech Recognition,
Medical Diagnosis, Statistical Arbitrage, Learning Associations, Classification, Extraction, and
Regression [138]. The same underlying technqiues used to make them suitable them for real world
applications can be used for botnet detection as well.
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As an example, many smart phones nowadays are capable of face recognition [139, 140]
and equipped with AI learning and testing tasks. Furthermore, there are a number of related works
published: DeepX has been presented in [141, 142], which is a software accelerator for deep
learning execution. Using this interface, the device resources are lowered significantly (including
memeory, computation, and energy) to overcome the bottleneck of mounting deep learning
engines on mobile devices.
A technique based on edge computing has been proposed in [143] for improving the
performance of deep learning applications. What we learned from design, development, and testing
of this deep learning-based botnet detection engine is that visualization of the network traffic data
provides certain informative features about the ongoing packets in the network, which may not be
easily seen by the one-dimensional numerical format of the traffic data.
The traditional machine learning classifiers are easily defeated by the neural networks. It
means that the assumptions of linearity for the decision by logistic regression and considering a
hyper-plane for differentiation of the images are not as effective as the learning layers and the
decision layer(s) of neural networks. Another lesson is the importance of having sufficient number
of normal and botnet traffic data during training to build a high performance system.
We realize that it is important to check the strength of our system in front of live data since
it shows how it behaves in real circumstances. The value of transfering knowledge from a different
domain into the security context is another aspect of this work that should not be neglected. Also,
it has been realized that a deep neural network can be more effective than shallow neural networks
when we use dataset weights.
The performance metrics, accuracy (as a measure of errors of the system, how it biases
toward categories), precision (as the fraction of retrieved network traffic data that are related to
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the query), recall (as the fractional of the related network traffic data that are successfully
retrieved), F1 score (as a combination of the precision and recall based on its mean), and Kappa
(as a measure of inter-rater agreement for qualitative items) are examined for understanding the
system behavior and getting the interpretations.
The interpretation can be stated as a deep neural network with transferred knowledge
surpasses a simple neural network and traditional machine learning engines (like SVM, logistic
regression, a series connection of PCA and SVM, KNN, RF, C4.5, Naïve Bayes, Clustering) in
having the least system errors and being biased correctly toward the targeted categories, and can
deliver the highest performance in correctly retrieving related network traffic data.
Transferring knowledge from a different domain can help in improving the system
performance, but the most optimal layer needs to be chosen as well. According to this lesson, a
specific number of layers should be fixed before starting the fine tuning process. At last, the speed
of the botnet detection engine matters the most when it is employed in the IoT and wearable
devices. This speed can be improved by using hardware accelerators and software algorithms.
3.7. Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a deep learning-based botnet detection engine that gets raw
network traffic data as input and transforms them into images. The images are input into a deep
CNN, DenseNet for classification of normal and botnet traffic data. Also, the idea of transfer
learning has been leveraged to evaluate the effectiveness of loading weights from a previously
trained model on a different dataset.
The experimental results show using transfer learning in classification of image
representation of network traffic data can lead to getting accuracy up to 99.98%, Area Under Curve
up to 99.99%, precision up to 99.98%, recall up to 99.98%, F-1 score up to 99.98%, and kappa up
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to 99.96%. Also, the obtained true positives and true negatives are 47,750 out of 47,759. Instead
of DenseNet, three other classification system, SVM, logistic regression, and a series connection
of PCA and SVM have been examined.
They demonstrated less strength in botnet detection comparing to the proposing system.
Overall, we believe that this work is a contribution to the communities of IoT security. In future
work, it has been planned to extend the ideas of one-dimensional data to image conversion and
transfer learning for detection of other security vulnerabilities, namely Spyware, Phishing, and
Spam in the IoT world. Also, we will use different types of neural networks for a comparative
study.
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CHAPTER 4: DESIGN AND PRIVACY-PRESERVING AND
SECURE BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION SYSTEM3
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we study a deep learning-based biometric recognition system that includes
certain computing elements for transfer learning and homomorphic encryption that interacts with
multiple parties and is capable of detecting true or fake type of data. Biometrics is a tool to
automatically distinguish subjects in a reliable manner for a target application based on the derived
signals from physical or behavioral traits (such as fingerprint, iris, palm veins, face, DNA, voice
pattern, facial pattern, and hand geometry).
In comparison to the classical security methods (including PIN, password, key, and card),
this technology provides several benefits such as being a unique identification of individuals,
mobile, very hard to forge, always with the user (no external carrying), user friendly, and secure.
The process of recognizing the objects/individuals in an automated manner using their biometric
data is called biometric recognition system (BRS).
A BRS has had applications in the law enforcement for decades in authentication of
individuals; however, nowadays smartphones rely on biometrics for verification of the user as
well. Traditionally, these systems include server-side database owner and users who submit
candidate biometric records for verification of the identity profiles. These data can be used to
measure biological characteristics for identification and classification of entities.
Two biometric data that have gained significant attention are iris and fingerprint.
Fingerprint is the fundamental and traditional elements to use for identification of human beings.

3

The material from this chapter were published in: Salem, M., Taheri, S. and Yuan, J.S., 2019. Utilizing transfer
learning and homomorphic encryption in a privacy preserving and secure biometric recognition system. Computers,
8(1), p.3.
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This element, as shown in Figure 4.1, includes a pattern of ridge and valleys on the surface of a
fingertip that is formed during the starting months of development of fetus.
Even, twins from the same parents or the prints from the fingers of the same person are not
the same. Multiple fingerprints of one person can provide additional information to allow higher
level of recognition. Small cuts and bruises on the fingerprints or other factors such as aging or
being exposed to environmental parameters can cause degradation of the recognition accuracy.

Core: Loop (in here)

Bifurcation

Ridge Ending

Region of Interest

Figure 4.1. An authentic fingerprint.
Iris is another and more recent element for human recognition. As shown in Figure 4.2, it
is the annular region of the eye, which is bounded by the pupil and the sclera on either side. Similar
to fingerprint, its texture and structure are formed during fetal development. They are stabilized
after few years from its formation.
The iris texture holds unique information for recognition and identification purposes which
can be leveraged to provide high system accuracy. As opposed to fingerprint, changing or
tampering the iris pattern does not happen easily. The preprocessed format of iris that is ready for
feature (i.e., the unique information) extraction is shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.2. A human eye [144].

Normalized Iris

Raw Iris

Localized Iris

Figure 4.3. The raw, localized, and normalized version of an iris.
In a modern biometric recognition system, the biometric data of the users collected during
registration are stored in the cloud and are accessed during verification. Storing the biometric data
in the cloud enables the verification process, performing numerous computations, and storing a
large volume of data. Despite all these benefits, this technology is not without its side effects.
The security and privacy of information heightens when biometric data is being shared,
since biometric data, unlike passwords and PINs, cannot be reset and one leak of information can
have inevitable consequences. These data should not be exposed to third party and should be under
control anywhere outside the user side. To address this problem, the biometric data stored in the
cloud should be secured through encryption.
By having encrypted data within the cloud, the privacy of entities are preserved. However,
simply encrypting the data makes it unusable with the computing processes in the cloud. Therefore,
it is required to provide a framework for applying mathematical functions on the encrypted data
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on the cloud side. This is a mandatory requirement; otherwise the plain and unencrypted biometric
information is at risk and can be changed or leaked.
Additionally, encrypting the data by any arbitrary encryption scheme is not possible since
applying a minor change on the plain information can lead to major change in the ciphertext. This
major change leads to unrecognizable data after decryption. This challenge can be solved through
encrypting the sensitive data using a scheme that has homomorphism. When the data is
homomorphically encrypted, certain operations can be carried out using the ciphertext, and
leveraging this homomorphism enables cloud computing.
In this way, the data is processed for recognition purposes without sharing the plaintext
information. Therefore, a homomorphically encrypted data is protected against the attackers and
honest-but-curious servers since it is never decrypted. Another challenge in this domain relates to
the recognition process. A successful recognition of biometric data highly depends on the
development of efficient feature extractors that are capable of obtaining meaningful information
from the data.
Traditionally hand-crafted, manual, or trial-and-error-based feature extractors were used to
represent the biometric data and help in the recognition task. In the recent years, with the advent
of deep learning, neural networks have been deployed in this domain they have been proven to
extract useful features and information from the data and achieve high accuracy. A recognition
system that takes advantage of these networks, given enough data, can surpass human-made
features and human-level accuracy in many applications.
However, compared to other similar image recognition tasks, gathering a large amount of
data is arduous in this domain. Moreover, a trained model on the biometric data holds information
about the data distribution and can be a point of vulnerability. A solution to these challenges is
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applying transfer learning and transferring knowledge from another task to the biometric
verification task. In this work a deep learning-based biometric recognition system within the
privacy preserving domain is developed.
In this system a pre-trained deep neural network is used to extract features from the
biometric data, alleviating the problems of small data and eliminating the need to train a model
and the possibility of information leakage through the model. Moreover, the biometric data is
encrypted using a partially homomorphic encryption and stays safe within the system while
verification is being carried out.
There are multiple parties in our computation model, including client, authentication
server, database, and matcher that provide an added level of security and privacy. We also show
that the pre-trained network is useful not only for recognition of different entities, but also for
detection of true and fake biometric data. The system extracts the features of biometric data from
a deep neural network (known as off-the-shelf features).
To preserve the privacy of extracted features and make them safe and protected, they are
masked and also encrypted using Paillier Chunkwise. Then, the encrypted features are recognized
on the cloud-side without being decrypted, leveraging the additive homomorphism property of the
applied encryption method. To further increase the system security and make its recognition
functionality more accurate, a true/fake detector is implemented on the user side.
This detector utilizes the extracted deep features by inputting them into a Support Vector
Machine for distinguishing the true and the fake biometric data. Our main contribution can be
stated as:
1. Proposing DeepZeroID system, which makes a bridge between deep features,
homomorphic encryption, and biometric security. Moreover, the running protocol among
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all parties within the system that takes an encrypted and masked data for query
computations has been demonstrated. In this way, accessing, computing, and storing the
data by the agents and parties inside the framework become more secure. This system has
the capability of having zero information leakage for two reasons. Firstly biometric data
stays encrypted in the system. The encryption prevents the attackers from gaining access
to any sensitive data or the contents of the individual queries. Secondly the neural network
used as a feature extractor is not trained on biometric data and has no knowledge of the
data distribution. This lack of knowledge enables the scalability of the proposed system as
well, since new user can be added without the need for changing the feature extractor.
2. Development of CNNOptLayer, which is an algorithm that performs an exhaustive search
operation among all layers of the convolutional neural network under process. It is capable
of finding the optimal layer for feature extraction.
3. Inclusion of a single Convolutional Neural network as the feature extractor for multiple
tasks within the system (namely iris/fingerprint recognition and true/fake detection). The
feature extraction is performed based on leveraging the CNNOptLayer algorithm.
4. Improving the encryption speed of a CNN-based privacy preserving biometric recognition
system by utilization of Paillier Chunkwise.
5. Presentation of new attacks and malicious scenarios for deep learning-based biometric
recognition system and demonstrating the weaknesses and deficiencies of the system under
these attacks.
The rest of this chapter is structured as: the background of the work is presented in Section
5.2. In the background section, the general information about transfer learning, homomorphic
encryption, the leveraged deep neural networks within the biometric system, and true/fake
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detection of biometric data (which is a part of our system) are discussed. Section 5.3 discusses the
related works. Section 5.4 describes our proposing system and methodology. In this section, the
general overview of our privacy preserving biometric recognition system is explained.
The processing flow of biometric data from the user-side perspective is described as well.
At its end, the process of deciding on a biometric data input is denoted. Section 5.5 centers around
experimental approach and the results, discusses the experimental setup and the process of
selecting dataset, shows the final results, and analyzes security aspect of the system. Moreover, a
discussion and limitations of the system are provided in its last part. The work is concluded in
Section 5.6.
4.2. Background
In this section, the fundamental concepts and techniques that are utilized in this work are
discussed. These concepts and techniques include transfer learning, homomorphic encryption,
leveraged pre-trained deep neural networks (which are DenseNet and AlexNet), and the process
of true/fake detection of the biometric data.
4.2.1. Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphism is mapping of a mathematical set into another set or onto itself in such a
way that applying mathematical operations to the elements of the source set is mapped into the
elements of the target set. Using this property, a dataset can be transformed into another while
preserving the relationships among their elements. Leveraging homomorphism during the
encryption process helps to perform certain types of computations on the ciphertext.
The result of operations on the ciphertext is also a ciphertext, which if decrypted results in
the same outcome of applying the mapped operations on the initial plain information. This is
different from other types of encryption according to which applying any change on the ciphertext
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causes damage of the plain information when it is decrypted. This type of encryption is called
Homomorphic Encryption. Nowadays, industries, companies, organizations, and any other private
institutes allow storing their information in a public cloud to access their computing and analytics
services.
Theoretically, a fully homomorphic encryption scheme [145] allows the computing and
analytics services to be done in the cloud in a protected and secure way. Therefore, cloud
computing platforms can perform complex and complicated computations on homomorphically
encrypted data without ever having access to the unencrypted data. As a result, arbitrary
computations can be applied on the encrypted data, while the features of the functions and the
format of the encrypted data remain preserved.
However, the efficiency and speed of these computations, at the moment, are drastically
low, causing hindrance of leveraging fully homomorphic encryption by its full capacity. Within
this context, the Paillier cryptosystem is a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for public key
cryptography and a partially homomorphic encryption. This system is additively homomorphic,
meaning it supports addition and is semantically secure. Its probabilistic property causes
randomness in production of ciphertext.
Due to the decisional composite residuosity assumption property of the Paillier encryption
scheme, an encrypted data using this system is secure against honest but curious servers and users.
The properties of homomorphic Paillier encryption system can be stated as: (a) the encrypted
numbers can be multiplied by a non-encrypted scalar; (b) the encrypted numbers can be added
together; (c) the encrypted numbers can be added to non-encrypted scalars.
So, these operations hold for a Paillier encryption system: (i) the product of two ciphertexts
is decrypted to the sum of their corresponding plaintexts. (ii) the multiplication of a ciphertext and
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a random number with the power of a plaintext decrypted to the sum of the corresponding
plaintexts. (iii) an encrypted plaintext with having another plaintext as its power is decrypted to
the product of the two plaintexts.
4.2.2. Leveraged Deep Neural Networks: DenseNet and AlexNet
The algorithms within the deep learning domain learn the complex, representative, and
discriminative features in a hierarchical way from the high dimensional data. These architectures
of these algorithms are usually constructed as multi-layer networks in a way to have more
computation of abstract features as nonlinear functions of lower-level features. They are used to
build a model that relates the inputs to the outputs based on modeling complex non-linear
relationships in both supervised and unsupervised settings.
These algorithms have applications in a variety of domains ranging from image processing,
computer vision, speech recognition, natural language processing, communication patterns, pixelbased classification, and target recognition, to high-level semantic feature extraction. A deep
learning method can be categorized as supervised, semi-supervised, or unsupervised. Two deep
neural networks are introduced in this section due to their utilization in our system: AlexNet and
DenseNet.
In the ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (in 2012), the AlexNet (i.e.,
the challenge winner) was introduced that is a convolutional neural network written in the CUDA
platform. The network is usually made of five convolution layers, max-pooling layers (with local
response normalization), dropout layers, and three fully connected layers. A softmax layer at the
end classifies the input data.
It showed more than 10% accuracy higher than the second-ranked network in the
competition and outperformed all its predecessors in the challenge. The other network utilized in
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this work is DenseNet. This network is a stack of dense blocks followed by transition layers.
According to its architecture, each layer is connected to every other layer in a feed-forward format
(within each dense block).
This means each layer is connected to the entire earlier layers (which provide feature reuse). Each block is made from a series of units, which each packs two convolutions, batch
normalization, and rectified linear unit (ReLU) activations. The output of each unit is a fixed
number of feature vectors. According to this parameter, the flow of information through the layers
is controlled. For each layer, the feature maps of all preceding layers are treated as separate inputs
whereas its own feature maps are passed on as inputs to all subsequent layers.
DenseNets have many persuading advantages namely, reducing the vanishing-gradient
problem, strengthening feature propagation, encouraging feature reuse, and reducing the number
of parameters substantially. This network architecture is not only efficient, but also has the big
advantage of improved flow of information and gradients throughout the network. The dense
connections in this network have a regularizing effect that reduces over-fitting on tasks with
smaller training set sizes.
Moreover, due to allowance of feature reuse among the Dense units, its structure tends to
be more compact in comparison to its counterparts. The most noticeable trend in the network
behavior is its easy training and higher accuracy in comparison to the other state-of-the-art
networks with a smaller number of network parameters. The architectures of these networks are
shown in Figure 4.4. In this work a pre-trained DenseNet on the ImageNet dataset is used as a
feature extractor for the authentication matcher.
Moreover, AlexNet is used for the true/fake detector to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of
deep neural networks against attacks. In the case of “authentication”, the optimum layer for feature
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extraction from the iris images is the 21st layer, while the 12th layer is for the fingerprints. With
respect to the true/fake detection system, the second layer’s features are chosen for the iris and the
69th layer’s features for fingerprint. These explanations for the authentication matcher and the
true/fake detector are visually shown in the left and the right subfigures of Figure 4.4 respectively.
We discuss the difference between the softmax and the SVM in classification of the
extracted features in here: their distinction is in the “interpretation” of the score vector [146-150].
The SVM interprets the scores as class scores and its loss function encourages the correct class to
have a score higher by a margin than the other class scores. The Softmax classifier instead
interprets the scores as (unnormalized) log probabilities for each class and then encourages the
(normalized) log probability of the correct class to be high (equivalently the negative of it to be
low).
As a result, the SVM can provide the class scores in a wider range of data with stronger
distinctions. This means applying a small change to an image does not make much difference to
the decision boundaries and consequently on the classification model and the decisions. However,
the softmax classifier recalculates the class scores and include the influence of the change applied
in the decisions. So, the the classification stability is higher with SVM that can lead to a higher
accuracy.
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Figure 4.4. The AlexNet CNN architecture for the authentication matcher (left) and the
DenseNet CNN architecture for the true/fake detector (right).
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4.2.3. True/Fake Detection of Biometric Data
Biometric data presents several benefits over classical data (i.e., password, key, card, and
so forth) for provision of security. In order to attack a biometric recognition system, the easiest
way is to deliver a fake biometric data. This attack is called spoofing and is of great importance to
the research community. This attack can be used to find the vulnerabilities against a recognition
system of the iris, the fingerprint, the face, and the signature.
The main strength of this attack is its defensive capability against digital protection
mechanisms, including encryption, digital signature, or watermarking. A strong and protected
biometric recognition system can distinguish authentic fingerprint or iris from fake ones. A number
of true and fake biometric data (i.e., fingerprint and iris) employed in this work are shown in Figure
4.5.

Figure 4.5. The samples of true fingerprint (first row), fake fingerprint (second row), true iris
(third row), and fake iris (fourth row).
The systems for discriminating between true and fake biometric data can be classified into two
parts: (a) hardware; and (b) software. In the hardware-based systems, a specific device is added to the
sensor in order to detect particular properties of a living trait such as blood pressure or skin distortion.
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The hardware-based systems display higher detection rate. In the software-based systems, fake traits
are detected once the sample has been acquired with a standard sensor.
These systems are less expensive and less intrusive and can be integrated in any part of the
recognition system. Using software-based modules, the system can be protected against external
injection of malicious data samples. The traits for distinguishing the real and the fake data are
extracted from the image instances of fingerprint or iris. There are a number of ways to extract
features:
✓ The manual descriptors including usage of local amplitude contrast (spatial domain) and
phase (frequency domain) for formation of a bi-dimensional contrast-phase histogram.
✓ Local phase quantization for texture derivation, and local binary pattern with wavelet.
✓ Using convolutional neural network.
The countermeasures for this attack are stated as: (x) utilization of multi-biometrics; (y)
using challenge-response methods; and (z) liveness detection techniques. The last technique has
shown significant performance in recent years and uses different physiological properties to
distinguish the real and fake traits. The protection methods based on the liveness assessment need
to satisfy certain requirements:
a) Being non-invasive.
b) Being low cost, which implies the possibility of its wide usage if it is affordable.
c) Delivering high performance, which means the detector needs to demonstrate a good
accuracy, while it does not cause any degradation on the system recognition performance.
Finally, development of a robust liveness assessment system which satisfies these
requirements can improve the integrity and correctness of the overall biometric recognition system.
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4.3. Related Work
In this section, the related works to the application of deep learning in recognition systems
as well as the applications of homomorphic encryption schemes are described. While traditionally
recognition systems use manually extracted features to represent the input data , the state of the art
systems have proven that end-to-end systems that allow the neural network to perform the feature
extraction autonomously have shown higher accuracies [151, 152].
Moreover, homomorphic encryption has been involved in these recognition systems to
preserve the privacy. A. Ene et al. [153] proposed implementing speech recognition system and
preserving the identity of users (or speakers) through leveraging homomorphic operations and
usage of large amount of plaintext space. In [154], the authors proposed executing computationally
intensive biometric recognition system by offloading the recognition process to the cloud.
In this technique, the recognition-based operations as well as bulk enrollment operations
are divided into multiple tasks, to be executed on a set of servers in the cloud. In order to further
improve the privacy and security of biometric data, it is offered to make them cancelable when
they are stored in the cloud. The work [155] presented a secure and privacy-preserving mechanism
for authentication of users based on their biometric data in a distributed framework.
In order to improve the security and privacy, three modalities are combined based on a
weighted score level fusion to determine the final multimodal data. To protect biometric data
storage, they proposed processing the data in a multi-party framework that enhances security in all
stages of authentication. Therefore, attacking a single database does not significantly jeopardize
the security of the data. This framework not only provides security, but also improves usability,
execution time, and efficiency.

100

In [156], a framework is shown that has the duty of protection and privacy provision within
the context of having a large amount of information. This framework consists of two layers of
protection, the first layer of which provides robust hash values as queries and the second layer
provides an ability for the client to modify certain bits in a hash value to prevent original content
or features from being revealed. This scaling of information helps make computations more
difficult on the server based on the interest of the client.
This interaction of client and server within a protected environment helps to preserve their
privacy. A secure system for multi-biometric data has been proposed in [157] that uses deep neural
networks and error-correction coding. The multi-biometric data is generated by a feature-level
fusion framework with the input of multiple biometric data. Via making the multi-biometric data
cancelable, they further secure the privacy and confidentiality of the users.
The PassBio has been proposed in [158] according to which a user-centric biometric
authentication scheme is offered that gives this ability to users to encrypt the biometric templates
with a light weight encryption scheme. The encrypted data stay in the server and will never be
accessed directly. In this framework, the privacy and protection are catered through running the
“compute-then-compare” computational model coupled with the threshold predicate encryption.
The authors in [159] provided good answers for characterization of biometric designs based
on privacy enhancing technologies. Through answering these questions, the regulations for the
protection of biometric information are presented and the cryptographic techniques for design of
a secure biometric system are analyzed and compared. In addition, a privacy-preserving approach
for authentication of biometric data within the context of mobile applications is proposed. The
proposed model uses a mechanism according to which pseudonymous biometric identities are used
for securing the registration and authentication of biometric identities.
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In [160], a basic fusion model blueprint for preserving the privacy of cloud-based user
verification/authentication is proposed. It is considered that the three modalities of biometric data
are located in different databases of semi-honest providers. They are combined based on their
performance parameters (i.e., weighted score). It was proposed in [161] that a distributed setting
of clients, cloud server, and service provider with verifiable interactions (to be executed on top of
a homomorphic encryption scheme) can help improve security against malicious servers.
Taheri et al. in [162] showed the biometric recognition systems (specifically for fingerprint
and iris) are not secure due to possible presence of hardware and software Trojans inside the
system. In their work, they proposed how hardware Trojans can manipulate the image instances of
the iris and the fingerprint, leading to denial of service in many of the existing biometric
recognition systems.
Accordingly, a cross-layer recognition system is developed that performs security-based
data analysis of biometric data in two levels and is strong enough in confronting the designed
hardware Trojans. The authors in [163] proposed using a privacy-preserving biometric
identification for face recognition based on eigen-face approach. In their technique, Paillier
cryptosystem is used as an additive homomorphic encryption unit. For finding the difference
between the face image vector from the client and the server’s database, Euclidean distance is
employed.
Inside their framework, a matcher is used to compare the information within the encrypted
domain in order to avoid revealing any information. A privacy-preserving face identification has
been proposed in [164] according to which the facial images are presented by binary feature vectors.
In its implementation, additive homomorphic encryption and oblivious transfer have been used. In
order to measure the similarity between the images, the Hamming distance has been used.
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An efficient matching protocol has been proposed in [165] with having application in many
privacy-preserving biometric identification systems inside a semi-honest setting. A more efficient
protocol is proposed by the authors that computes the Euclidean distances for improving the privacy
and security of the matching system. A novel privacy-preserving biometric identification scheme was
proposed in [166] that achieves efficiency through exploitations of the cloud computing power.
The scheme provides outsourcing of biometric data to the cloud servers. The identification of
biometric data occurs through generation of a credential for the candidate biometric trait and its
submission to the cloud. On the cloud side, the identification happens over the encrypted data using
the credential. This identification has the advantage of real time computation, low communication cost,
and secure outsource of data to the cloud. In addition, the problem of training high quality word vectors
over large-scale encrypted data within the context of privacy-preserving is tried to be solved by
designing a suite of arithmetic primitives on encrypted data.
A privacy-preserving identification mechanism for mobile sensing is proposed in [167]
that selects sensed data dynamically in order to protect the sensitive information of participants.
This mechanism solves the contradiction between the protection of user privacy and performing
the task of the identification. The privacy and sensitivity of the data are catered by letting the users
to define their sensitivity and selecting the sensed data dynamically.
The identification part is given by training a two-layered neural network and learning the
user behavior in order to generate an identity for it. In [168] an efficient and privacy-preserving
identification system for fingerprint data was presented using cloud systems. Within this context,
the cloud has the duty of exploiting the computation power for extensive mathematical
computations. [169] proposed a privacy-preserving identification system that outsources the
encrypted biometric data into the cloud and is efficient in computations.
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All the identification operations within the cloud are executed on the encrypted data and
they are returned to the database owner. A complete security analysis shows that this scheme is
secure even if attackers forge requests. In [170] proposed a secure face verification scheme using
a specifically trained neural net. They extracted the features from the last layer of the network. In
comparison to that work, we eliminate training on sensitive data, use a faster encryption scheme,
and find the optimum layer to train on using CNNOptLayer.
It has been proven that transfer learning can increase the accuracy when small data is
presented, and in this work, the case is similar with the presence of small data and the need for
feature extractors. Therefore, using the same concept of deep features can help the verification
task. Moreover, in this work an algorithm is presented to assist in finding the optimum layer for
feature extraction. Furthermore, by adding homomorphic encryption and eliminating the need for
training, this work leverages a pre-trained DenseNet to preserve the security of the biometric data.
4.4. Methodology of the Proposed System
The proposed system in this work caters privacy-preserving capability to a deep learningbased biometric recognition system that receives queries from users. In this system four elements
are involved, namely client (from cellphone/computer), matcher (from cloud), database (different
means can be used for this purpose), and authentication server (from cloud).
The data stored on the database is encrypted personal records which prevents attackers
from gaining access to the sensitive information of the enrolled users. The DeepZeroID system
uses only fingerprint and iris, but it can be extended to other biometric images as well. For every
query, the region of interest within the biometric data needs to be localized and processed before
it is sent to the recognition system.
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4.4.1. General Overview of Privacy-Preserving Biometric Recognition System
The network architecture and the associated biometric recognition system (including their
elements) are shown in Figure 4.6. The details of this system are depicted in Figure 4.7. As it can
be observed from the figure, there are four sides in the network namely client, matcher, database,
and authentication server. On the client-side, a person provides his/her fingerprint, iris, username,
and biographic information (which is the place of birth in here). The inputted iris image is
segmented in order to find the region of interest within the eye and then normalized; however, the
fingerprint stays in its raw format.
These images are then fed to a pre-trained deep neural network (i.e. DenseNet) and the
outputs of specific layers of this network are extracted as the feature vectors for the inputs. An
algorithm namely CNNOptLayer is developed to find the optimal layer for feature extraction. In
parallel to this process, the username and biographic information that was gathered from the user
are delivered to two word-based feature extractors. After extraction, these two word-based
features, are concatenated and replicated to create a binary mask for the user.
Having done so, the extracted features from the fingerprint or iris are binarized and bitmasked, and then up-sampled and encrypted using a partially homomorphic encryption scheme.
On the other side, two SVM classifiers trained on the true and fake fingerprint and iris features are
used to determine the type of the input biometric data in terms of being true or fake. Outside of the
user side, the encrypted features are stored in a database for future matching. The future queries
are compared to the reference features by a matcher within the cloud.
In order to verify an input, their encrypted binary vector is sent to the authentication server
and is compared to the reference vector with the XOR operation being carried out. The results of
the XOR operation are sent to the matcher unit, where the hamming distance is calculated. If the
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hamming distance is smaller than a certain threshold, the vectors match. The input is verified if
the results of the verification system as well as the authenticity system are positive. The flow and
protocol for this system is shown in Algorithm 4.1.

User Input

Mask Generation

Iris/Fingerprint

Feature Extraction
(using DenseNet)

True/Fake Classification
(using SVM)

Client

Authentication
Server

Verification Result

Database

Matcher

Homomorphic
Encryption

Figure 4.6. The proposed deep learning-based privacy preserving biometric recognition system.
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Figure 4.7. The details of the proposed system.
4.4.2. Flow of Biometric Data at the Client-Side
The inputted data passes through five stages on the client side before being sent out to the
cloud. These stages are discussed in details hereunder.
1. Data Preprocessing: The area of interest inside the image taken from the eye, i.e., the iris,
needs to be extracted. In this work circular Hough transformation is used to localize the
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iris and extract it. The segmented iris is then normalized. Fingerprint images remain
unchanged.
2. Feature Extraction: The images are fed to a DenseNet that is pre-trained on millions of
images from the ImageNet dataset. This massive amount of images included a thousand
various classes such as chairs, zebras, apples, monitors, and etc. The concept of transfer
learning aids us to use the patterns learnt from these images for the task of biometric
verification. Each layer within this deep network contains many patterns that might be
useful in representing the inputted image. The output of these layers, also known as offthe-shelf features [171], is taken as the representation of the input, i.e., the feature vector.
However, the task of finding the right layer to extract the features from can be arduous. In
[172], layers are chosen randomly in order to extract features. In this work the pre-trained
DenseNet is coupled with the CNNOptLayer algorithm to find the most optimal layer for
feature extraction for each task. This algorithm performs an exhaustive search on the
convolutional layers within the network, and uses their output as features. The acquired
features result in a verification output and their performance can be measured using the F1
score. The layer with the highest F1 score is chosen as the optimal layer for that specific
task. After extraction, the feature vectors are binarized based on the mean of each feature.
This binarization allows us to perform hamming distance and use the encryption scheme.
3. Masking the Data: The username and the biographic information (or place of birth) are
given to two word-based feature extractors. The first extractor finds the index of the first,
the middle, and the last element of its word from the dictionary of letters. Then, the ceiling
of the index of the first element to the power of the index of the third element is divided by
the multiplication of the index of the second element to the power of two on one side and

108

the addition of the index of the first element and the index of the second element on the
other side. The result of this process can be named BioInfoData1. Referring to Figure 4.7,
the output of the word-based feature extractor (1) function is BioInfoData1. The other
feature extractor finds three elements: the length of the birthplace word, the frequency of
the most repeated character, and the difference between the highest and the lowest indices
among the characters in the word. The operation to be performed on these elements is
described as the round of the addition of the first element, the second, and the third element
divided by three as the base and the ceiling of the first element divided by the third element
as the power. The result of this process can be named BioInfoData2. Referring to Figure
4.7, the output of the word-based feature extractor (2) function is BioInfoData2. Next,
BioInfoData1 and BioInfoData2 are input to the data fusion unit in which they are
concatenated and repeated until the lengths of the image feature vectors are reached. After
getting the final mask, it is XORed with the biometric feature vectors to create the plain
data for the encryption. The reason for XORing the mask with the feature vector lies within
the fact that feature vectors are binarized and later XORed for comparison. Since the mask
generation outputs the same mask for the same individual each time they request for
verification, the result of comparing two masked feature vectors of the same individual is
equal to that of the comparison of two plain feature vectors. Therefore, masking the binary
feature vectors does not change the results of the comparison unit for the same individuals,
but highly affects the cases where the vectors come from different individuals.
4. Encryption: The two plain vectors data go into a Paillier Chunkwise encryption scheme
[173]. This scheme first up-samples the data, and then encrypts chunks of it using Paillier
Encryption. This scheme has two advantages; firstly, Paillier encryption is partially
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homomorphic and supports addition, which enables us to perform the XOR operation on
the authentication server. Secondly, the up-sampling allows the matcher to calculate the
hamming distance and recognize if the two feature vectors match or not.
5. True/Fake Detection: The last operation on the client-side to identify the liveness of the
presented biometric data. The CNNOptLayer is used to find the optimal layer for feature
extraction for this task and a SVM, which is trained on these feature vectors from true and
fake datasets, identifies the liveness of the data.
4.4.3. Decision Making Process
The decision for a claimed identity is made based upon two elements: (1) the result of matcher,
and (2) the result of true/fake detection unit. In this work the authentication/matcher architecture which
is pivotal for the performance of Paillier Chunckwise is used. The encrypted feature vector is sent to
the authentication server along with the username. The original biometric data for that user name is
retrieved from the database and is sent to the authentication server. Using the additive homomorphism
of Paillier scheme, the two encrypted vectors are XORed.
The results of this XOR and tell us how similar these binary vectors were before encryption.
This result is sent to the Matcher, which calculated the hamming distance by looking at the up-sampled
results. If the resulted hamming distance is smaller than a pre-defined threshold, which will be
determined in the next section, the two vectors come from the same user. If the true/fake detection unit
identifies the biometric data as live data, and the hamming distance is smaller than the threshold, the
user is verified.
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4.5. Experimental Approach and Results
4.5.1. Experimental Setup
In order to perform the feature extraction, a pre-trained DenseNet is acquired. The used
DenseNet is a Keras implementation of this network in Python that supports the TensorFlow
backend. This network has 161 layers with the input size of 224 × 224. The iris images are
segmented using Hough transformation. The images are resized to match the input size and are fed
to the DenseNet.
Using CNNOptLayer, the optimum layer for the tasks of biometrics verification and
true/fake detection are identified. The features extracted from these layers are binarized and upsampled and masked. The final vectors are encrypted using Paillier Chunkwise Encryption written
in Matlab. The true/fake detection classifier is written using Scikit-learn’s SVM.
4.5.2. Dataset Selection
The datasets used in this work are the Center for Biometrics and Chinese Academy of
Sciences' Institute of Automation (CASIA) fingerprint and iris datasets [174]. Both of these
biometric data also have fake version, which were used in the training of the true/fake detection
unit. Overall, 165 users were selected with each having five fingerprint and five iris images. The
right thumb and the right iris are used for each user and a unique username and place of birth is
given to them.
Therefore, there are 825 images for each biometric input that can be compared to each
other. This yields 339,900 different cases of comparisons for each biometric data type. In the end,
the iris and fingerprint vectors are merged to see how well our system works in a bi-modal
environment. The true/fake classifier is trained on data from CASIA’s true/fake dataset, with tenfold cross-validation. Therefore, this system’s data is different from the ones used for verification.
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4.5.3. Final Results
Each of the nearly 340,000 comparisons yields in a hamming distance computed by the
matcher. If the input vectors match, this distance should be low. After all of the distances are
calculated, a threshold that maximizes the F1 score is found and the last F1-score is computed.
The F1 score results of choosing each layer of the DenseNet as feature extractor is shown in
Figure 4.8.

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.8. The results of each layer of the DenseNet as feature extractor for iris (a) and
fingerprint (b).
As it is visible from Figure 4.8, different layers have different capabilities in extracting
features. The optimum layer for feature extraction from the iris images is the 21th layer, while the
12th layer gives the best representation for the fingerprints. This is due to the fact that each of these
layers holds patterns learnt from the ImageNet dataset and different patterns suit different types of
data.
Moreover, it can be seen that iris verification achieves a higher F1 score than fingerprint
verification, showing that this pre-trained network is more suitable for feature extraction from
normalized iris images. Another important observation is the fact that the performance seems to
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become better as the layers increase but falls after certain layers. While the first layers hold a
simpler abstraction of the input data, the higher layers hold a more complex abstraction.
If this abstraction becomes too complex, information is lost and performance is
downgraded. Having found the optimum layers using CNNOptLayer, we take a closer look at the
results from these two layers. After the iris features are extracted from the 21th layer and
fingerprint features are extracted from the 12th layer, they are binarized.
Having done so, the hamming distances between all possible and unique pairs of input
images are calculated. In order to do so, one image (e.g., an iris) is taken as the reference, and the
rest of the images are compared to it and the hamming distances are recorded. Since there are 5
images taken from each user in the dataset, only 4 other image should ideally match this image
and the 820 other users should have a higher hamming distance.
In this work, the collection of the distances that are gathered from match cases are called
“Positive”, while the collection of the distances that are not from the same person’s data are called
“Negative”. This naming can also be thought of as their ground truth verification results. These
two distributions are shown in Figure 4.9.

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.9. The optimum “hamming distance” distributions of iris (a) and fingerprint (b).
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As it is visible from Figure 4.9, the negative instances in average have a higher hamming
distance than the positive ones. This is a testament to the fact that the feature extraction is
performed correctly. However, these two distributions have less overlap in the iris images than
they do in the fingerprint images, showing that the verification of irises is easier for the system
that verification of fingerprints.

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.10. The results of changing the threshold in iris (a) and fingerprint (b) verifications.
In order to find an optimum threshold, this value is swept across the minimum to the
maximum range of the distances and the one with the highest F1 score is chosen. This is reflected
in Figure 4.10. Now that the thresholds are found, we can depict how the decision boundary would
look like in this one dimensional space in Figure 4.11.
As it can be seen from Figure 4.11, there are misclassifications in both cases of verification.
In order to alleviate this problem, we take the action of bit-wise masking the data with the mask
created from the user input. This masking of the data takes place before up-sampling and
encryption. After the masks are applied, the changes in the distributions are depicted in Figure
4.12.
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As it can be observed from Figure 4.12, the positive distribution remains unchanged due
to having the same masks; however, the negative distribution is pushed further in the distance.
This lowers the false positives greatly. In order to not affect the security of the system, the
threshold remains unchanged, so that if anyone can gain access to the personal data of a user, they
would have no advantage in gaining access to the system.

(a)
(b)
Figure 4.11. The optimum “hamming distance” distributions of iris (a) and fingerprint (b) with
the optimum thresholds.

(a)
(b)
Figure 4.12. The optimum “hamming distance” distributions of iris (a) and fingerprint (b) with
the optimum thresholds after masking the data.
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In order to evaluate the performance of this system in a bi-modal environment, the features
of iris and fingerprint images are concatenated and fed to the system as the input features. The
result of this combination is visible in Figure 4.13. The combined distributions showed in Figure
4.13 shows that this combination has decreased the overlap between the negative and positive
distribution.
Therefore, combining the fingerprint and iris data makes the system more accurate. The
optimum threshold for this case is found and shown in Figure 4.14. As for the true/fake detection
system, the CNNOptLayer was similarly used in order to find the best features. It proved an easy
task for the DenseNet since the 2nd layer’s features for the iris and the 69th layer’s features for
fingerprint yielded 100 percent classification accuracy. The results are shown in Table 4.1.

Figure 4.13. The “hamming distance” distributions of the combined iris and fingerprint features.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.14. The results of threshold sweeping (a) and the optimum “hamming distance”
distributions (b) of the combined iris and fingerprint features.
Table 4.1. The overall results of the verification system with iris and fingerprint inputs (TP, TN,
FP, and FN denote true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative respectively).
Data Type

Masked

Layer

Threshold

TP

TN

FP

FN

Fingerprint
Fingerprint
Iris
Iris

No
Yes
No
Yes

10,243
10,243
6427
6427

812
812
1414
1414

337,450
338,246
338,165
338,248

800
4
85
2

838
838
236
236

Combined

No

12
12
21
21
12
21

FScore
49.79
65.86
89.81
92.24

17,108

1507

338,168

82

143

93.05

Combined

Yes

17,108

1507

338,250

0

143

95.47

12
21

+
+

As is observed in Table 4.1, the best result was obtained when the fingerprint and iris
features were concatenated. This table also shows the reason behind masking the data. While the
data is homomorphically encrypted and does not need masking for privacy, the masking helps the
accuracy of the system. Via masking, the false positives that are detrimental to the goal of a
verification system are lowered significantly.
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4.5.4. Security Analysis
In order to evaluate the security of the proposed system, a number of locations within the
system that the data is unprotected (or plain) are targeted. The points that are targeted in here are
the CNN-based feature extractor and the SVM-based classifier within the true/fake detection
module. These attacks are carried out on AlexNet which is different from our system and serve the
sole purpose of finding vulnerabilities within CNNs. Besides the aforementioned privacy concerns,
there are other possible threats and attacks that can target a biometric recognition system. They
can be stated as:
▪

Attacks on the sensing devices, which are known as direct attacks. These attacks can cause
impersonation or evasion of identity. The countermeasure for these attacks operate based
on the liveness detection according to which it is assessed that the biometric data is fake or
alive. This operation is done based on specific patterns (such as the ones remained from
sweating or blinking eyes).

▪

Attacks on the channels that connect different modules. An attack from this type is called
man-in-the-middle attack according to which an original image is replaced with a new
synthetic image.

▪

Attacks to the processing modules and algorithms.

▪

Attacks to the template database.

▪

Fabricating a fake biometric trait to mimic an enrolled client, which is called spoofing
attack.

▪

Feeding stolen data of the victim to the feature extractor.

▪

Attacks on the feature extractor.

▪

Attacks in the matcher.
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▪

Attacks on the template database.

▪

Suffering of deep neural networks within the system from unexpected instabilities and
performing misclassification on data instances created by adversaries through adding
invisible and small disorder to the originally recognized data.

▪

The extracted features from deep neural networks may be vulnerable to mimicking and
synthetically image production.

▪

Leakage of essential information from a trained network model.

The proposing attacks for the feature extractor point to the fully connected layer, shown in Figure 4.15.
Bias Vector

Weight Matrix

Input Vector

Output Vector

Output Vector (y) = Weight Matrix (W) . Input Vector (x) + Bias Vector (b)

Figure 4.15. The architecture and formula for the fully connected layer.
The attacks are: (A substituting every “odd” element of the Bias vector of the seventh fully
connected layer with its next “even” element in the vector (𝑏[2𝑛 + 1] = 𝑏[2𝑛], for “n” starting
from zero). (B) substituting every thirty-two elements of the Bias vector of the seventh fully
connected layer with their average value (𝑏[𝑛: 𝑛 + 31] = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑏[𝑛: 𝑛 + 31]), n = 1, 33, 66,
…). (C) substituting every thirty-two elements of the Bias vector of the seventh fully connected
layer with their minimum value (𝑏[𝑛: 𝑛 + 31] = 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚(𝑏[𝑛: 𝑛 + 31]), n = 1, 33, 66, …).
(D) substituting every “odd” element in eight columns of the Weight matrix (with the
interval size of 512) of the seventh fully connected layer with its next “even” element in the vector
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(𝑊[𝑛, 𝐾] = 𝑊[2𝑛, 𝐾], for “n” starting from zero and “K” = 1, 513, 1026, etc.). (E) substituting
every element of the Weight matrix of the seventh fully connected layer with their
mean/median/minimum/mode value (𝑊[: ] = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒/𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛/𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚(𝑊[: ])).
(F) Flipping the Weight matrix of the seventh fully connected layer up-side and down-side
(𝑊 = 𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑈𝑝𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝑊)). (G) changing the layer for feature extraction from the seventh fully
connected layer to the second convolution layer (𝑦𝐹𝐶7 = 𝑦𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉2 ). (H) performing an insider attack
by targeting the classifier and through: (i) manipulation of 12.5% of the Training labels; (ii)
manipulation of 25% of the Training labels; (iii) manipulation of 50% of the Training labels.
The equation of the SVM classifier is shown to the following. According to this equation,
𝑠 represents the support vectors, 𝛼 represents the weights, 𝑏 represents the bias, x represents the
input vector, 𝑘 represents the kernel function (i.e., it can be a dot product for a linear kernel), c
represents the group type. If c ≥ 0, then the input vector belongs to the first class, otherwise it
belongs to the second class. According to the mentioned attack, the support vectors are
manipulated to cause misclassification of the input data.
𝑐 = 𝛼𝑖 × 𝑘 × (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥) + 𝑏
Manipulation of the output of neurons (i.e. the input data for SVM) is done based on: (I)
positively rectify the outputs of a number of neurons during the verification phase (e.g., |𝑦[𝑖]|, 𝑖 ∈
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠); (II) forcing the outputs of a number of neurons to zero value (power gating
neurons) during the verification phase (e.g., 𝑦[𝑖] = 0, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠); and (III) negatively
rectify the outputs of a number of neurons during the verification phase (e.g., −|𝑦[𝑖]|, 𝑖 ∈
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠).
Among the proposed attacks, only a number of them were applicable and led to observable
negative impact on the system. The attack number 7 causes degradation of TPR from 1.0 to 0.17
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(−83%) and TNR from 1.0 to 0.79 (−21%) when the fingerprint is input into the system. This attack
means the unauthorized access and denial of service. The attack number 5 causes degradation of
TPR from 1.0 to 0.0 and FNR when the substitution value is mean or median.
On the other hand, when the substitution value is minimum or mode then TNR is degraded
from 1.0 to 0.0. The first case means denial of service and the second case means unauthorized
access. Regarding the iris biometric data, the attack number 7 causes a complete denial of service.
The attack number 5 delivers the same results as what were delivered for the fingerprint data. All
these attacks are performed after the user enrollment process.
There are three components in our system that collectively defend against these attacks.
Firstly, the matching unit calculates the hamming distance between the original and the new feature
vectors and enables the task of verification to take place. Secondly, the masking unit, which
requires input from the user and only works correctly if the inputted words are the same as the
original words. Lastly the true and fake detection unit checks if the input if received from a live
individual or if it is synthetized.
As we have shown, this unit is the most vulnerable unit is the system and can be
manipulated to detect fake inputs as true. If the true/fake detection unit is compromised at the user
side, this manipulation is only effective on the output of the SVM in the user side and is not
effective on the results of the matcher in the cloud. Therefore, in the worst case scenario where the
attacker has the username and the place of birth of the user (i.e., can generate the correct mask),
has fake biometric data, and manipulates the true/fake detection unit to output true, the result of
the matcher in the cloud remains the same and the attacker is not verified.
In the literature, a number of defenses have been proposed for the attacks mentioned in (1) to
(10) [175-177]. In [175, 176], it is proposed to combine cryptography and biometric security in order
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to design a stronger authentication system. The authors in [177] discussed many different defenses for
biometric recognition systems, including risk-based approach, systems and security architecture,
defensive measures, challenge/response, retention of data, randomizing input biometric data, liveness
detection, multiple biometrics, multi-modal biometrics, multi-factor authentication, soft biometrics,
signal and data integrity and identity, cryptography and digital signatures, template integrity,
cancellable biometrics, hardware integrity, network hygiene, physical security, activity logging, policy,
and compliance checking.
There is another option for countering this attack that is protecting the deep neural network.
Meanwhile, a number of techniques have been proposed for protection of neural networks may
help in correcting the operation of the true/fake detection system. It means protecting the neural
network-based feature extractor. In [178], an effective defense against backdoor attacks on neural
networks has been proposed.
The defense is called fine-pruning that is a combination of pruning and fine-tuning. This
defense is capable of weakening or even eliminating the backdoors (with a specified success rate).
Another work [179] proposes a novel approach for backdoor detection and removal from neural
networks. This method is able to detect poisonous data as well as repairing the model. A robust
and generalizable detection and mitigation system for detection of backdoor attacks for neural
networks has been presented in [180].
This technique can identify backdoors and reconstruct possible triggers. The technique
includes input filtering, neuron pruning and unlearning. The SVM classifier can be defended and
protected as well. The following techniques have been proposed to defend a classifier against possible
attacks, which can be integrated into our model. In [181], an optimization framework has been
proposed that is able of finding the label flips for the purpose of maximizing the classification error.
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The authors in [182] presented a strategy for improving the SVM robustness in front of input
data manipulation based on a simple kernel matrix correction. [183] shows an adversary-aware design
of SVMs based on real-world security problems. A method has been proposed in [184] according to
which the classification model as well as the training procedure are not modified and it can be used to
defend against many attacks. Using this defense, the distribution of clean and manipulated features can
be modeled in order to enhance the SVM performance in classification.
4.5.5. Discussions
The usage of one pre-trained neural network as feature extractor for multiple tasks in this
work showed the flexibility of deep learning. While DenseNet was trained on images of everyday
objects, the patterns learnt within proved to be useful in extracting features from both iris and
fingerprint images in both tasks of verification and liveness detection. Observing the performance
delivered by different layers’ features in Figure 4.9 gave us insight about how the information that
is valuable for the given task propagates through the network and at what layer the abstracted
information becomes the most valuable.
This Figure which is the heart of the CNNOptLayer algorithm can be derived in other tasks
that contain transfer learning. While it is common practice to use the last layers of a pre-trained
neural network, in this work we observed that it can be detrimental to do so, and used the algorithm
to find the best layer. One of the downsides of our work was the low F1 score on fingerprint data.
This is due to the fact that the needed patterns might not exist or be dominant in the pre-trained
neural network.
For future research, one can train a specified neural network to learn verification of iris and
fingerprint data in a multitasking manner. This network then might yield better results, having seen
a more similar data distribution. The reason we avoided doing so was to not save any data from
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the biometric data distribution inside the model, gaining a zero knowledge system that is scalable
with no need to train on sensitive data. However, one can also train a network on generic
fingerprint/iris dataset and test it on the sensitive data. Overall, a trade-off was observed between
preserving the security of the data and the performance of the system.
4.6. Conclusions
In this work, a privacy-preserving cloud-based and multiple-party biometric verification
system has been proposed which relies on one pre-trained deep neural network to perform feature
extraction. Via using transfer learning, the achieved system was able to extract features from iris
and fingerprint images for the tasks of biometric verification and true/fake detection. This enabled
usage of a neural network that required no knowledge on sensitive data and scalability of the
system when new users are added.
Optimization of this process was done using a novel algorithm called CNNOptLayer which
found the optimum layer for each task and input data type. The biometric features were bit-masked
and encrypted using Paillier Chunckwise. This homomorphic encryption allowed the biometric
data to remain encrypted outside of the user side and preserved the privacy of the user. Overall,
the system was able to achieve a verification F1 score of 95.47% when verifying the combined
features of iris and fingerprint inputs with zero false positives.
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CHAPTER 5: DETECTION OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
USING ADVERSARIAL TRAINING AND NOISE TRAINING4
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we study a novel system for the adversarial example detection with the
biometric and the pharmaceutical applications. In this system, two different types of neural
networks in terms of the number of layers as well as the methods of transfer learning and noise
training are leveraged. One of the networks has the duty of generating adversarial examples and
the other one detects the adversarial examples. The area of deep/machine learning has shown
extreme effectiveness and capability in image classification, object recognition, speech
recognition, plagiarism detection, and language translation [131, 185-192].
The application of this area can range from the information technology to automotive
industry. Traditionally, it is assumed that the deep/machine learning algorithmic engines need to
be designed under the assumption of training them on extracted samples from a distribution that
is a demonstration of test samples to be used for making predictions, with the assumption of
having similar training and test data distributions. According to this assumption, the test samples
will be classified in their correct category.
However, this assumption may not always be correct, especially with the presence of
intelligent adversaries. This has a severe impact on the security-critical problems. In this context,
attacks are designed in a way to evade the machine learning-based malware detection systems.
This means the trained models on fully clean data can be vulnerable to maliciously engineered
data. These data usually need to look clean (which means they do not seem manipulated by the

4

The material from this chapter were published in: Taheri, S., Salem, M. and Yuan, J.S., 2019. Razornet:
Adversarial training and noise training on a deep neural network fooled by a shallow neural network. Big Data and
Cognitive Computing, 3(3), p.43.
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human eyes), while perform their task in targeted or untargeted misclassification (with high
confidence).
According to this strategy, the attack inputs from a benign machine learning-based engine
can be used for construction of malicious data. In other words, the feature vector of a malicious
data sample that has been detected correctly by the engine can be manipulated to pass the system
by being classified as benign. The strategically manipulated data is called Adversarial
Example/Sample/Perturbation in this context.
These perturbations can target either a specific input or a number of inputs. They can
reveal the weaknesses of a system in representation learning and classification. Accordingly,
they are fooled and will fail to perform their prediction and recognition purposes. Szegedy et al.
[193] who generated small perturbations on the images for classification problem and fooled the
state-of-the-art deep neural networks with high probability have initiated this.
Many of the previously proposed defenses are not effective anymore [194-202],
especially due to the emergence of new attacks in this area. In fact, a well-engineered adversarial
sample can fool neural networks of different models, different architectures, and trained on
different data. This is called cross-model and cross-dataset property of the defenses. It means the
adversarial data can disrupt classification systems and their algorithms.
The engineered data can bring weakness in learned representations and classifiers. They
show whether the systems are stable in confronting the perturbations or not. As a result, it is
important to determine how a neural network should be trained to make it robust to adversarial
samples. These attacks can fool applications of different kinds, such as biometric recognition
systems or pharmaceutical/clinical trial.
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For a biometric recognition system, a face image can be modified in a way to causes
gender misclassification, while it looks like its original entity [203]. Similarly, a perturbation into
the iris or the fingerprint of an entity can lead to denial of service or unauthorized access, to be
studied in this work. In the application of pharmaceutical/clinical trial, the goal is using neural
networks to estimate/predict the individual-level treatment effects in terms of type of patient and
the type of treatment [204-221].
This classification task is a causal inference problem, which is based on modeling the
casual effect of a treatment on the outcome of a patient [222-227]. In this area, the result of
having adversarial samples can be catastrophic, especially due to its consequences on the
personal, ethical, legal, and financial objectives [228]. In this context, we may have either
adversarial drug/treatment or adversarial patient [229-233].
They both can change the clinical decisions maliciously [234]. An adversarial drug can
enter a system through development and manufacturing or wrong recognition/classification.
Nowadays, many mobile devices are equipped with high quality cameras and advanced
recognition algorithms [235-243]. Using these algorithms, people can acquire and analyze the
information from the physical world [244, 245].
The applications of this capability can include recognition of books, road signs, menus,
and specifically pills in this context. Based on what has been informed, we plan to contribute to
the area of adversarial example detection with the application in biometric and pharmaceutical
data according to the following: (1) proposing a novel system named, ShallowDeepNet that
includes a shallow and a deep neural network.
The shallow neural network is responsible for data preprocessing that is defined as
generating adversarial samples in this context (G-Net). The generated adversarial samples from
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this network are able to fool a deep neural network. The deep neural network or RazorNet is
responsible for understanding data and information as well as detecting adversarial samples (DNet). So, a serial connection of G-Net and D-Net (G+D Net) helps us to detect many of the
unknown and unseen attacks.
Leveraging a shallow neural network, an attacker is able to disrupt the deep neural
network without having access to its model as well as spending shorter training time. (2)
Engaging transfer learning for the application of adversarial examples detection. (3) Using both
adversarial training and noise training together in our system. (4) Utilizing four different types of
noise in improving knowledge of detector network, namely Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN), Motion Blur, reduced contrast and AWGN, and Perlin noise.
(5) generating the adversarial versions of two different types of data, biometric
(fingerprint and iris) and pill image using well known adversarial attacks, namely: (a) Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM); (b) Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA); (c) DeepFool;
(d) Carlini and Wagner (C&W); (e) Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). (6) Assembling and
integrating a comprehensive system consisting of all the discussed elements. An example of
attacking an image by FGSM is shown in Figure 5.1.

Clean Data

FGSM Perturbation

Perturbed Data

Figure 5.1. The figure shows injecting perturbation from the FGSM attack into a sample image
from the ten-class Canadian Institute For Advanced Research (CIFAR) dataset. A high amount
of perturbation is chosen during the simulation for better visual presentation.
Next, we propose a systematic defense based on leveraging the learned knowledge from
clean unrelated dataset, adversarial unrelated dataset, noisy dataset, related manipulated dataset
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during training and all the learned knowledge from the last steps in detection of adversarial
perturbations. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the background
information including all the employed concepts and techniques. We discuss the related works in
Section 6.3.
The proposed systematic defense against the well-known adversarial attacks is illustrated
in Section 6.4. It is explained how the process of decision making on the biometric and pill
image data can be improved using transfer learning as well as the learned knowledge from noisy
data. The experimental approach along with the results are provided in Section 6.5. In Section
6.6, we discuss how this system can be improved in the future and what its possible limitations
are. The conclusion is given in Section 6.7.
5.2. Background
In this section, the fundamental concepts and techniques utilized in this work are
discussed. These concepts and techniques include transfer learning, data recognition system for
fingerprint, iris, and pill image data, well-known adversarial attacks for fooling neural networks,
neural network robustness against noise.
5.2.1. Data Recognition System for Fingerprint, Iris, and Pill Image Data
In this section, we discuss two targeted neural network-based systems for adversarial
attacks, namely Biometric Recognition System and Pill Recognition System. A scientific
medium to distinguish different objects in a reliable manner for a target application based on the
physical or behavioral traits of entities (such as fingerprint and iris) is called Biometrics. A
system for recognition of biometric data tries to find patterns inside the data and extract features
from them to be compared against the reference data.
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This type of recognition systems has many security-related applications, including access
control, time, attendance management system, government and law enforcement, passport-free
automated border crossings, national ID systems, computer login, and other wireless-based
devices for authentication. Two reputed with significant gained attention biometric data are
fingerprint and iris. The fundamental and traditional biometric data is fingerprint with having
recent application in smart phones.
This trait has a pattern of ridge and valleys on the surface of a fingertip with having
formation during the beginning months of a fetus development. Using the print instance from
multiple fingers can further enhance the level of security. On the other hand, having small cuts or
bruises along with aging and exposure to the environmental disturbances can cause performance
degradation of the system. The other trait is iris that has newer applications.
It is the annular region of the eye, with bounding of pupil and sclera on either side. This
texture is formed during the fetal development as well and is stabilized as we age. The unique
information within this data helps perform recognition and identification tasks. Therefore, having
a biometric recognition system with fingerprint and iris image instances as its inputs is one of the
best candidates in security provision.
Recently, the usage of prescription drugs has been increased tremendously compared to
the past, especially among the elderly [246-257]. Consequently, the possibility of pill
misrecognition has increased significantly [258-268]. The misrecognition can happen due to the
similarities in colors, shapes, imprints, and scorings of the pills [269, 270].
The consequences of this misrecognition can be catastrophic to patients as well as leading
to medication error or noticeable financial burden [271-277]. A typical pill recognition system
has two modes of learning mode and recognition mode [278-291]. In the learning mode, there is
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a pill profiling (using the images of pills from a database) and storage. The other mode starts
with acquiring the image containing marker and pill.
During this process, we have normalization of image size, detection of marker,
performing profiling based on the pill shape, size estimation, and color detection. The stored data
in the database in used for further consultation. On the other hand, the recognition mode aims pill
detection based on pill profile and feature filtering. The data preprocessing in this mode is
similar to the previous mode. Usually, the pill recognition systems are mounted on the mobile
devices.
In this case, we may have the same issues that discussed earlier like low quality images
that can lead to misclassification of a pill image. Also, adversarial perturbations can be
introduced into the pill images with malicious intent in order to worsen the health condition of a
patient. A neural network-based biometric recognition system and a pill recognition system are
shown in the top and the bottom parts of Figure 5.2.
Left Instance

Right Instance

Biometric Recognition System
Hidden Layer

Input Layer

Output Layer

Pill for Disease A

Pill for Disease B

Classification Result:
1) Left Fingerprint
2) Right Fingerprint
3) Left Iris
4) Right Iris

Classification Result:
1) Pill for Disease A
2) Pill for Disease B
3) Pill for Disease C
4) Pill for Disease D

Pill Recognition System
Pill for Disease C

Pill for Disease D

Figure 5.2. A neural network-based biometric recognition system and a pill recognition system.
5.2.2. Threat Model: Well-Known Adversarial Attacks for Fooling Neural Networks
In this section, the employed well-known adversarial attacks for fooling neural networks
are discussed. The attacks under discussion are Fast Gradient Sign Method, Jacobian-Based
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Saliency Map Attack, DeepFool, Carlini and Wagner Attack, and Projected Gradient Descent
[292-295]. These attacks generate adversarial examples, which are instances of small and
intentional feature perturbations that make a machine/deep learning model make a false
prediction.
These attacks can be modeled by: defining F as a classification regime that can output the
predicted label F(x) for a given data sample x. Generation of a perturbation “r” specific to the
data sample can cause misclassification based on the equation of 𝐹(𝑥 + 𝑟) ≠ 𝐹(𝑥). This
perturbation “r” should not be distinct enough to be perceived by human beings. Samples
instances from this attack are shown in Figure 5.3.
Fast Gradient Sign Method: FGSM is a fast method for generating adversarial
examples [195]. Using this technique, one-step gradient update is performed along the direction
of gradient at each pixel. The perturbation of this attack can be described as:
𝜂 = 𝑐. 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∆𝑥 . 𝐽𝜃 (𝑥, 𝑙))

(5.1)

So, the adversarial data can be formulated as:
𝑥 𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 𝑥 + 𝑐. 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∆𝑥 . 𝐽𝜃 (𝑥, 𝑙)

(5.2)

In this equation, 𝜃 is the magnitude of the perturbation that is small enough to be
invisible, and 𝑙 is the target label. Consequently, the generated adversarial example 𝑥 ′ is
calculated by the summarized 𝑥 ′ = 𝑥 + 𝜂 formula. The way to calculate this perturbation is
using backpropagation.
The first gradient sign method uses the gradient of the loss function for determination of
the direction of the input data to be changed (whether in the direction of increase or decrease). In
this way, the loss function is minimized. The network is optimized using the fast gradient sign
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method in terms of the 𝐿∞ distance metric [296-300]. It is required to use a distance metric to
quantify similarity. This distance measures the maximum change to any of the coordinates.
It is an optimal measure for use and certain defense methods are protected by this
distance. This technique may be fast in speed, but it is not designed primarily for the sake of
finding the optimal adversarial samples. This technique helps generate auto-encoders by
computing model’s loss function derivative with respect to the feature vector of input. The
detection accuracy in the shown figure is in the state of highest level of perturbation.
Refer to Figure 5.3 to see how this attack affects data. As it can be observed from the
figure, five different attacks for injection of perturbation into the images were applied. The
perturbations cause wromg classification of the images of iris. It should be mentioned that the
shown images have a high level of perturbation that means having the amount of perturbation
(i.e. the eps parameter) equaling to 10 and running the attack for four epochs.
Jacobian-Based Saliency Map: JSMA attack is an efficient saliency adversarial map
under 𝐿0 distance [195]. In this attack, a Jacobian matrix is computed with a given sample X and
is expressed as:
𝐽𝑓 (𝑥) =

𝜕𝑓(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥

=[

𝜕𝑓𝑖 (𝑥)
𝜕𝑥𝑖

]𝑖×𝑗

(5.3)

Using this equation, the input features of X that made most noticeable changes to the
output can be modified. Those most influential features are employed according to which certain
small input deviations can trigger large output variations. This method tries to inject perturbation
into the input features with large adversarial saliency scores. In addition, exploiting the forward
derivative of a deep neural network helps us find an adversarial perturbation that forces the
model in misclassification of a specific target class.
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DeepFool: This attack proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [195] that finds the closest
distance from original input to the decision boundary of adversarial samples. This attack is
classified as untargeted and is optimized for the 𝐿2 distance metric. An iterative attack by linear
approximation is proposed for the purpose of overcoming the non-linearity in high dimension.
Based on an uninitialized classifier, it is found that minimal perturbation of an affine classifier is
the distance to the separating affine hyperplane 𝐶 = {𝑥 ∶ 𝑤 𝑇 𝑥 + 𝑏 = 0} [301].
𝑐(𝑥)

The perturbation of an affine classifier can be stated as: 𝜂 ∗ (𝑥) = − ||𝑤||2 . 𝑤. Considering
𝑐 as a binary classifier then an iterative method is used to approximate the perturbation by
considering 𝑐 is linearized around 𝑥𝑖 at each iteration. The minimal perturbation is given by:
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛
||𝜂𝑖 ||2 considering 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑐(𝑥𝑖 + ∇𝑐(𝑥𝑖 )𝑇 . 𝜂𝑖 ) = 0. Extending this result to the multi-class
𝜂𝑖
classifier helps in finding the closest hyperplane. It can also be extended to more general
𝑙𝑝 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚, 𝑝 ∈ [0, ∞].
Carlini and Wagner: A targeted C&W attack has been offered by [11] for the purpose
of defeating the defensive distillation. This attack can bypass most of the existing adversarial
detecting defenses. The objective function (g) of this attack is defined as:
𝑚𝑖𝑛
||𝜂||𝑝 + 𝑐. 𝑔. (𝑥 + 𝜂), 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑥 + 𝜂 ∈ [0,1]𝑛
𝜂

(5.4)

Based on this equation, g(𝑥 ′ ) ≥ 0 if and only if g(𝑥 ′ ) ≥ 𝑙 ′ , and 𝑙 ′ is the label of the
adversarial class in targeted adversarial samples. Using this equation, the distance and the
penalty term can be better optimized. This attack is one of the strongest attacks that have been
proposed so far.
Projected Gradient Descent: A PGD attack model for generating adversarial example
has been proposed in [302] according to which the objective 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛿 ≤𝜀 𝐿(𝜃, 𝑥 + 𝛿, 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ) is
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solved. This attack is used for maximization of this objective under a loss function, calling L.
Accordingly, an image X with introduced perturbation magnitude under the max norm (𝜂). This
attack can also be considered as the multi-step variant of the FGSM attack. Through this attack,
projected gradient descent is conducted in multiple iterations for the purpose of updating the
adversarial example.

(A) FGSM Attack

(B) JSMA Attack

(C) DeepFool Attack

(D) CW Attack

(E) PGD Attack

Figure 5.3. Sample instances for (A) FGSM attack; (B) JSMA Attack; (C) DeepFool Attack; (D)
CW Attack; and (E) PGD Attack. For each attack, there is pill image data on the left side and the
iris biometric data on the right side.
We carry out two statistical analysis-based experiments in order to demonstrate the
extensibility and the defense strength of our proposing system through showing: (1) the
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differences between the fingerprint, iris, and pill image samples; along with (2) the similarities
between the original samples and the adversarial samples.
Using the first experiment, we explain there is no (or possibly few) “coarse-grained”
resemblance between these three types of data (i.e. fingerprint, iris, and pill image) and how the
proposing system can be applied on diverse types of data. The analysis focuses on displaying the
differences between the global features/patterns of these types.
In the second experiment, we examine the similarities among the original samples from
these three types of data and their adversarial versions. Having a system capable of detecting the
adversarial samples regardless of their closeness and similarities to their original counterparts
show its defense strength and security-based effectiveness. According to the first experiment, if
there are close patterns and similarity among the images then we cannot determine the system
extensibility and ability in recognizing various (global) features/patterns.
In this regard, we run correlation analysis on the iris, fingerprint, and pill image samples,
shown in Figure 5.4. As it can be seen from the plots in this figure, the correlation coefficients
among these images are low enough (below 0.5) to determine that they are not related in terms of
(global) features/patterns. A successful running system on these types of data can demonstrate its
extensibility.

Figure 5.4. The analysis of similarities among the images of fingerprint, iris, and pill datasets.
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According to the second experiment, if there are differences among the images then we
cannot determine the system defense ability in detecting adversarial examples. The parameters
used for fooling the shallow neural network are selected in a way that the images of original and
adversarial data look similar by the human eye and have small difference based on the distance
measures among the images.
In this way, their level of sneakiness is higher and it is more difficult and challenging to
catch them using the ordinary defense methods. What we chose for the “eps” parameter is 0.1 for
FGSM, 10 for JSMA, 10 DeepFool, 10 for CW, and 0.1 for PGD. The attacks are run for 4
epochs. We performed distance measurement on the original and the perturbed images from the
biometric and the pill image datasets.
The distance measures are Euclidean, Manhattan, Chebyshev, and Correlation Coefficient
with their formulas presented in Equations 5.5-5.8. Also, the average of these distances among
100 instances of the original and the adversarial images are shown in Table 5.1. The method of
averaging can be described as: (a) finding the distance value between each pair of original and
perturbed image; (b) constructing an array of calculated distances; and (c) calculating the
average value of the constructed array.
2
Euclidean Distance: 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) = √∑𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 )

(5.5)

Manhattan Distance: 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) = ∑𝑚
𝑖=1|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |

(5.6)

Chebyshev Distance: 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) = max (|𝑥𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 |)

(5.7)

𝑖=1,…,𝑚

Correlation Coefficient: 𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) =

∑𝑚
̅)
𝑖=1(𝑥𝑖 −𝑥̅ ).(𝑦𝑖 −𝑦
2 𝑚
̅)2
√∑𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑥𝑖 −𝑥̅ ) .∑𝑖=1(𝑦𝑖 −𝑦
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(5.8)

Table 5.1. The average of distance measures between the original and the perturbed samples of
the biometric and the pill data.

Type of Distance

Type of Data

Type
of
Attack

Euclidean

Manhattan

Chebyshev

Correlation Coefficient

Fingerprint

Iris

Pill

Fingerprint

Iris

Pill

Fingerprint

Iris

Pill

Fingerprint

Iris

Pill

𝑭𝑮𝑺𝑴

0.12

0.01

0.10

0.37

0.08

0.24

0.11

0.05

0.10

0.99

0.50

0.33

𝑱𝑺𝑴𝑨

1.86× 10−4

8.15
×
10−5

6.52
×
10−5

4.88× 10−4

2.20
×
10−4

1.63
×
10−4

8.55× 10−5

3.05
×
10−5

3.26
×
10−5

1.0

0.50

0.33

𝑫𝒆𝒆𝒑𝑭𝒐𝒐𝒍

0.08

0.01

0.05

0.21

0.05

0.11

0.06

0.01

0.04

1.00

0.50

0.33

𝑪𝑾

0.02

0.01

0.05

0.11

0.05

0.11

0.01

0.00
1

0.04

1.00

0.50

0.33

𝑷𝑮𝑫

0.11

0.01

0.10

0.38

0.10

0.28

0.10

0.01

0.10

0.99

0.49

0.31

5.2.3. Noise Training
One of the methods in improving the system performance is addition of noise to the input
data of a neural network when it is under training. It has been shown that training a network with
noise can be realized as a form of regularization according to which an extra term is added to the
error function. However, the term of regularization involves second derivatives of the error
function.
It is not bounded below and can lead to difficulties if used in the direction of a learning algorithm
based on minimization of error. The process is performed based upon mixing the noise segments
with the original training data [296, 303-305]. The types of noise employed in our work are
AWGN, motion blur, reduced contrast enhanced AWGN, and Perlin noise.
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The noisy data helps us learn more information and features that can make the network
more knowledgeable to distinguish the difference between the clean, adversarial, and noisy data.
Specifically, the Perlin noise is a type of gradient noise that has been developed in 1993 with
applications in computer graphics. This noise is capable of providing the natural textures on the
motion pictures. Injecting this noise into the pictures can cause better understanding of the
natural phenomena (i.e. possibly intentional and unintentional perturbations).
The Perlin noise tries to compute a pseudo-random gradient at each of the eight nearest
vertices on the integer cubic lattice with a splined interpolation is done on the data. It has the
capability of determining noise at a point in space through computation of a pseudo-random
gradient [306-308]. Due to these properties along with its simple and easy, many of the attacks
may be modeled using this technique. In fact, the randomness and diversity of noise can be the
reason it can detect samples from unknown and unseen attacks.
5.2.4. Shallow-Deep CNN-Based System Architecture
The authors in [305] proposed a system architecture for diagnosis of breast cancer
according to which the relationships between low energy and recombined images will be
discovered. The architecture is capable of applying full field digital mammography for rendering
“virtual” recombined images. Together with FFDM, a deep convolutional neural network is
trained with the purpose of introducing feature extraction followed by classification models.
In this process, the diagnosis function is performed. In simple words, the shallow CNN
has the duty of “image reconstruction” and the deep CNN has the duty of “feature extraction”.
Considering two parallel paths of: (a) entering images to a shallow CNN for image
reconstruction and giving the output to a deep CNN for feature extraction; and (b) using a deep
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CNN for feature extraction. The features from these paths are combined before determination of
the “benign” and the “cancer” image samples.
We use a similar idea in our work with the goal strengthening detection of adversarial
examples. According to the explanations, we use a deep neural network for detection of
adversarial examples generated by a shallow neural network. A similar concept exists in the
domain of circuit design and testing. In that domain, we have the concept of Razor according to
which the supply voltage is tuned for monitoring the error rate during operation [309].
The error detection provides in-situ monitoring of the actual circuit delay. This technique
relies on a mixture of architectural and circuit level techniques for efficient and effective error
detection and correction of delay path failures. This concept can be practically described as
augmenting each flip-flop with a so-called shadow latch, controlled by a delayed clock. The
shadow latch corrects any error in operation of the main flip-flop since it holds the correct data.
According to this concept, we can call the deep neural network RazorNet.
5.3. Related Work
In this section, the related works are presented. The area of fooling neural
networks is not necessarily limited to images since it can include other types of data such as
words. Accordingly, a method has been proposed by [310] that fools a reading comprehension
system through adding sentences to the ending parts of the paragraphs with utilization of the
crowdsourcing. Another work is random character swaps [311] that breaks the output of neural
machine translation systems. In this regard, they proposed a method for generation of random
character that can swap and utilize the generated input sentences as additional training data for
their models.
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Similarly, a method has been proposed [312] that can generate a large number of input
sentences through replacement of a word with its synonym. The authors in [313-316] showed
having adversarial training can help in holding a great promise for learning robust models. The
authors in [317] presented an application of multi-threading mechanism for minimization of the
training time through rejection of the unnecessary selection of weights.
The main goal in this work is making the neural networks more precise without any
dependency on the input data. A multi-core solution is leveraged in order to choose the best
weights among all parallel-trained networks. They examined their solution for different types of
neural networks (classic, spiking, and convolutional) using sample classification problems. Their
method shows improvement in the training time and efficiency in different tasks. The concepts
from other related domains can be employed in this domain.
In [318], the authors proposed SeqGAN that is a sequence generation framework for
solving the problems of: (a) difficulty to pass the gradient update from the discriminative model
to the generative model. (b) the limitation of discriminative model in assessing partially
generated sequence. This framework models the data generator as a stochastic policy in
reinforcement learning and bypasses the generator differentiation problem by directly performing
gradient policy update.
Leveraging this concept, reinforcement learning can be used in generation of adversarial
examples in our system architecture. Application of image processing technique for noise
removal can be helpful in overcoming the threats of adversarial examples. For example, taking
the architectures for applying multi-frame SR with JPEG2000 compression (working based on a
modified adaptive Wiener filter) [319] and leveraging a computer-aided lung nodule detection
system into the context of adversarial example detection [320].
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[321] Shows an adversarial learning algorithm for supervised classification, specifically
convolutional neural networks. The proposing algorithm has the duty of production of minor
changes to the data distribution defined over positive and negative class labels. This results in
misclassification by the neural network. According to this system, the main goal is manipulation
of the variations of the input data by formulation of a multilayer stochastic game targeting the
classification performance of the network that helps in finding learner decision boundaries.
In this manipulation of data, many of the positive labels turn into negative labels. The
work is further augmented by proposing a network capable of defending against unforeseen
changes in the data. Kwon et al. [322] proposed a multi-targeted adversarial example that is
capable of misclassifying each of the multiple models as each target class along with minimizing
the distance of the original sample.
This type of adversarial data implemented on MNIST dataset can cause 100% attack
success rate. The authors discovered that distortion among each of the target class in multiple
models differ. The distortion information is beneficial for selection of target classes. Through
their analysis, they have realized a trade-off between distortion and model scalability. A
poisoning attack called TensorClog has been proposed in [323] according to which the deep
neural networks are jeopardized.
This attack has three properties of: (a) lowering inference accuracy by training on the
poisoned data leading to reduction of the incentive of abusive data collection. (b) training on the
poisoned data converges to a larger loss that prevents the neural network from learning the
privacy; and (c) this attack regularizes the perturbation for maintaining a high structure
similarity, leading less changes in the actual content.
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Through implementation of this attack on CIFAR-10 dataset, we have an increase in both
converged training loss and test error. The authors in [324] proposed a novel hybrid modular
artificial neural network architecture that is capable of constructing smooth polygonal meshes
from a single depth frame with beforehand knowledge. It has application in depth-based
reconstruction of three-dimensional shape of objects.
The network architecture consisting of separate nodes for recognition of object type and
reconstruction. This allows easier retraining and extension for new types of objects. The network
has been employed in recognition of nine real-world objects using neural networks trained on the
ShapeNetCore dataset. An investigation on the robustness of the representations learned by the
fooled neural network (analyzing the activations of its hidden layers) has been done in [325].
Through this investigation, they tested scoring approaches employed for k-nearest
neighbor classification for distinguishing between correctly classified authentic clean images and
adversarial images. We obtained scores searching only between the very same images employed
for training the network. The system evaluation shows hidden layers activations helps in
revealing wrong classifications due to the presence of adversarial attacks.
A defense mechanism for the vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial examples is
presented in [326]. This mechanism includes a new deep de-noising neural network capable of
removing the perturbations inside the adversarial examples. An ordinary de-noiser suffers from
the amplification effect (which means the gradual growth of noise) leading to misclassification.
The de-noiser from this work is able to handle this problem using a loss function.
The loss function is defined as the difference between the model outputs activated by the
original image and the de-noised image. A new model-training algorithm based on transfer
learning is proposed in this work that can overcome slight image disturbances and making the
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model to get generalized better around the training samples. This defense method in overall is
strong against both white-box or black-box attacks.
Besides its strength, it is extensible to any deep neural network-based model. In addition
to these works, a number of the proposed works in this area are based on detection of adversarial
examples relying on adding an outlier class detection module to the classifier [327]. According
to these methods, the classification model needs to be changed and therefore are not modeldependent.
A detection model has been presented in [304] that operates based on kernel density
estimation and Bayesian neural network uncertainty. A work presented by [296] showed that all
the defense methods can be bypassed. They also mentioned that the same discovery that
adversarial examples are outside of the training distribution. Other types of work in this area are
based on learning network features and adapting them to different domains for the same task
[303].
Similar works are poisoning attacks that have been mainly explored in the context of
binary classification. In a recent work, the vulnerabilities of Capsule Networks to adversarial
attacks (i.e. targeted and untargeted, black and white box, and individual universal) are studied.
It is shown that these attacks when applied to the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark
are capable of misleading the Capsule Networks [328].
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5.4. Proposed System and Methodology

Attack Phase

Convolution Layer

Convolution Layer

Flatten Layer

Fully Connected Layer

Fully Connected Layer

Dense Block 1

Dense Block 2

Dense Block 3

Pooling Layer

Maximum Pooling Layer

Pooling Layer

Maximum Pooling Layer

Convolution
Layer

Convolution Layer

Pooling Layer

Convolution Layer

Convolution
Layer

Dataset of Adversarial Data Samples

Convolution
Layer

Dataset of Clean Data Samples

Linear

Attacking Engine for
Adversarial Samples
(FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool, CW, and PGD)

Detection of
Adversarial Samples

Convolutional Neural Network
Defense Phase

Dataset of Noisy Data Samples
(AWGN + ReducedContrastAWGN + Perlin + MotionBlur)

Weights from ImageNet

Figure 5.5. The architecture of our system (G+D Net) for detecting adversarial examples.
In this section, we propose a system for detection of adversarial samples based on two
main ideas of: (a) deep-shallow convolutional neural network; and (b) transfer learning.
According to this system, the architecture includes two parts of shallow convolutional neural
network and deep convolutional neural network. The idea of shallow-deep CNN has been
proposed in [305] for the application of improved breast cancer diagnosis.
The biological processes according to which a variation of multilayer perception is
designed to require minimal preprocessing have inspired the shallow neural network. The deep
neural network or RazorNet has the capability of learning more features from data. Therefore,
the shallow neural network is used to preprocess data and the deep neural network is used to
extract more information from data.
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In our system, the purpose is generating adversarial examples from a shallow neural
network. The generation of adversarial examples is called preprocessing data. The generated
adversarial samples along with clean data as well as the noisy data samples will be given to deep
CNN for detecting malicious activities. The deep neural network has the duty of understanding
those adversarial data. The architecture of our system is shown in Figure 5.5.
This architecture consists of a generator (𝑓𝑔𝑒𝑛 ) and a detector (𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑡 ). 𝑓𝑔𝑒𝑛 has the duty of
generating data with adversarial features and gets normal data as its input. 𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑡 has the duty of
detecting new data with adversarial features and gets normal data (𝑋𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 , 𝑌𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 ), adversarial
data (𝑋𝐴𝑑𝑣 , 𝑌𝐴𝑑𝑣 ), and noisy data (𝑋𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑦 , 𝑌𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑦 ) as its inputs. So, we have hybrid training set for
detector. This explanation can be formulated as:
𝐷𝐻𝑇𝑆 = {(𝑋𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 , 𝑌𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚 ), (𝑋𝐴𝑑𝑣 , 𝑌𝐴𝑑𝑣 ), (𝑋𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑦 , 𝑌𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑦 )}

(5.9)

They have different parameters and layers for feature extraction and training in a way
𝑓𝑑𝑒𝑡 operates stronger than 𝑓𝑔𝑒𝑛 . The detected adversarial data can be fed back to the deep neural
network for retraining that cause better classification accuracy. Based on the concept of Razor
flip-flop discussed earlier, we can define the deep neural network as Razor neural network,
which has the function of detecting the errors generated by the shallow neural network.
The original biometric data as well as the pill images are given to the shallow neural
network. The adversarial images generated from this network along with the dataset of clean
data, adversarial data, and noisy data samples are input to deep CNN for detection of malicious
patterns. The elements in the architecture of shallow neural network are in the following order:
a. Two-dimensional convolution with the filter size of 64 and kernel size of 64.
b. Two-dimensional convolution with the filter size of 64, padding of the same, and
activation of the ReLU.
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c. The two-dimensional max pooling with pooling size of [2,2] and stride of 2.
d. Two-dimensional convolution with the filter size of 64 and kernel size of 64.
e. Two-dimensional convolution with the filter size of 64, padding of the same, and
activation of the ReLU.
f. The two-dimensional max pooling with pooling size of [2,2] and stride of 2.
g. Flatten layer.
h. Two fully connected layers.
i. A dense layer with four units and one unit for the biometric data (including the left the
right iris and fingerprint data samples) and the pill image data respectively.
The deep convolutional neural network is DensetNet with the architecture of a
convolution layer, a dense block 1, a convolution layer, a pooling layer, a dense block 2, a
convolution layer, a pooling layer, a dense block 3, a pooling layer, and a linear layer. These
architectures can be seen in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2. The architectures of shallow neural network and deep neural network used in our
system of adversarial detection.

Shallow Neural Network

Deep Neural Network

𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐯𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 𝐅𝐢𝐥𝐭𝐞𝐫 = 𝟔𝟒; 𝐊𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐥
= [𝟑, 𝟑]; 𝐒𝐚𝐦𝐞 𝐏𝐚𝐝𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠

Convolution: 7 × 7; Stride = 2

𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐯𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 𝐅𝐢𝐥𝐭𝐞𝐫 = 𝟔𝟒; 𝐊𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐥
= [𝟑, 𝟑]; 𝐒𝐚𝐦𝐞 𝐏𝐚𝐝𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠

Pooling Layer = 3 × 3; Stride = 2

𝐏𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐒𝐢𝐝𝐞 = [𝟐, 𝟐]; 𝐒𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐝𝐞 = 𝟐

Dense Block (1) =
1 × 1 Conv
[
] ×6
3 × 3 Conv

𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐯𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 𝐅𝐢𝐥𝐭𝐞𝐫 = 𝟏𝟐𝟖; 𝐊𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐥
= [𝟑, 𝟑]; 𝐒𝐚𝐦𝐞 𝐏𝐚𝐝𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠

1 × 1 Convolution
Pooling Layer = 2 × 2; Stride = 2

𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐯𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 𝐅𝐢𝐥𝐭𝐞𝐫 = 𝟏𝟐𝟖; 𝐊𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐥
= [𝟑, 𝟑]; 𝐒𝐚𝐦𝐞 𝐏𝐚𝐝𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠

Dense Block (2)
1 × 1 Conv
= [
]
3 × 3 Conv
× 12

𝐌𝐚𝐱 𝐏𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐠; 𝐏𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞 [𝟐, 𝟐]

1 × 1 Convolution

Flatten Layer

Pooling Layer = 2 × 2; Stride = 2

Fully Connected Layer 2

Dense Block (3) =
1 × 1 Conv
[
] × 32
3 × 3 Conv
1 × 1 Convolution

Dense Units = 1/4

Pooling Layer = 2 × 2; Stride = 2

Fully Connected Layer 1

Dense Block (4) =
1 × 1 Conv
[
] × 32
3 × 3 Conv
Pooling Layer = 7 × 7

Softmax

Softmax

The attacks used in this system are FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool, CW, and PGD. These
attacks try to fool the network with the purpose of causing accuracy drop. The noisy data to be
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used in this system are: (a) AWGN, Reduced Contrast version of AWGN, and Motionblur of the
noisy Bangla handwritten digit dataset [329]; (b) added Perlin noise to the CIFAR-10 and
CASIA. The generated samples from this network will construct the dataset of adversarial data
samples.
These samples along with the noisy samples will be used to retrain the deep neural
network. Our number of samples of each type of data can be described as 6664 for the original
biometric data (including iris and fingerprint). The ratios of training and testing are 0.8 and 0.2
for this dataset. From the training part of the dataset, a ratio of 0.1 is chosen for validation part of
the training. The attacked version of this dataset by the well-known attacks of FGSM, JSMA,
DeepFool, CW, and PGD includes 33,320 number of image samples.
The pharmaceutical dataset specifically for pill image data is divided to the training and
the testing records, each containing 7,291 and 800 number of images respectively. The attacked
version of these records include 36,455 and 4,000 respectively. Our noisy Bangla handwritten
digit dataset has 197,889 frames for each type of noise, including AWGN, Motion Blur, and
reduced contrast and AWGN. Our Perlin dataset comprises 100,000 number of items (including
both CIFAR-10 and CASIA data samples).
The retrained network will be able to detect the adversarial examples. The system can be
set adaptive in order to adjust its security level for: (a) clean data; (b) adversarial data; (c) noisy
data; and (d) altogether in different phases in order to adjust itself with respect to the strength of
the fooling attacks. In other words, only one case of defense is used if the attack is not strong
enough. On the other hand, all cases of the attack can be used if the attack is strong enough to
fool the neural network. The algorithm and the diagram of this system is shown in Algorithm
5.1.
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Algorithm 5.1. The protocol and overall scheme of the system of shallow-deep neural
network architecture, adversarial training, and transfer learning in detection of adversarial
perturbations.
Input:
X: Dataset of clean data samples.
Y: Dataset of noisy data samples (Y).
W: Weights from Imagenet.
SM: Shallow neural network model (SM).
DM: Deep neural network model (DM).
Output: Detection of adversarial samples.
01: initialize list Adversarial Dataset;
02: Train SM on 𝐗 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐢𝐧 ;
03: for each Sample in 𝐗 do
04:
Adversarial Sample  Adversarial Sample Generator (Sample, Trained SM);
05:
Append Adversarial Sample to Adversarial Dataset;
06: Train DM on 𝐗 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐢𝐧 , 𝐘𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐢𝐧 , and 𝐀𝐝𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐭 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐢𝐧 along with transferring
weights of W;
07: for each Sample in 𝐀𝐝𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐭 do
08:
Sample Type  Adversarial Sample Detector (Sample, Trained DM);
09:
return Sample Type;
5.5. Results
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our architectural model, we used two datasets of
CASIA biometric data and 1k Pharmaceutical Pill Image Dataset [330-332]. The real biometric
data are chosen from the biometric dataset and all images of the pill image dataset are used as the
clean data. For all these data, their adversarial versions are generated using the attacking engine
(which includes FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool, CW, and PGD attack functions).
Before inputting the adversarial data to the deep neural network, we provide ImageNet
weights to the network. This provides an initial knowledge to the network. Besides the
adversarial data, the noisy data (AWGN, motion blur, reduced AWGN, and Perlin) are given to
the neural network to further augment its understanding and make it capable of distinguishing the
clean, adversarial, and noisy data.
In fact, the network is retrained in this step due to the given weights to the network. The
images are all resized with the shape of 32 × 32 × 3 (𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ × ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 × 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙) RGB
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image. The library used in the implementation of our system is Keras machine learning library.
Also, we used Scikit-learn for getting the performance parameters.
The deep neural network is pre-trained with ImageNet weights and retrained on the
adversarial and the noisy data using transfer-learning technique [126]. The retraining has been
done for five epochs and we shuffled the data. The optimizer employed in our experiment is
stochastic gradient descent [333]. The learning rate is 0.01, the decay is10−6, and the momentum
is 0.9. We can see training setting of the deep neural network in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3. The training parameters of the deep classifier.
Parameters

Values
Adversarial Retraining and Noise
Retraining
Stochastic Gradient Descent
0.01
10−6
0.9

Training Method
Optimization Method
Learning Rate
Decay
Momentum

According to the simulation results on the biometric data, the system is capable of
detecting the adversarial data with 80.65% accuracy when the adversarial data are given into the
network and it goes up to 93.4% when both adversarial data and clean data are given into the
network. For the pill image data, the system accuracy is improved from 34.55% to 96.03% when
the adversarial data is input to the network, while from 96.03% to 98.20% when the adversarial
data as well as the noisy data are input to the network.
In order to make sure that the results are generalizable, we performed five rounds of
simulation for each of the experiments. According to the simulation results, the system performs
completely the same in the five runs of every experiment that shows the reliability of the results.
Applying Friedman test on the system outputs acknowledge this statement.
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We use the Friedman test for analyzing three or more repeated measurements of ordinal
data [334]. No result is presented for this test in here for abbreviation. Having this amount of
improvement in the results is not out of sight due to presence of multiple effective components
(i.e. adversarial training, noise training, transfer learning, and stronger detection network) in our
system. Another reason for quality of our system is its excellent operation on the datasets from
two different domains.
In fact, there is no similarity between biometric and pill image data. Having high
performance on these un-related datasets proves the strength and generalizability of our defense
strategy. Meanwhile, the defense system is extensible to other types of data based on the
discussion that was provided earlier regarding independency of iris, fingerprint, and pill image
data on each other.
The results from examining our system along with other systems for comparison are
shown in Table 5.4. The proposed system can be further improved when we retrain the neural
network using the existing adversarial data. Also, one can always obtain the deep neural network
when a new attack is capable of breaking the shallow neural network such as the obfuscated
gradient attack, one pixel attack, and universal perturbation attack.
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Table 5.4. The results of our system in detecting adversarial examples (samples).

Dataset

System
Detection
Accuracy
on Clean
Data

System
Detection
Accuracy on
Attacked
Data Without
Defense

CASIA
Dataset –
Images of Iris
and
Fingerprint
Data

90.58%

Pillbox
Dataset –
Images of Pill

99.92%

34.55%

CIFAR
MNIST
CIFAR

92%
N/A
N/A

MNIST

88%

[337] -VGG

MNIST

89%

[337] –
ResNet

CIFAR

85%

[337] -VGG

CIFAR

82%

10%
19.39%
8.57%
0% (Strongest
Attack)
36%
(Strongest
Attack)
7% (Strongest
Attack)
37%
(Strongest
Attack)

Ours –
Biometric
Dataset
Ours –
Pillbox
Image
Dataset
[335]
[336]
[336]
[337] –
ResNet

1.31%

System Detection Accuracy
on Attacked Data

Clean Data +
Adversarial
Data

Clean Data +
Adversarial
Data + Noisy
Data

80.65%

93.4%

96.03%

98.20%
86%
75.95%
71.38%

83% (Strongest Attack)
85% (Strongest Attack)
71% (Strongest Attack)
80% (Strongest Attack)

5.6. Discussion
In this section, the future directions for this project are discussed. The opportunities for
improving this system can be exploited from the following cases:
a) Emergence of new threats for fooling neural network can break this system, obfuscated
gradient or one-pixel attack. In fact, when a new type of attack is introduced, this system
may not be effective due to lack of knowledge for that specific adversarial data. We can
tackle this issue by periodic updating the RazorNet.
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b) Considering only one adversarial data generator network (𝒇𝒈𝒆𝒏 ) for generation of
adversarial samples. This is not sufficient in real-world applications and it is more potent
to include diverse type of network models. It means including multiple (N) adversarial
data generator networks with different architecture in our system. Figure 5.6 shows the
system of NG+D Net.
c) For higher level of extensibility of our system, it is beneficial to engage datasets from
different domains and pre-train the detector with diverse types of weights.
d) In order to increase the knowledgeability of our detector, various types of noise and
perturbations can be injected to the selected datasets and perform noise training on the DNet. Another possibility for extending this work is employing advanced image processing
methods for noise removal into our system architecture to overcome the threats of
adversarial examples, especially the ones belonging to unknown and unseen attacks.
e) A number of the emerging recognition system architectures can be examined in the
domain of securing neural networks, namely bilinear CNN [338], gated Siamese CNN
architecture [339], HyperFace [340], and EndoNet [341].
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Attack Phase

Attacking Engine for
Adversarial Samples
(Obfuscated Gradient, One-Pixel,
Universal Perturbation, and etc.)

Dataset of Clean Data Samples

G-Net 1

G-Net 4

G-Net 3

G-Net 2

G-Net 5

G-Net 6

G-Net 7

G-Net 8

Linear

Dense Block 3

Pooling Layer

Pooling Layer

Dense Block 2

Convolution
Layer

Pooling Layer

Dense Block 1

Convolution
Layer

Convolution
Layer

D-Net
Datasets of Adversarial Data Samples

Detection of
Adversarial Samples

Convolutional Neural Network
Defense Phase

Dataset of Noisy Data Samples
(AWGN + ReducedContrastAWGN + Perlin + MotionBlur)

Weights from ImageNet

Figure 5.6. The diagram of NG+D Net system for detecting adversarial examples.
5.7. Conclusions
In this work, we propose a defense system called ShallowDeepNet (or G+D Net) that is
able to resist in confronting the adversarial attacks. The proposed system includes a shallow
neural network and a deep neural network. The shallow neural network is responsible for
executing the data preprocessing tasks, while the deep neural network (known as RazorNet)
needs to perform the main data processing. The data preprocessing is defined as the generation of
the adversarial examples (or error-contained data). It is done through fooling a shallow neural
network coupled with an attacking engine that includes certain well-known attacks, namely
FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool, CW, and PGD.
The generated adversarial examples from this engine are used in retraining the pre-trained
RazorNet. Inclusion of multiple elements into our system, namely detector neural network,
transfer learning, adversarial training, and noise training makes this system strong and robust
enough to recognize and detect clean and malicious data from different domains. The simulation
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results from running the biometric (fingerprint and iris) and the pill image data on this system
proves that it is able to detect the malicious versions of these data with the accuracy of 93.4%
and 98.20% respectively.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we conclude this dissertation by summarizing our key contributions and
discussing our key finding and possible future works. In overall, we accomplished four different
contributions included in two categories of Hardware Security and Artificial Intelligence Security.
Here is the summary of discussions for these contributions:
1. Security of Analog to Digital Converter: We found that this hardware element can be a
target of attacks. Various types of hardware Trojans for two different ADCs namely, SAR
ADC and Delta-Sigma ADC are introduced. The corresponding defenses are presented as
well. All the hardware elements are implemented using an emerging transistor technology
named TFET that evaluates the energy efficiency of this device. It is shown that the
designed Trojans are capable of damading the functionality and degrading the performance
of these ADCs significantly. The defense methods have the duty of correcting the
functionality of these hardware elements using software or hardware-based means. There
are still many possible threats for analog and mixed-signal integrated circuits including the
ADCs that need to be discovered.
2. Botnet Detection: We propose a deep learning-based botnet detection system that has the
functionality of transforming the network traffic data into images and detecting botnet type
of data from the input images. A deep convolutional neural network was used for detection
and classification of the normal and the botnet traffic data. We engaged the idea of
transferring knowledge for the sake of improving the effectiveness of classification.
Meanwhile, the image representation of network data opens up new opportunities for the
finding anomalies in the security context discovered in this work. This area has many
opportunities and challenges that need to be discovered. Other types of data and formats
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can be examined for transformation and other deep learning methods should be evaluated
in order to develop new and more effective methods for this area.
3. Biometric Recognition System: A system of recognizing biometric data is very
demanding nowadays especially due to their applications in sensitive and security products.
We introduced a biometric recognition system with engaging different technologies
including cloud computing, transfer learning, and homomorphic encryption. Our proposing
system operates on two different types of biometric data namely, fingerprint and iris. The
system is also capable of detecting true and fake data. The results show our system is strong
in performing verifications of the registered users. The system is capable of getting
extended by examming different technologies and other types of biometric data. Having a
secure biometric recognition system is a requirement for the future of IoT devices.
4. Adversarial Examples Detection: One of the challenges facing AI systems is different
types of attacks launching on these systems. One of capable attacks in bypassing AI
systems is adversarial examples that can fool these systems for wrong classification. We
propose a novel system for detection of these attacks according to which two neural
networks with different architecture are incorporated. One of them is a shallow neural
network that has the duty of preprocessing data by generating adversarial examples. The
other neural network is deep in layers and has the duty of main processing by being trained
on different sources of data including, the generated adversarial examples, the clean
samples, and noisy samples. The transfer learning is applied on the deep neural network to
further improve its knowledge. The results demonstrated the effectiveness of our system in
detecting and classifying normal and malicious data. This type of system through
assembling multiple architectural and software elements has the characterisrics being
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further researched. Different types of data from multiple domains can be incorporated as
well in order to examine the extensibility of the systems.
In summary, this dissertation presents four important contributions related to the areas of
Hardware Security and AI Security, including Security of ADC, botnet detection, biometric
recognition system, and adversarial examples detection. These areas are receiving noticebale
attentions from academia, industry, and military organizations. Therefore, more research needs
to be done in design and development of the attacks and the defenses for hardware and AI
systems.
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